-
500Dimensions of bodily subjectivityPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3): 279-283. 2009.
-
721Losing social space: Phenomenological disruptions of spatiality and embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and SchizophreniaIn Jack Reynolds & Richard Sebold (eds.), Phenomenology and Science, Palgrave-macmillan. 2016.We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how this altered sense of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of embodim…Read more
-
2023Seeing mind in actionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2): 149-173. 2012.Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implau…Read more
-
461Empathy beyond the head: Comment on "Music, empathy, and cultural understanding"Physics of Life Reviews 15 92-93. 2015.
-
1040Enacting Musical ExperienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3): 98-123. 2009.I argue for an enactive account of musical experience — that is, the experience of listening ‘deeply’(i.e., sensitively and understandingly) to a piece of music. The guiding question is: what do we do when we listen ‘deeply’to music? I argue that these music listening episodes are, in fact, doings. They are instances of active perceiving, robust sensorimotor engagements with and manipulations of sonic structures within musical pieces. Music is thus experiential art, and in Nietzsche’s words, ‘we…Read more
-
489A Daoist Critique of Searle on Mind and ActionIn Bo Mou (ed.), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement, Brill. pp. 97-123. 2008.
-
563James Austin's Selfless Insight: Zen and the Meditative Transformations of Consciousness (review)Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10): 240-244. 2010.
-
477Interdisciplinary approaches to the phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinationsSchizophrenia Bulletin 40. 2014.Despite the recent proliferation of scientific, clinical, and narrative accounts of auditory verbal hallucinations, the phenomenology of voice hearing remains opaque and undertheorized. In this article, we outline an interdisciplinary approach to understanding hallucinatory experiences which seeks to demonstrate the value of the humanities and social sciences to advancing knowledge in clinical research and practice. We argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH utilizes…Read more
-
260Phenomenology and the visibility of the mentalAnnual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan 29 13-25. 2013.
-
1232The Who and the How of ExperienceIn Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, no self?: perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions, Oxford University Press. pp. 27-55. 2011.
-
490Gestural coupling and social cognition: Moebius Syndrome as a case studyFrontiers in Human Neuroscience 6. 2012.Social cognition researchers have become increasingly interested in the ways that behavioral, physiological, and neural coupling facilitate social interaction and interpersonal understanding. We distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the role of such coupling processes in social cognition: strong and moderate interactionism. According to strong interactionism (SI), low-level coupling processes are alternatives to higher-level individual cognitive processes; the former at least sometimes render …Read more
-
1341Merleau-Ponty on shared emotions and the joint ownership thesisContinental Philosophy Review 46 (4): 509-531. 2013.In “The Child’s Relations with Others,” Merleau-Ponty argues that certain early experiences are jointly owned in that they are numerically single experiences that are nevertheless given to more than one subject (e.g., the infant and caregiver). Call this the “joint ownership thesis” (JT). Drawing upon both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis, as well as studies of exogenous attention and mutual affect regulation in developmental psychology, I motivate the plausibility of JT. I argue that t…Read more
-
365EmpathyIn Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Sage Publications. 2013.
Exeter, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
1 more
Japanese Philosophy |
William James |
John Dewey |
Asian Philosophy |
American Pragmatism, Misc |
Musical Experience |