Daniel Schulthess

Is the classical model of action, damage, and responsibility, which is based on the idea that it is always possible to individuate the direct or indirect damages resulting from a certain individual or collective action, still valid in the case of the environmental consequences of industrial production and mass consumption? We argue that the absence of a classical plaintiff in these cases implies that we have to conceive of the consequences of our individual actions (as consumers of industrial goods for example) in a new manner: the moral and juridical evaluation of our actions and the assessment of individual responsibility is no more bound to a clearly identifiable damage.

The author, referring in particular to Jonas Cohn’s Theorie der Dialektik, interprets Hegel’s dialectic in the light of the Aristotelian principle of the priority of actuality over potentiality. The principle finds application especially in the field of the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy, which is thought from the point of view of Absolute Knowledge as actuality of the Spirit. In this regard the main issue is to understand the nature of the limitations that Spirit encounters on the way of the actualization of its potentialities. The most extreme form of limitation is contradiction, which historically is given in the form of conflict between philosophical doctrines. Some philosophers, like Kant, sees limitation as intrinsic to cognitive activity. According to Hegel, the thought of limitation is contradictory, since it presupposes the thought of what lies beyond the limit.

Although our moral intuitions lead us to distinguish, with regard to euthanasia, between the omission to treat a terminal patient and the act of actively kill him, consequentialists deny that there is such a distinction. The article considers a logico-mathemtical difficulty following from the consequentialist approach to moral problems, arguing thus for the necessity to take into consideration also other philosophical resources to deal with the issue of euthanasia. Indeed, as soon as one considers a population varying both in its composition and in its size as the whole in respect to which the consequences of an action have to be assessed, the problem arises that there are many possible optima, so that the assessment is difficult or even impossible.

The article compares Descartes’ and Leibniz’ use of the concept of a machine. For Descartes, the activity of the engineers rises to become the model for the scientific enterprise: one proceeds from the simple and the familiar to explain the complex. In this way one can escape the sheer astonishment about the complexity of the machines and their effects. This mechanical model is extended also to the explanation of the living beings. Also Leibniz regards living beings as machines. The difference between living and inanimate machines is that in the case of the former their parts are machine-like all the way down, to the infinite. Another peculiarity of the living machines is their infinite convolution that allows them to maintain their individual identity over time. The author also points to the self-similar character of the folds.

Although, according to the Austrian school, economic competition, since it pushes entrepreneurs to innovations that benefit not only themselves but consumers as well, is supposed to lead to the public good, it is essential to consider also the possibility of cartel formation. In this case a mechanism is set up whereby the prices of goods and services are kept artificially high. The article shows that it is the same entrepreneurial spirit celebrated by the Austrian school that makes that in certain situations, whose logic can be analyzed according to the model of the prisoner’s dilemma, companies agree to keep prices high. The conclusion is that the public good can only be realized through institutional interventions with both legal and ethical dimensions.

Thomas Reid’s influence on continental and especially on French philosophy at the beginning of the 19th century has to be considered against the background of the crisis of the philosophical project of the moderns. This project, which is intimately related to the rise of the modern scientific world image, has one of its major tenets in the so called “theory of ideas” introduced by Descartes and developed further by Locke. By emphasizing the role of our active faculties in the formulation of judgements, Reid rejects this theory. One of the consequences of this rejection is the distinction Reid makes between sensations, which are passive, and perceptions, which are active. Maine de Biran picks up Reid’s emphasis on our active powers but reinterprets it on the light of his theory of the “primitive fact” that external objects resist our efforts to move them, thus providing a unifying principle for Reid’s “principles of common sense”.

The article develops the conception that Leibniz has of organisms as machines of a particular type, differing from artificial machines because 1. all the parts of an organic machine are in turn composed by smaller machines and thus to infinity; and 2. the maintenance of the individual identity in living machines is provided by the fact that they have folds going to infinity which can unfold and fold back, thus allowing infinite transformations of the body. The author then discusses these two theses. With respect to thesis 1 the question is how the idea that the artificial machines have parts which are not in their turn machines is compatible with the mechanistic worldview hold by Leibniz. With respect to thesis 2 the author emphasizes the fact that Leibniz's conception of the infinite convolution of the organic machines seems to anticipate several points in the mathematics of fractal curves.

Our aim is to show how the well-known tale of Charles Perrault, Le Petit Poucet, contains the illustration of two principles of rational choice in a situation of uncertainty, the maximin ("to limit the breakage") and the maximax ("to target the best"). It builds in a targeted and economical way highly fluctuating situations which make inapplicable the first while showing the virtualities of the second principle. As such, this children's story has a new reading, which is not without connection to the problem of the decisions of migrants in our troubled world.

The causal texture of environmental problems is very different from the causal aspects which are relevant in other cases of moral or legal significance. The author suggest to take account of this in environmental matters. He takes the various instruments of environmental policy Under scrutiny: regulations, taxes and labels. He argues that labels have strong advantages over the two others instruments: they somehow map the texture of environmental problems and have interesting motivational properties.

The article confronts one of the ἄποpοι λόγοι discussed in ancient Eristic-Stoic logic: the famous “cuckold” (κερατίνης), where an interrogator has his respondent to admit to have been or still be cuckolded. The source of the problem is a principle of dialectics related to the principle of the excluded-middle according to which a question admits only a positive or a negative answer. To the question “Have you ceased to be cuckolded?” both answers seem to presuppose that the respondent has been cuckolded. To solve the problem one can either deny the dialectical principle of the excluded-middle or (as Stoic logic does) introduce the idea that negation refers not simply to the predicate (as in Aristotelian logic) but to the entire proposition (by denying the existence of the subject, for example).

The article reconstructs Leibniz’s theory of the relation between perceptions and reality. Leibniz’s position is different both from that of Descartes, according to whom the perceptions of the senses, unlike those of the mind, are never perceptions of reality, and from that of Locke, according to whom only the perceptions of primary qualities have a resemblance to reality, whereas secondary qualities do not correspond to anything real. The author shows that, according to Leibniz, the expressive link between perception and reality can be pursued in both directions: the analysis of ordinary perception allows us, on the one hand, to arrive at distinct perceptions of reality; on the other hand, Leibniz shows against Locke that even secondary qualities express a certain reality, namely that of the constitution of our body and of our sensory apparatus.

Starting from the recognition of the difficulty of establishing peace and the observation that several attempts to terminate conflicts end in failure, the author puts forward the argument that peace is a state that is essentially a by-product, according to the definition given by Jon Elster in his homonymous paper of 1981. Such states are characterized by the fact that they can only be brought about by actions aimed at other ends, i.e. non-intentionally. According to the author it is in the light of this notion that we must consider the strategies implemented by the pacifying power in a so-called pacification war. In fact, what follows from such a war is rarely peace. The question arises to know how much the pacifying power is conscious of this fact and what follows from it both politically and morally.

The article takes into consideration the opposition between Lifeworld and world of science in the analytic tradition (going back to Descartes and Locke) on the one hand, and in continental authors such as Bergson, Husserl and Heidegger on the other. The two approaches aim at a surpassing of the opposition between Lifeworld and world of science, by different strategies that the author eviscerates. In the last part of the article the author develops a personal theory of the relationship between Lifeworld and world of science: in the wake of the analytic tradition, he denies to the lived world a transcendental autonomy that could ground science; it is rather science that, starting from the positional nature of our relation to the world, should account for our experiences. At the same time the author stresses the limits of à la Quine naturalism in accommodating intentionality and “self-transcendence” (T. Nagel).

The article proposes an interpretation of the role of practical reason in Hume. The starting point is the distinction between strong practical reason and weak practical reason. The distinction concerns the assignment of values to states of affairs: strong practical reason is itself involved in this assignment of values, whereas weak practical reason only deliberates on the basis of given assignments. According to the author of the article Hume, showing how our choices are produced from a mechanics of passions, refutes not only strong but also weak practical reason. In the last part of the article the author, relying on the distinction that Hume makes between calm and violent passions, attempts to defend a rationalist conception of the deliberative dynamic, which reserves for reason an arbiter role on the passions.

The article considers the questions posed by environmental ethics in the light of the work of Hans Jonas, especially his work Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Jonas centers his ethic on the concept of responsibility, which finds its expression in the categorical imperative that enjoins us to take into account the future effects of our actions. The specification of this imperative generates a series of problems: 1) given that the specification rests on complex causal chains, it has an hypothetical character; 2) the effects that are the object of imperatives are external to our intentions (externality); 3) the complexity of the causal chains involved generates threshold effects; 4) the complexity of the causal chains prevents us from having a complete knowledge of it. The author then considers the possibilities and limits of Jonas' ethics to solve these problems.

The article deals with the issue of public items (objects, processes, events) in the philosophy of Leibniz. Starting from the famous passage of the Monadology which illustrates his conception of the substance by the image of a city perceived from different perspectives, the author shows how Leibniz conceives the public character of certain items, i.e. the reality of the phenomena that express them, not only in disagreement with the causal model, according to which public items would be the causal source of shared perceptions, but in disagreement even with the correspondence model, according to which shared perceptions would correspond to external objects. The key to understand the position of Leibniz is rather to look at his concept of the compossible, which makes it possible to explain the congruence between shared perceptions without having to resort to the concept of correspondence.

Starting from an anecdote reported by Ernst Mach in the Analysis of Sensations, the author shows how the distinction between intentionality de re and intentionality de se can contribute to solving the individuation problem, at least for those individuals who are capable of self-referentiality. Intentionality is expressed linguistically in the form of the oratio obliqua, in the context of which the subordinate can be false even when the whole is true. The analysis of the conditions of falsity of the subordinate tells us that this can be false either because the predicate does not fit to the subject or by a failure of reference, conceived according to the descriptive theory of reference. The intentionality de se is peculiar precisely by the fact that in this case the reference cannot fail and uniquely individuates the haecceitas of the intentional subject.

The article proposes a comparison between certain aspects of Samuel Pufendorf's (1632-1694) conception of natural law and certain aspects of John Searle's social ontology. As in Pufendorf the entia moralia are superimposed on the entia physica, of which they constitute modes that ground systems of norms (natural or positive), so in Searle the institutional facts that are created by certain speech acts of the performative type are superimposed on the physical facts. The difference between Pufendorf and Searle is that the latter understands all institutional facts as extrinsic to the physical facts (as a consequence of the peculiarity of their self-referentiality). For Pufendorf, on the other hand, moral modes are intrinsic to certain entia physica endowed with reason and will, whereas certain legal relations, like property, are extrinsic.

The article compares David Humes’ and John Searle’s positions concerning the relation between descriptive and evaluative statements. Although the two positions seem to be just opposite in that Hume denies the derivability of the ought from the is, while Seale accepts it, the author shows that Hume and Searle have many similarities, for for both obligations rely upon the institution of promising. The difference is that for Hume the speech act of promising as such does not have intrinsic evaluative impact. Only in the civil state can the calm passions emerge which give to the motivation to act its ought-character. For Searle, on the contrary, the evaluative character is intrinsically linked to the speech act of promising, so that it becomes possible to derive the ought from the is. At the end the question of the relation between institutional and moral institutions is addressed.

Among the salient aspects of laughter; I retain its aptitude to administer a kind of punishment – albeit of a relatively mild character. Henri Bergson did not hesitate to adopt for himself the traditional formula that "laughter chastises the ways of life" (Laughter, I.2). I maintain that laughter, seen under this angle, simultaneously conveys an evaluation (commonly a depreciative one) and an immediately implemented punishment. This twofold nature makes of laughter a very specific kind of behavior. The starting point of our approach is the following: as human behavior generally, laughter is itself susceptible of an evaluation. It is of the kind that can be applied to acts of evaluation, and also of the kind that may be applied to punishments. Under the light of this second-order evaluation, laughter may be considered as appropriate or not, as acceptable or not, as deserved or not. This depends principally on the object of laughter. I try to describe some of the norms that are relevant at this second-order level. I also expect such norms to extend their relevance to humor, insofar as it sets out to bring about laughter. The norms that appear at this second-order level (mostly restrictive norms) have a strong social and contextual character. We may describe them without recognizing them as binding. Nevertheless, they do not lack an authority of their own. This is not to say that they are above criticism. There is much to say about humor in ethical and juridical terms. I describe summarily some conflicts of norms that may appear at this second-order level, and claim that there is a dialectical arrangement that best permits to understand how these norms work together.

The article deals with Kierkegaard's conception of the comic and the role it plays in his thought. The background against which the issue must be tackled is Kierkegaard's critique of modernity: according to Kierkegaard, modernity is characterized by its objectifying tendencies, to which we must oppose the rediscovery of interiority. These two registers correspond to two different linguistic regimes: objectivity to direct communication, interiority to indirect communication. The latter can express itself in the form of the incongruity that grounds the comic, for example when an interlocutor answers a rhetorical question. Such an answer cannot be apprehended literally (objectively) but only by an internal exercise. In the last part of the article the author highlights the different functions that have irony and humour in Kierkegaard’s conception of the stages of existence.

The article deals with the role of questions in the process of acquiring knowledge. Starting from the classical definition of knowledge as true and justified opinion, the author shows how the justification of our opinions is based on an epistemic practice in which questions play a fundamental role. Before knowledge we have the stages of ignorance and uncertainty. The latter shows a disjunctive structure that is similar to that of questions. In order for questions to be asked a dimension of libido sciendi or at least a wish to know is necessary. The author concludes, relying on Johannes Daubert, with considerations on questioned states of affairs (Fragverhalte) that can generate knowledge in the form of known states of affairs (Erkenntnisverhalte).

The authors begins with the observation that jokes can have a different moral import: some may even be edifying. Is humor therefore to be integrated into an overall moral perspective? One of the leading philosophers of the 19th century, S. Kierkegaard, pleaded for such an integration. The best way to understand why he took such a stand is to articulate the edifying jokes - or rather the humor that underlies them - in terms of Kierkegaard's notion of indirect communication. However, this pushes the problem one step further: the main challange being to understand why indirect communication should be expected to have a positive moral import.

Conference Proceedings (ASPLF Conference “Le Beau” in Iaşi, Romania, August 23-27, 2016). Sections: 1. Le beau dans l'histoire de la philosophie; 2. Le beau à travers les cultures; 3. Beauté de la pensée et beauté du langage; 4. Ontologie et métaphysique du beau; 5. Le beau dans la nature et dans la société; 6. Beauté, éthique, politique; 7. Les catégories esthétiques; 8. L'esthétique et la vie quotidienne; 9. Renouvellement et perspectives de l'esthétique. Conference sections: 1. The Beautiful in the History of Philosophy; 2. The Beautiful across Cultures; 3. Beauty in Thought and Beauty in Language; 4. Ontology and Metaphysics of the Beautiful; 5. The Beautiful in Nature and in Society; 6. Beauty, Ethics, Politics; 7. Aesthetic Categories; 8. Aesthetics and Everyday-Life; 9. New Perspectives in Aesthetics.

The article proposes a comparison between the “retrograde” conception that Bergson has of truth and his atypical interpretation of the concept of possibility. These conceptions are developed in two articles collected in La pensée et le mouvant. The “retrograde” conception of truth starts from the observation of the temporal gap between an event and the formulation of the judgment that relates it and finds its condition of truth in it. The retrograde movement consists in putting aside the temporality proper to the judgment and to “eternalize” it, so that the truth precedes the event. With respects to the possible Bergson has a similar conception: the events that are realized in the present are conceived by language as realization of previous possibilities. According to Bergson, language has thus the “magic power” of influencing the past retroactively.

The article deals with the aesthetic dimension of humour. The author starts with Hannah Arendt’s distinction between labour as a set of tasks necessary for the reproduction of biological life and praxis as an expression of freedom. In the same way the humour would be detached from the “working communication” of everyday life. Humour represents a “break” with ordinary modes of communication. This is done through “transpositions”, which can take the form of objectual transpositions (which play on the equivocal references of a term), verbal transpositions (which contrast the uttered hypertext with a more usual hypotext; self-deprecation is a special case of verbal transposition) or metacognitive transpositions (like the “lapalissade”). The aesthetic value of humour is increased by the simplicity of the means used to obtain the contrast.

The author gives an account of how a set of themes that we nowadays call metaethics contributes to shaping Nietzsche’s approach to morality. Initially, moral judgement, or value judgement, in order to be acceptable for the philosopher, should be similar to a judgement made in the field of natural sciences. The impossibility of moral judgement to satisfy such a requirement precipitates the loss of morality, at least in Nietzsche’s “first way” (in Human too Human). The position thus joined comes with a great disadvantage: it removes action. Faced with such a disadvantage, Nietzsche is forced to change his way of understanding the nature of moral judgement. At this point, in his “second way”, he embarks in experiments engaging a completely different approach to moral judgement. It is as such that he becomes almost a “metaethician”, while ultimately leaving the status of moral judgement in indecision.

The article deals with the question of the relationship between physical modes and moral modes in Samuel Pufendorf’s theory of natural law. By distinguishing these two kinds of modes (which are both modes of natural substances) Pufendorf anticipates the “law of Hume”, according to which the is and the ought are incommensurable. According to Pufendorf, Grotius and Hobbes’ conception of the state of nature is at fault because these authors make natural law a fact that would not be accompanied by imposition and from which deontological notions would thus flow in a natural way. According to Pufendorf, on the contrary, deontological modes go hand in hand with the moral modes which are attached to certain natural substances only because of a divine imposition which wanted to make man a naturally sociable being.

The article reconstructs the diffusion of the ideas of the Scottish philosophical school (Reid, Smith, Stewart) in France in the early nineteenth century and the role played by the Geneva philosopher Pierre Prevost. Prevost emphasizes the originality of the Scottish school compared with the French and German school in his writing “Reflections after my translation of the posthumous works of Adam Smith” of 1797. From at least 1792 already Prevost had begun a correspondence with Dugald Stewart, which lasted until the death of the latter in 1828. About twenty letters of Stewart to Prevost are preserved in Geneva. Through the mediation of Prevost the Scottish Enlighteners influenced the development of French philosophy from Ideology towards Eclecticism (Degérando, Pictet, Royer-Collard, Cousin).