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295On Shame – In Response to Dan Zahavi, Self and OtherInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5): 634-638. 2015.In chapter 14 of Zahavi’s recent book, Self and Other, the notion of shame is discussed. In feeling shame one experiences oneself as experienced by others. For Sartre, that experience in itself is sufficient for shame, as one experiences oneself as determined in the experience of others and hence as shamefully not self-determining. But Zahavi introduces an extra condition for shame, which is a ‘global decrease in self-esteem’. This paper questions the need for this condition and argues that seei…Read more
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253Being subject to the rule to do what the rules tell you to doIn Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom, Routledge. pp. 145-156. 2010.
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245ProcessesPhilosophy 72 (279): 19-27. 1997.A natural picture to have of events and processes is of entities which extend through time and which have temporal parts, just as physical objects extend through space and have spatial parts. While accepting this picture of events, in this paper I want to present an alternative conception of processes as entities which, like physical objects, do not extend in time and do not have temporal parts, but rather persist in time. Processes and events belong to metaphysically distinct categories. Moreov…Read more
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635What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in itPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2): 135-148. 2012.What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9224-0 Authors Rowland Stout, School of Philosophy, UCD Dublin, Dublin 4, Republic of Ireland Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759
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420Seeing the anger in someone's faceAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1): 29-43. 2010.Starting from the assumption that one can literally perceive someone's anger in their face, I argue that this would not be possible if what is perceived is a static facial signature of their anger. There is a product–process distinction in talk of facial expression, and I argue that one can see anger in someone's facial expression only if this is understood to be a process rather than a product
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142Internalising practical reasonsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3). 2004.Practical reasons figure in both the justification and the causal explanation of action. It is usually assumed that the agent’s state of believing rather than what they believe must figure in the causal explanation of action. But, that the agent believes something is not a reason in the sense of being part of the justification of what they do. So it is often concluded that the justifying reason is a different sort of thing from the causally motivating reason. But this means that in a causal proc…Read more
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333Adopting roles: Generosity and PresumptuousnessRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 141-161. 2015.Generosity is not the same thing as kindness or self-sacrifice. Presumptuousness is incompatible with generosity, but not with kindness or self-sacrifice. I consider a kind but interfering neighbour who inappropriately takes over the role of mother to my daughter; her behaviour is not generous. Presumptuousness is the improper exercise of a disposition to adopt a role that one does not have. With this in mind I explore the idea that generosity is the proper exercise of the disposition to ado…Read more
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422The Life of a ProcessIn Guy Debrock (ed.), Process Pragmatism: Essays on a Quiet Philosophical Revolution, Brill | Rodopi. 2003.
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94Process, Action, and Experience (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2018.Process, Action, and Experience offers a radical new approach to the philosophy of mind and action, taking processes to be the central subject matter. An international team of contributors consider what kinds of things processes are, and explore the progressive nature of action and conscious experience.
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197ActionRoutledge. 2005.The traditional focus of debate in philosophy of action has been the causal theory of action and metaphysical questions about the nature of actions as events. In this lucid and lively introduction to philosophy of action, Rowland Stout shows how these issues are subsidiary to more central ones that concern the freedom of the will, practical rationality and moral psychology. When seen in these terms, agency becomes one of the most exciting areas in philosophy and one of the most useful ways into …Read more
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369Was Sally's reason for running from the bear that she thought it was chasing her?In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave-macmillan. 2009.Arguing against the claim that beliefs are reasons for action.
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |