Damiano Migliorini

The author contextualizes the Problem of Evil in Open Theism system, listing its main theses, primarily the logic-of- love-defense (and free-will-defense) connected to Trinitarian speculation. After evaluating the discussion in Analytic Philosophy of Religion, the focus is on the personal mystery of evil, claiming that, because of mystery and vagueness, the Problem of Evil is undecidable. Recalling other schools of thought (Pareyson: ontology of freedom; Moltmann: Dialectical theology; Kenotic theology; Original Sin hermeneutics), the author tries to grasp their common insights. One of them is the evident explanatory failure of theodicies, expressed in the antinomian statements ‘God is not innocent’. The author follows these insights, developing the concept of Eternal Immolation (Bulgakov), arguing that, without a proper understanding of its mystery (what is, and what is not), theistic theodicy could remain compromised. ‘Eternal Immolation’ is considered consequent – or already present – in recent speculations, it stands or falls when we accept that these reveal some unresolved points in Christian doctrine. Hence, ‘Eternal Immolation’ becomes a coordinating-concept, able to bring together their assumptions: several kinds of kenosis, the ontology of freedom with a logic-of-love defense, strongly linked to a libertarian human freedom, and the acknowledgement of the unresolved mystery of evil.

The Author proposes to describe the possible foundations of a Trinitarian theism that may be a philosophically adequate translation of the Johannine declaration: “God is love”, introduced by some contemporary thinkers as a key to resolving some aporias within classic theism. This is done by way of analysis of Trinitarian ontology and relational ontology, for which there is an attempt to provide a shareable phenomenological basis. The paper then goes on to questions of epistemology (hyperphatic theology) linked to the ability of human reason and human language to express the categories introduced in this analysis, categories that are nothing else but a renewed philosophical appreciation of the terminology proper to Trinitarian speculation.

The new theoretical perspective proposed by the Open Theism theologians, compels us to study in depth and to evaluate the “classic” argumentative tools used to solve the ancient antinomy between divine omniscience and human freedom, to which the thesis of the Open Theism try to give an innovative solution. Among these tools – invoked by many authors in the contemporary debate about omniscience, in analytic philosophy of religion – several ones are part of Thomas Aquinas’ thought: the division in primary and secondary causes, the division of God’s knowledge, the distinction between propositions understood in sensu composito or in sensu diviso, the division between necessity de dicto or de re, and others. This paper aims to analyze the interpretation of these tools developed in the contemporary context and tries to draw some conclusions on the overall efficacy of the “Thomistic Solution” that we can build starting from these tools. La nuova prospettiva teoretica proposta dai sostenitori dell’Open Theism ha reso necessario un approfondimento e una valutazione degli strumenti argomentativi “classici” utilizzati per risolvere l’antica antinomia tra onniscienza divina e libertà umana, alla quale le tesi dell’Open Theism cercano di dare una soluzione innovativa. Tra questi strumenti – recuperati da molti autori nel contemporaneo dibattito sull’onniscienza, all’interno della filosofia analitica della religione – ve ne sono molti attribuiti a Tommaso d’Aquino: la divisione in causa prima e cause seconde, la suddivisione della conoscenza di Dio, la distinzione tra proposizioni intese in senso composto o in senso diviso, quella tra necessità de dicto e necessità de re, e altri. Il presente contributo si propone di analizzarne l’interpretazione sviluppata nel contesto contemporaneo e trarre alcune conclusioni sull’efficacia complessiva della “soluzione tomistica” che si può delineare a partire da questi strumenti.

The debate on divine omniscience and its compatibility with human freedom, developed after the formulation of the famous Pike’s Argument, has led some authors to formulate a new form of theism called open theism. The main thesis of this theory deals with the redefinition of the attribute of omniscience – meant as dynamic – and other divine attributes, such as eternity and immutability. The core of the theory, however, lies in the assumption, in metaphysical terms, of the affirmation of the New Testament «God is love» (revoking some insights of Trinitarian theology). Clearly, the critiques moved to open theism, in the intense and still underway debate, are various, but the most compelling ones concern the weakness of the new metaphysics that open theism is trying to build. After setting out the main features of the debate around omniscience, the thesis and the main objections to open theism, it appears possible to draw some conclusions which, although temporary, show how the theoretical path defended by open theism represents an appealing challenge for contemporary analytic philosophy of religion.

Over the past four decades, the issue of the relationship between divine omniscience and human freedom has been the subject of a great debate in the context of Analytic Philosophy of Religion. Many authors have contributed to the debate by formulating some ‘solutions’, taking inspiration from the thought of classical authors (e.g. Boethius, Aquinas, Ockham). One of these, is inspired by Luis de Molina’s thought. The Author, therefore, aims to present the main theoretical thesis of this solution, following the development in the various publications about this question. The Author also tries to show how the thought of Molina has beeen “translated” in contemporary discourse, the limits of the solution, and make understandable the transition occurred within the debate, which led to the Molinist solution and then to the Open Theism.

Over the past three decades, the issue of the relationship between divine omniscience and human freedom has been the subject of great debate. Inside it, were compared many authors and many “solutions”. One of these is the one that is inspired by Ockham’s thought. The author, therefore, aims to present the main theoretical nodes of this solution, following the development that it has had in the various publications about this question. The author also tries to show its limits, to make understandable the transition occurred within the debate, which led to the Molinist solution and then to the open theism.

ENGLISH: The author investigates whether the model prevalent today of an “humble reason” - based on fallibilism and epistemic humility - is the most appropriate to express the theological truth, even in the light of the debate within the contemporary theism (rational theology). To answer this question it is necessary to examine the epistemological status of “human truth” and the “truth of faith”, in order to develop a common approach to sciences, philosophy and theology. Finally, the author shows how the communitarian dimension and the “choice” (a call for freedom) are inherent to theology understood as “critical faith”, whose peculiarity is to posit itself without nostalgia in the middle between fideism, rationalism and a certain relativism. From the path, finally, it emerges the proposal of a new “cristeologia”. ITALIAN: Il rapporto tra fede e ragione è la questione meta-teologica per eccellenza. L’autore si propone dunque d’indagare se il modello oggi prevalente di “ragione umile” – basato su fallibilismo e umiltà epistemica – sia il più adeguato per esprimere le verità teologiche, anche alla luce del dibattito interno al teismo contemporaneo (teologia razionale). Per rispondere a questa domanda è necessario esaminare lo statuto epistemologico della verità umana e della verità di fede, per poter elaborare un metodo comune alle discipline scientifiche, filosofiche e teologiche, capace di trovare un equilibrio tra fideismo e positivismo teologico. Dopo una breve panoramica storica dei rapporti tra fede e ragione nel pensiero occidentale (con particolare attenzione alla dottrina dei praeambula fidei), l’articolo cercherà di mostrare come, nel paradigma della verità relazionale e del fallibilismo sia necessario integrare il problema delle fonti, dell’autorità, del concetto di ispirazione e della nozione di “rivelazione”, giacché contraddistinguono la teologia rispetto alla filosofia. Si mostrerà infine come la dimensione comunitaria e della scelta (appello alla libertà) siano connaturate alla teologia intesa come fede critica, la cui peculiarità è di collocarsi senza nostalgie nel mezzo tra fideismo, razionalismo e un certo relativismo. Dal percorso emergerà infine la proposta di una nuova "cristeologia".

The author analyzes the interpretation of Boethius’ “timelessness solution” developed in contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Religion, and the main objections that have been moved to it, trying to draw some conclusions about its effectiveness (a) in solving the antinomy between omniscience and human freedom; (b) in weakening the argument of Open Theism. La nuova prospettiva teoretica proposta dall’Open Theism impone un approfondimento e una rivalutazione delle soluzioni “classiche” all’antinomia tra onniscienza divina e libertà umana. Tra queste “soluzioni” vi è, com’è noto, quella di Boezio, ripresa e resa più sofisticata da molti autori nel dibattito contemporaneo, all’interno della filosofia analitica della religione. L’Autore intende analizzare, quindi, l’interpretazione della timelessness solution sviluppata in tale contesto e le principali obiezioni che le sono mosse, cercando di tracciare alcune conclusioni circa la sua efficacia nel risolvere l’antinomia e nell’indebolire le tesi dell’Open Theism.

The philosophical thought of Massimo Cacciari and the conceptual issues of « open theism » are two speculative routes apparently very distant from each other. This contribution highlights the common goal in their going to the root of philosophic problems in order to seek an answer: they think of a divine way of becoming explaining the reason of both the reality of the world and the paradoxical reality of human freedom. The two routes tend to converge and recover concepts pertaining to the Trinitarian speculation whose philosophical « translation » in philosophy passes, today, through the relational and trinitarian ontology, and also the « iperphatic » theology. In this convergence there is ground for thinking not only a truly Trinitarian theism, but also a Trinitarian philosophy, which considers Trinity as the essential summit of a good metaphysics.