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Leo Groarke

Trent University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    67
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    44

 More details
  • Trent University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Peterborough, Ontario, Canada
  • All publications (67)
  •  59
    Good reasoning matters!: a constructive approach to critical thinking
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Offering an innovative approach to critical thinking, Good Reasoning Matters! identifies the essential structure of good arguments in a variety of contexts and also provides guidelines to help students construct their own effective arguments. In addition to examining the most common features of faulty reasoning--slanting, bias, propaganda, vagueness, ambiguity, and a common failure to consider opposing points of view--the book introduces a variety of argument schemes and rhetorical techniques. T…Read more
    Offering an innovative approach to critical thinking, Good Reasoning Matters! identifies the essential structure of good arguments in a variety of contexts and also provides guidelines to help students construct their own effective arguments. In addition to examining the most common features of faulty reasoning--slanting, bias, propaganda, vagueness, ambiguity, and a common failure to consider opposing points of view--the book introduces a variety of argument schemes and rhetorical techniques. This edition adds material on visual arguments and more exercises.
    ReasoningCritical ThinkingInformal Logic
  •  66
    The Toils of Scepticism (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 23 (3): 95-95. 1991.
    Pyrrhonian Skepticism
  •  183
    Descartes' first meditation: Something old, something new, something borrowed
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (3): 281-301. 1984.
    René Descartes
  •  37
    Commentary on Feteris
  •  29
    Skepsis pflegen: Die sophistische Vortragskunst
    In Markus Gabriel (ed.), Skeptizismus und Metaphysik, De Gruyter Akademie Forschung. pp. 221-238. 2011.
  •  38
    Protecting One's Own: Hobbes, Realism and Disarmament
    Public Affairs Quarterly 2 (1): 89-107. 1988.
  •  247
    Logic, Art and Argument
    Informal Logic 18 (2). 1996.
    Most infonnallogic texts and articles assume a verbal account of reasoning which defines "argument" as a set of sentences. The present paper broadens this definition in order to account for "visual arguments" which are communicated with nonverbal visual images. Standard approaches to verbal arguments are extended in a way that allows them to explain and evaluate visual argumentation
    Informal Logic
  •  301
    When Two Wrongs Make A Right
    Informal Logic 5 (1). 1983.
    CONTEMPORARY TREATMENTS OF INFORMAL FALLACIES TAKE TWO WRONGS REASONING AS A FORM OF FALLACIOUS INFERENCE. I ARGUE THAT SUCH INFERENCES ARE OFTEN VALID AND THAT AN ADEQUATE TREATMENT OF TWO WRONGS ARGUMENTS MUST DISTINGUISH VALID AND INVALID ARGUMENTS, RATHER THAN REJECT THEM OUT OF HAND
    Informal Logic
  •  64
    Emotional Arguments: Ancient And Contemporary Views
    The prodigious development of argumentation theory over the last three decades has raised many issues that challenge some of the long held assumptions that characterize the traditional study of argument. One of these issues is the role of emotion in argument and argument analysis. While rhetoric has, with its emphasis on persuasion, always recognized that emotions play some role determining which arguments we accept and reject, a long tradition sees appeals to emotion as fallacies that violate t…Read more
    The prodigious development of argumentation theory over the last three decades has raised many issues that challenge some of the long held assumptions that characterize the traditional study of argument. One of these issues is the role of emotion in argument and argument analysis. While rhetoric has, with its emphasis on persuasion, always recognized that emotions play some role determining which arguments we accept and reject, a long tradition sees appeals to emotion as fallacies that violate the standards of rationality and objectivity reason and argument require.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  45
    Commentary on Reed & Walton
  •  86
    The Socratic Dictum and the Importance of Philosophy
    Teaching Philosophy 8 (3): 193-199. 1985.
    Philosophy of Education
  •  215
    Cohen's Arguments and Metaphors in Philosophy
    Informal Logic 23 (2): 205-209. 2003.
    Informal Logic
  • Rebuilding Rawls: An Alternative Theory of Justice
    Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 2
    John Rawls
  •  47
    Pure and Applied Theories of Argument: Where Does Philosophy Belong Within Argumentation Theory?
    Informal Logic
  •  87
    Hilary Putnam on the End of Argument
    with Louis Groarke
    Philosophica 69 (1): 41-60. 2002.
    We argue that Hilary Putnam's pragmatism provides an epistemological perspective which can help us understand--and can positively inform--the development of informal logic.
  •  133
    Woods and Walton on the Fallacies, 1972-1982
    Informal Logic 13 (2). 1991.
    Informal Logic
  •  2
    Douglas N. Walton, Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 10 (7): 294-296. 1990.
  •  49
    Commentary on Hoaglund
  •  88
    Some Sources for Hume's Account of Cause
    with Graham Solomon
    Journal of the History of Ideas 52 (4): 645-663. 1991.
    We show that four central aspects of Hume's account of cause were contained and available to him in the translation of Sextus Empiricus' "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" contained in Thomas Stanley's 1687 _History of Philosophy
    Hume: CausationHume: Intellectual Context
  •  186
    Affirmative action as a form of restitution
    Journal of Business Ethics 9 (3). 1990.
    Though the common sense defense of affirmative action (or employment equity) appeals to principles of restitution, philosophers have tried to defend it in other ways. In contrast, I defend it by appealing to the notion of restitution, arguing (1) that alternative attempts to justify affirmative action fail; and (2) that ordinary affirmative action programs need to be supplemented and amended in keeping with the principles this suggests.
    Business EthicsAffirmative Action
  •  96
    Parmenides' Timeless Universe, Again
    Dialogue 26 (3): 549. 1987.
    The paper defends my thesis that Parmenides' poem contains a critique of time, in answer to Mohan Matthen's criticisms of my views
    Eleatics
  • Lógica Informal
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. forthcoming.
  •  59
    Zeno's Dichotomy: Undermining The Modern Response
    Zeno of Elea
  •  89
    Form and Transformation: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus Frederic M. Schroeder McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas, Vol. 16. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992, xiv + 125 pp., $34.95 (review)
    Dialogue 33 (4): 751-. 1994.
    Plotinus
  •  59
    Commentary on Roque
  •  79
    The Skeptical Tradition Myles Burnyeat, editor Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. 450. $38.50 cloth: $10.95 paper (review)
    Dialogue 24 (4): 746-. 1985.
    History: Skepticism
  •  33
    8. Can Capitalism Save Itself? Some Ruminations on the Fate of Capitalism
    In John Douglas Bishop (ed.), Ethics and Capitalism, University of Toronto Press. pp. 196-218. 2000.
    Socialism and Marxism
  •  46
    Seduction as deduction: persuasion as deductive argument
    Both 'persuasion' and 'rational convincing' play a major role in argumentative discourse but only the latter is said to constitute argument and be amenable to traditional logical analysis. I argue against this assumption by showing that there are many paradigmatic instances of persuasion which are best understood as implicit arguments. So understood, acts of persuasion can conform to well recognized argument schemata and are best assessed accordingly. I shall argue that the attempt to distinguis…Read more
    Both 'persuasion' and 'rational convincing' play a major role in argumentative discourse but only the latter is said to constitute argument and be amenable to traditional logical analysis. I argue against this assumption by showing that there are many paradigmatic instances of persuasion which are best understood as implicit arguments. So understood, acts of persuasion can conform to well recognized argument schemata and are best assessed accordingly. I shall argue that the attempt to distinguish arg ument and persuasion is fraught with difficulties. I contrast my conclusions with those of authors like Gilbert, Johnson, and Johnson and Blair.
    Informal Logic
  •  41
    Political Cartoons in a Stephen Toulmin Landscape
    Informal Logic
  •  180
    Informal Logic
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1996.
    Informal logic is an attempt to develop a logic that can assess and analyze the arguments that occur in natural language discourse. Discussions in the field may address instances of scientific, legal, and other technical forms of reasoning, but the overriding aim has been a comprehensive account of argument that can explain and evaluate the arguments found in discussion, debate and disagreement as they manifest themselves in daily life — in social and political commentary; in news reports and ed…Read more
    Informal logic is an attempt to develop a logic that can assess and analyze the arguments that occur in natural language discourse. Discussions in the field may address instances of scientific, legal, and other technical forms of reasoning, but the overriding aim has been a comprehensive account of argument that can explain and evaluate the arguments found in discussion, debate and disagreement as they manifest themselves in daily life — in social and political commentary; in news reports and editorials in the mass media ; in advertising and corporate and governmental communications; and in personal exchange.
    Informal LogicArgument
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