Bo Mou

This new 4 volume collection will be organized into four distinct but complementary volumes which as a whole give a synoptic view of the major issues, conceptions, approaches, and current engaging exploration in studies of Chinese philosophy. With an introduction, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Chinese Philosophy provides everything a scholar needs to break into the field, and is an invaluable reference work for the expert.

In this paper, I give a metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of deflationism by discussing some basic conceptual and methodological issues involved in the debate between deflationism and substantivism. In so doing, I argue for three positive points. First, the crux of the dispute between deflationism and substantivism is whether or not truth is substantive in its metaphysical nature and in its explanatory role in philosophical enterprises, rather than whether or not a minimal approach regarding conceptual resources is taken to explain truth; a minimal approach itself is philosophically innocent. Second, there is no intrinsic connection between the core idea of deflationism and the Tarski‐style equivalence thesis, which is often identified as implying or supporting the former. Third, there are some unbridged fundamental gaps between the core idea of deflationism and various redundancy theses; these redundancy theses cannot be identified as the former, nor can they be used to justify the former on their own.

This book presents a systematic unifying-pluralist account--a "constructive-engagement" account--of how cross-tradition engagement in philosophy is possible. The goal of this "constructive-engagement" account is, by way of reflective criticism, argumentation, and methodological guiding principles, to inquire into how distinct approaches from different philosophical traditions can talk to and learn from each other for the sake of making joint contributions to the contemporary development of philosophy. In Part I of the book, Bo Mou explores a range of fundamental theoretic and methodological issues in cross-tradition philosophical engagement and philosophical interpretation. In Part II, he analyzes several representative case studies that demonstrate how relevant resources in the Western and Chinese philosophical traditions can constructively engage with each other. These studies cover issues in philosophical methodology, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language and logic, and ethics. The book's theoretical and practical approaches expand the vision, coverage, and agenda of doing philosophy comparatively, and promote worldwide joint efforts of cross-tradition philosophical inquiries. Cross-Tradition Engagement in Philosophy will be of interest to graduate students and scholars interested in comparative philosophy and the intersection of Chinese and Western philosophy. It will also appeal to those who are interested in the ways in which cross-tradition philosophical engagement can enhance contemporary philosophical debates in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language and logic, and ethics.

This article gives a holistic re-examination of the semantic content and syntactic structure of the concept of relative identity: it suggests and explains an expanded and enhanced dual-track characterization of relative identity. It is expanded in this sense: its due coverage is not narrowly restricted to the equal-status case of identity statements (the symmetric case for identity simplex) but also includes the category-assimilating case (the asymmetric case for identity complex), both of which are unified by the shared semantic core content of relative identity. It is enhanced in this sense: it is intended to give a more refined characterization of relative identity for the sake of enhancing our understanding of the structure and content of real-life relative-identity statements in people’s basic employment of language in view of the relation between thought, language, and the world.

This book demonstrates how, through cross-tradition engagement, insights from the Chinese philosophical tradition can work with relevant resources from modern logic and contemporary philosophy to enhance our understanding of two basic principles of logic: the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction. The law of identity and the law of non-contradiction are widely accepted principles in logic. However, there are disagreements as to how to understand and treat the genuine structures and contents of these two basic principles. This book provides a holistic inquiry into these principles for the sake of enhancing our understanding and treatment of them from the vantage point of cross-tradition engagement. It begins by offering a philosophical interpretation of three classical texts in Chinese philosophy in their contexts: the Bai-Ma-Lun in Gongsun Long's texts, the Xiao-Qu in the Later Mohist texts, and Lao Zi's Dao-De-Jing in classical Daoism. The author explains an innovative dual-track characterization of relative identity that is informed by relevant resources from these texts as well as Western philosophical traditions. He shows how this cross-tradition engaging approach can make constructive and significant contributions to the jointly concerned fundamental issues of identity and reference in logic, philosophy of logic and language, metaphysics, as well as philosophy more generally. Cross-Tradition Engagement on the Laws of Logic will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, Chinese philosophy, and comparative philosophy.

The purpose of this study is to suggest and explain an engaging approach to three distinct types of (alleged or genuine) semantic paradoxes, the White-Horse-Not-Horse Paradox, the Ultimate-Unspeakable Paradox, and the Liar Paradox, in a unifying way that is sensitive to distinct features of them. Although the three types of semantic paradoxes address distinct types of objects, and although their seemingly paradoxical features are different (alleged or genuine), their distinct structures and contents can be understood and treated on the same common ground, which is jointly conceived in people’s pretheoretic understandings of truth and of the double-reference feature of people’s basic employment of language (saying something about an object), and from the unifying vantage point of a double-reference approach.

In this theme essay for the addressed special-theme section in this special issue of the journal Comparative Philosophy commemorating the first anniversary of the International Society for Comparative Philosophy toward World Philosophy, I intend to give an elaboration of the theme “comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy”, which has been explicitly presented and formally stated through its recent academic-organizational channel CPWP and focuses on via the Journal’s and CPWP’s jointly organized international conference. The theme “comparative philosophy toward world philosophy” as a whole marks a momentous accumulating point of the significant development of comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement regarding its “direction” dimension, through the constructive-engagement strategy in theoretic exploration and reflective practice especially since the beginning of this century.

The aim of this essay is to give a meta-philosophical and meta-methodological characterization of some central characteristic features comparative philosophy as a general way of doing philosophy through cross-tradition engagement toward world philosophy. This is elucidated by presenting a holistic account of the conditions for maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles for appropriately and effectively considering different approaches to philosophy. This essay is meta-methodological in character: Given that comparative philosophy sets out to explore how to adequately look at contraries (especially those from different philosophical traditions, but not limited to them, methodologically speaking), and given the self-reflective philosophical nature of comparative philosophy, exploring adequacy conditions for how to look at contraries is meta-methodological in character but also a significant part of comparative philosophy per se. This meta-methodological exploration in comparative philosophy is neither exhaustive nor exclusive: It is not exhaustive because comparative philosophy as a whole has other substantial contents; it is not exclusive because this suggested account itself is open-ended and can include further adequate conditions that would be complementary to the current set from the holistic vantage point, which is exactly one ending point of this essay.

This article gives a holistic re-examination of the semantic content and syntactic structure of the concept of relative identity: it suggests and explains an expanded and enhanced dual-track characterization of relative identity. It is expanded in this sense: its due coverage is not narrowly restricted to the equal-status case of identity statements (the symmetric case for identity simplex) but also includes the category-assimilating case (the asymmetric case for identity complex), both of which are unified by the shared semantic core content of relative identity. It is enhanced in this sense: it is intended to give a more refined characterization of relative identity for the sake of enhancing our understanding of the structure and content of real-life relative-identity statements in people’s basic employment of language in view of the relation between thought, language, and the world.

The _History of Chinese Philosophy_ is a comprehensive and authoritative examination of the movements and thinkers that have shaped Chinese philosophy over the last three thousand years. An outstanding team of international contributors provide seventeen accessible entries organised into five clear parts: Identity of Chinese Philosophy Classical Chinese Philosophy (I): Pre-Han Period Classical Chinese Philosophy (II): From _Han_ Through _Tang_ Classical Chinese Philosophy (III): From _Song _Through Early _Qing_ Modern Chinese Philosophy: From Late _Qing _Through 21st Century This outstanding collection is essential reading for students of Chinese philosophy, and will be of interest to those seeking to explore the lasting significance this rich and complex philosophical tradition.

This volume is the first encyclopedia of Chinese philosophy that has ever been published in the English speaking world; it is a valuable reference book not only for those students and scholars in the field of Chinese philosophy but also for all philosophers who are interested in broadening their philosophical perspectives and in how some resources in another significant philosophical tradition could jointly contribute to fundamental philosophical concerns and issues. My strategy in this review is this: first, I will highlight a number of prominent features of this reference book at the surface level; and then, after a brief background introduction, I will make some comments on some distinct characteristics of the volume at a deeper level in regard to its editorial strategy and methodological approaches and in view of the relation of Chinese philosophy with Western philosophy.

The purpose of this paper is to present and explain a meta-philosophical methodological framework of how to look at seemingly competing approaches for the sake of cross-tradition understanding and constructive engagement in comparative philosophy in a global context. For this purpose, first, I introduce and explain some relevant conceptual and explanatory resources employed in the framework, especially the distinction between the methodological perspective and the methodological guiding principle, and make some initial methodological points. Second, I suggest six meta-philosophical adequacy conditions for adequate methodological guiding principles, which constitute one core portion of the suggested methodological framework.

In this paper, I suggest an approach to the alleged problem with the Tarskian formal definition of truth: its enumerative character seems to make it unable to capture our pretheoretic general understanding of truth. For this purpose, after spelling out two requirements for extending an enumerative definition to new cases, I examine to what extent Tarski's Convention T provides what are needed for extending the Tarski's enumerative definition. I conclude that, though not explicitly providing what are needed, Convention T does implicitly suggest something quite promising and provide necessary conceptual resources for its further modifications. Then I suggest a Tarskian explicitly general definition of what it is to be a truth-definition on the basis of some theoretical and conceptual resources within Tarski's semantic theory, and I explain how it would make the Tarskian seemingly enumerative formal definition have a general character in accord with our pretheoretic understanding of truth. Finally, I examine the current proposal in comparison with Davidson's approach and in the light of Hintikka's new perspective

In this article, through a comparative analysis of Dewey's and Laozi's relevant accounts, I examine a pragmatic insight concerning moral rules and moral experience to the effect that (i) fixed and formulated moral rules should not be taken as the final absolute moral authority, and (ii) attention needs to be paid to the moral agent's own moral experience that responds to the felt demands in concrete situations. The purpose of this paper is to enhance understanding the crucial points of the pragmatic insight and to look at how, in certain complementary ways, Dewey's and Laozi's distinct approaches could contribute to the pragmatic insight and learn from each other. I endeavour to show several points: (1) The pragmatic insight has its distinct metaphysical foundations in Dewey's and Laozi's accounts, whose combination could enhance each other's visions and overcome each other's limitations; (2) Both Dewey and Laozi reject some sharp dualism to look at the nature of moral experience that responds to the felt demands in concrete situations; in so doing, their distinct focuses on different aspects, or developing stages, of such moral experience could be complementarily coordinated into a whole; (3) Their characterisations of the pragmatic insight are also based upon their distinct but related naturalistic perspectives to human moral foundation; Laozi's approach could provide some constructive insight for and due natural limitations on Dewey's account.