•  7
    El principio de justificación inferencial, escepticismo y creencias causales
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 195-202. 2000.
  •  27
    Subjetividad y valor en un mundo natural
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (2): 25-44. 1998.
    I discuss, in this paper, the view of value that is associated with Humean motivational theories. I argue that these theories unjustifiably constrain the kind of element that may contribute to our motivational economy and, thereby, unduly reduce our capacity to recognize certain sources of value. To this purpose, I will examine some axiological experiences that, if I am right, are inaccessible to a Humean analysis of our motivational structure. I will insist, for instance, on a sense in which so…Read more
  •  332
    Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (2): 155-172. 2010.
    In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.
  •  271
    First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement
    European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3): 325-362. 2009.
    There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first-person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first-personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.I object, however, that the way in which…Read more