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839Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression DistinctionIn Tibor Solymosi & John Shook (eds.), Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism: Understanding Brains at Work in the World, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 140-161. 2014.
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812IntentionalityIn Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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782Watsuji, Intentionality, and PsychopathologyPhilosophy East and West 70 (3): 757-780. 2020.Despite increasing interest in the work of Tetsuro Watsuji, his discussion of intentionality remains underexplored. I here develop an interpretation and application of his view. First, I unpack Watsuji’s arguments for the inherently social character of intentionality, consider how they connect with his more general discussion of embodiment and betweenness, and then situate his view alongside phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Next, I argue that Watsuji’s characterizatio…Read more
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756Radical Enactivism and Inter-Corporeal AffectivityIn Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders, Schattauer. 2010.
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734Knowing through the body: The Daodejing and DeweyJournal of Chinese Philosophy 36 (1): 31-52. 2009.No Abstract
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712Empathy, enaction, and shared musical experienceIn Tom Cochrane, Bernardino Fantini & Klaus Scherer (eds.), The Emotional Power of Music: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Musical Expression, Arousal and Social Control, Oxford University Press. pp. 177-196. 2013.
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699Losing social space: Phenomenological disruptions of spatiality and embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and SchizophreniaIn Jack Reynolds & Ricky Sebold (eds.), Phenomenology and Science, Palgracve Macmillan. forthcoming.We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how this altered sense of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of embodim…Read more
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682James on Experience and the Extended MindContemporary Pragmatism 3 (1): 165-176. 2006.William James’s characterization of consciousness as a selecting agency can be used to develop and defend an externalist view of mind. The mind – including the content of phenomenal consciousness – is in an important sense distributed beyond the skin and skull of the subject, out into the world of people and things. Moreover, conscious experience is an action, and not simply something that happens to us. Consciousness, perception, and experience are activities – in other words, things that we do…Read more
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678Affordances and the musically extended mindFrontiers in Psychology 4 1-12. 2013.I defend a model of the musically extended mind. I consider how acts of “musicking” grant access to novel emotional experiences otherwise inaccessible. First, I discuss the idea of “musical affordances” and specify both what musical affordances are and how they invite different forms of entrainment. Next, I argue that musical affordances – via soliciting different forms of entrainment – enhance the functionality of various endogenous, emotiongranting regulative processes, drawing novel experienc…Read more
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671Embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia: A phenomenological analysisIn J. Aaron Simmons & James Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the 21st Century, Palgrave-macmillan. forthcoming.In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and …Read more
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669Agency and atmospheres of inclusion and exclusionIn Dylan Trigg (ed.), Atmospheres and Shared Emotions, Routledge. pp. 124-144. 2021.
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655Lost in the socially extended mind: Genuine intersubjectivity and disturbed self-other demarcation in schizophreniaIn Christian Tewes & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches, Cambridge University Press. pp. 318-340. 2020.Much of the characteristic symptomatology of schizophrenia can be understood as resulting from a pervasive sense of disembodiment. The body is experienced as an external machine that needs to be controlled with explicit intentional commands, which in turn leads to severe difficulties in interacting with the world in a fluid and intuitive manner. In consequence, there is a characteristic dissociality: Others become problems to be solved by intellectual effort and no longer present opportunities f…Read more
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643The affective 'we': Self-regulation and shared emotionsIn Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran (eds.), Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the ‘We’, Routledge. pp. 263-277. 2015.What does it mean to say that an emotion can be shared? I consider this question, focusing on the relation between the phenomenology of emotion experience and self-regulation. I explore the idea that a numerically single emotion can be given to more than one subject. I term this a “collective emotion”. First, I consider different forms of emotion regulation. I distinguish between embodied forms of self-regulation, which use subject-centered features of our embodiment, and distributed forms of se…Read more
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624The Open BodyIn Antonella Carassa, Francesca Morganti & Guiseppa Riva (eds.), Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and Neuroscience, Universita Della Svizzera Italiana. pp. 109-128. 2009.In this paper we characterize the body as constitutively open. We fi rst consider the notion of bodily openness at the basic level of its organic constitution. This will provide us a framework relevant for the understanding of the body open to its intersubjective world. We argue that the notion of “bodily openness” captures a constitutive dimension of intersubjectivity. Generally speaking, there are two families of theories intending to characterize the constitutive relation between subjectivity…Read more
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619Agency, Environmental Scaffolding, and the Development of Eating Disorders - Commentary on RodemeyerIn Christian Tewes & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches, Cambridge University Press. pp. 256-262. 2020.
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619Concrete consciousness: A Sartrean critique of functionalist accounts of mindSartre Studies International 12 (2): 44-60. 2006.In this essay, I argue that Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of…Read more
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612Musicing, Materiality, and the Emotional NicheAction, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 14 (3): 43-62. 2015.Building on Elliot and SilvermanÕs (2015) embodied and enactive approach to musicing, I argue for an extended approach: namely, the idea that music can function as an environmental scaffolding supporting the development of various experiences and embodied practices that would otherwise remain inaccessible. I focus especially on the materiality of music. I argue that one of the central ways we use music, as a material resource, is to manipulate social spaceÑand in so doing, manipulate our emoti…Read more
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604Engineering affect: emotion regulation, the internet, and the techno-social nichePhilosophical Topics 47 (2): 205-231. 2019.Philosophical work exploring the relation between cognition and the Internet is now an active area of research. Some adopt an externalist framework, arguing that the Internet should be seen as environmental scaffolding that drives and shapes cognition. However, despite growing interest in this topic, little attention has been paid to how the Internet influences our affective life — our moods, emotions, and our ability to regulate these and other feeling states. We argue that the Internet scaffol…Read more
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584Emotions and the Social NicheIn Christian von Scheve & Mikko Salmela (eds.), Collective Emotions, Oxford University Press. pp. 156-171. 2014.
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579Musical Manipulations and the Emotionally Extended MindEmpirical Musicology Review 9 (3-4): 208-212. 2014.I respond to Kersten’s criticism in his article “Music and Cognitive Extension” of my approach to the musically extended emotional mind in Krueger (2014). I specify how we manipulate—and in so doing, integrate with—music when, as active listeners, we become part of a musically extended cognitive system. I also indicate how Kersten’s account might be enriched by paying closer attention to the way that music functions as an environmental artifact for emotion regulation.
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556Mental institutions, habits of mind, and an extended approach to autismThaumàzein 6 10-41. 2018.We argue that the notion of "mental institutions"-discussed in recent debates about extended cognition-can help better understand the origin and character of social impairments in autism, and also help illuminate the extent to which some mechanisms of autistic dysfunction extend across both internal and external factors (i.e., they do not just reside within an individual's head). After providing some conceptual background, we discuss the connection between mental institutions and embodied habits…Read more
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550The space between us: embodiment and intersubjectivity in Watsuji and LevinasIn Leah Kalmanson, Frank Garrett & Sarah Mattice (eds.), Levinas and Asian Thought, Duquesne University Press. pp. 53-78. 2013.This essay brings Emmanuel Levinas and Watsuji Tetsurō into constructive philosophical engagement. Rather than focusing primarily on interpretation — admittedly an important dimension of comparative philosophical inquiry — my intention is to put their respective views to work, in tandem, and address the problem of the embodied social self.1 Both Watsuji and Levinas share important commonalities with respect to the embodied nature of intersubjectivity —commonalities that, moreover, put both thin…Read more
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536James Austin's Selfless Insight: Zen and the Meditative Transformations of Consciousness (review)Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10): 240-244. 2010.
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532Towards a wide approach to improvisationIn J. McGuirk, S. Ravn & S. Høffding (eds.), Improvisation: The Competence(s) of Not Being in Control, Routledge. 2021.This paper pursues two main aims. First, it distinguishes two kinds of improvisation: expert and inexpert. Expert improvisation is a (usually artistic) practice that the agent consciously sets as their goal and is evaluated according to (usually artistic) standards of improvisation. Inexpert improvisation, by contrast, supports and structures the agent’s action as it moves them towards their (usually everyday life) goals and is evaluated on its success leading the agent to the achievement of tho…Read more
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517From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent RevolutionFrontiers in Psychology 9. 2018.In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups…Read more
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511Stop, look, listen: The need for philosophical phenomenological perspectives on auditory verbal hallucinationsFrontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 1-9. 2013.One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech, against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly defined. In this paper we begin by introducing philosophical phenomenology and highlighting its relevance to …Read more
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500Phenomenology of the social self in the prodrome of psychosis: From perceived negative attitude of others to heightened interpersonal sensitivityEuropean Psychiatry 26 (8): 532-533. 2011.
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480Musical agency and collaboration in the digital ageIn Kath Bicknell & John Sutton (eds.), Collaborative Embodied Performance: Ecologies of Skill, Methuen Drama. pp. 125-140. 2022.
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478Musical Worlds and the Extended MindProceedings of A Body of Knowledge - Embodied Cognition and the Arts Conference CTSA UCI, 8-10 Dec 2016. 2018.“4E” approaches in cognitive science see mind as embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. They observe that we routinely “offload” part of our thinking onto body and world. Recently, 4E theorists have turned to music cognition: from work on music perception and musical emotions, to improvisation and music education. I continue this trend. I argue that music — like other tools and technologies — is a beyond-the-head resource that affords offloading. And via this offloading, music can (at least …Read more
Exeter, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
1 more
Japanese Philosophy |
William James |
John Dewey |
Asian Philosophy |
American Pragmatism, Misc |
Musical Experience |