David Burrell

The dual purpose of this book is to point out the ways whereby reflective religious thinkers work and to suggest how these skills can be acquired. It is a manual of apprenticeship in acquiring religious understanding. The thought of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Kierkegaard, and Jung on selected religious topics is developed expressly to show how each handled these issues and thus to provide living exemplars for religious understanding. The issues have an inherent unity in their dealing with man's knowledge of God, especially in their concern with the ways we treat what must be beyond our grasp. Augustine travels a journey of progressive awareness. As one scheme of understanding after another cannot offer an explanation, so it ends in confession. From his life we learn "how to discriminate our action from God's while discerning God's action in ours." In the case of Anselm and Aquinas the goal was to speak of divine things accurately enough to avoid misunderstanding, yet without giving a false impression that we have made clear what the divinity really is. Kierkegaard and Jung aim to clarify our experience of the transcendent. But this experience is expressed in a language whose success in removing the roadblocks to faith and understanding can be evaluated.

As an exercise in comparative philosophical theology, our approach is more concerned with conceptual strategies than with historical although the animadversions of those versed in the history of each period will assist in reading the texts of each thinker. We need historians to make us aware of the questions to which thinkers of other ages and cultures were directing their energies, as well as the forms of thought available to them in making their response; but we philosophers hope to be able to proceed without having to arm ourselves with extensive knowledge of the surrounding milieu, trusting that others more knowledgeable will correct and extend our efforts. Our contribution should then be one of offering perspectives within which further discourse may profitably proceed, suitably challenged and amended in the course of a common inquiry. Since my familiarity is with Aquinas, and since he comes chronologically first, I shall begin with him, though there is no discernible connection between the two thinkers other than their preoccupation with establishing the primacy of existing in a metaphysical discourse which had hitherto obscured its significance.

The main lines of this exploration are quite simply drawn. That the God whom Jews, Christians, and Muslims worship outstrips our capacities for characterization, and hence must be unknowable, will be presumed as uncontested. The reason that God is unknowable stems from our shared confession that ‘the Holy One, blessed be He’, and ‘the Father almighty, creator of heaven and earth’, and certainly ‘Allah, the merciful One’ is one ; and just why God's oneness entails God's being unknowable deserves discussion, though that will occur as we move along. The issue facing us is the one which preoccupied al-Ghazali: how does a seeker respond to that unknowability? The root meaning of the Arabic word for ‘student’ means ‘seeker’, and that attitude of ‘seeking the face of God’, along with the indescribability of the face, will be presumed throughout our discussion. That's why we are struck with the clumsy term ‘unknowable’ rather than its more euphonious Greek form ‘agnostic’. For Western agnostics are such largely because they cannot find God sufficiently compelling, while they ‘would not have the impudence to claim to be atheists’ – as one contemporary seeker puts it. So theologians feel it necessary to enclose the term in quotation marks when discussing, say, Aquinas' ‘agnosticism’ regarding divinity. Yet a genuine unknowing does lie at the heart of the inquiry of the Jew, Christian or Muslim seeking after God; indeed, it is the unknowing which distinguishes a search for God from lusting after idols. So let us follow al-Ghazali in an effort to discover the lineaments of both search and seeker after an unknowable God.

This work offers a bold and illuminating exercise in philosophy as narrative, and in doing so presents itself quite consciously as an alternative mode of explanation to the "rationalist paradigm" which dominated Greek philosophy. Yet while acknowledging the inspiration of Hegel, the work hews far more closely than the author of Phänomenologie des Geistes to the actual dialectic of explanation as it worked itself out from Aristotle through Plotinus to Aquinas--to mention only the most prominent milestones. In that respect, the book offers an apparently independent and certainly more lyrical orchestration of the themes elaborated in such careful counterpoint by Edward Booth in his Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Writers. Indeed, for each author, it is a stubborn aporia inherent in Aristotle's project, yet resistant to resolution in terms of that same project, which fuels the resultant "historical dialectic." Booth's formulation focuses on the metaphysical clash between Aristotle's assertion that existing individuals bear ontological primacy and his insistence that form alone is intelligible, however, while Madigan pinpoints the explanatory lacuna in the project of Aristotle's Metaphysics as he intended it to complete the Physics. Yet I would suggest that these two formulations manifest a single metaphysical impasse for Aristotle; in fact, the very one which was to come to the fore in the debate which emerged within Islamic, Jewish, and Christian philosophical theology regarding the origins of the universe. As Madigan summarizes it: "a theory of creation or the production of the world through efficient causality is necessary to explain the world, or to render Aristotle's system complete. This is what Plotinus' philosophy lacked. But given creation or the free production of an independent world, a theory of salvation is necessary to make creation itself for the first time rational".