Fernando Broncano

En este artículo pretendemos arrojar luz sobre la normatividad propia del conocimiento humano. Describimos el dominio normativo epistémico como un campo de agencia humana que está definido por el conocimiento entendido como logro. La normatividad del conocimiento se apoya en la contribución del agente epistémico a la consecución de ciertas tareas. Tal contribución es epistémicamente significativa cuando el agente llega a participar en la consecución del éxito. Por último identificamos algunos rasgos asociados con la agencia epistémica completa (condiciones de integración cognitiva y autonomía epistémica), y aclaramos lo que queremos decir con implicación apelando a la idea de adoptar una perspectiva epistémica.

I propose to consider the interpersonal character of testimony as a kind of social bond created by the mutual intention of sharing knowledge. The paper explores the social mechanism that supports this mutual intention starting from an initial situation of modelling the other’s epistemic perspective. Accepting testimony as a joint action creates epistemic duties and responsibilities and the eventual success can be considered as a genuine achievement at the social level of epistemology. Trust is presented here as the symptom that both parties are involved in such a social bond.

Truth is an epistemological concept that sometimes is claimed to have explanatory strength. It is argued, within a realistic view about causality and explanation, that concepts must represent naturalistic properties in order to have explanatory power. The eliminativistic theories about truth fail to account the use of predicate “truth” in explanatory contexts. Many antirealistic explanations of truth are reconstructed in order to sustain that thesis. Specially, we focus on the minimalist theory of truth. As we argue, we cannot eliminate the predicate “truth” in some of the most relevant contexts of science and daily life.

Se revisan varios libros publicados recientemente que corresponderían al campo de la epistemología politica. Sus autores pertenecen a tradiciones tan distintas como los Estudios sobre la Cieneia, Sociologia del Conocimiento, Epistemología, Filosafia de la Cieneia o Economía. La convergencia en este tema es el dato más significativo, habida cuenta de las bien conocidas controversias contemporaneas sabre Ia ciencia. EI nucleo central de los trabajos es la relación entre ciencia y democracia.We review a few volumes appeared in the last years about the topic of Political Epistemology. The authors came from different traditions such as Science Studies, Sociology of Science, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science or Economics. This convergence is the most meaningful fact, given the well-known controversies in the general field of science. the hard core of the reviewed volumes is the relationship between science and democtratic studies.

The relation between narratives and agency can be sometimes considered as mutually constitutive. There are cases in which telling a story expresses higher degrees of agency, and respectively, agency is shaped as a narrative that expresses the agent’s reasons. From henceforth, I will contend that a narrative theory, beyond the personal identity problem, can also enlighten how the agent attains giving reasons for the action by making sense of sequences of events. In order to explain how agency is constituted from understanding and control, we must assume a primitive competence for narratives. Agency supposes an ordering that cannot be reduced to temporality, but expresses a certain sense of accomplishment that can be narratively constituted. In this context, I will examine Welleman’s theory of emotions as an ordering framework of the events in structures of means-ends. A possible objection to his explanation of the agential narratives is that emotions themselves need to be understood as narrative processes. I suggest then that an enactivist approach would be a way of explaining the narrative constitution of agency. One virtue of this approach is that it harmonizes the biological and cultural components of the agency from the most basic layers to the ordinary folk-psychological narratives.

The aim of this article is to present trust as a meta-emotion, such that it is an emotion that precedes first-order emotions. It examines how trust can be considered a meta-emotion by establishing criteria for identifying trust as a meta-emotion. How trust plays out differently in aesthetic and ordinary contexts can provide another mode for investigating meta-emotions. The article illustrates how it is possible to recognize these meta-emotions in narratives. Finally, it presents one of the aims of trust, sharing knowledge between agents, when someone who provides testimony shares knowledge in an epistemic trust process with others. It shows a relationship construction between subjects and objects thanks to the trust, a meta-emotion that represents emotional ties between subjects to achieve another emotion.

Our aim in this paper is to throw some light on the kind of normativity characteristic of human knowledge. We describe the epistemic normative domain as that field of human agency defined by knowledge understood as an achievement. The normativity of knowledge rests on the contribution of the epistemic agent to the fulfillment of certain tasks. Such contribution is epistemically significant when the agent becomes engaged in the obtaining of success. Finally, we identify some features associated with full epistemic agency and elucidate what we mean by engagement by appealing to the idea of adopting an epistemic perspective. En este artículo pretendemos arrojar luz sobre la normatividad propia del conocimiento humano. Describimos el dominio normativo epistémico como un campo de agencia humana que está definido por el conocimiento entendido como logro. La normatividad del conocimiento se apoya en la contribución del agente epistémico a la consecución de ciertas tareas. Tal contribución es epistémicamente significativa cuando el agente llega a participar en la consecución del éxito. Por último identificamos algunos rasgos asociados con la agencia epistémica completa, y aclaramos lo que queremos decir con implicación apelando a la idea de adoptar una perspectiva epistémica.

We propose to extend a reliabilist perspective from epistemology to the very concept of rational justification. Rationality is defined as a cognitive virtue contextually relative to an information domain, to the mean performance of a cognitive community, and to normal conditions of information gathering. This proposal answers to the skeptical position derived from the evidence of the cognitive fallacies and, on the other hand, is consistent with the ecological approach to the cognitive biases. Rationality is conceived naturalistically as a control system of the flow of information: reliabilism is the approach that qualifies this system as virtuous. There can be specific-domain devices selected by evolution, although the constraints of the very flow of information can be also represented, even with imperfect means of formalization, and then rationality becomes reflective. Reliable rationality is postulated in conclusion as a more philosophically abstract concept than maximal, minimal or bounded rationality.

Se revisan varios libros publicados recientemente que corresponderían al campo de la epistemología politica. Sus autores pertenecen a tradiciones tan distintas como los Estudios sobre la Cieneia, Sociologia del Conocimiento, Epistemología, Filosafia de la Cieneia o Economía. La convergencia en este tema es el dato más significativo, habida cuenta de las bien conocidas controversias contemporaneas sabre Ia ciencia. EI nucleo central de los trabajos es la relación entre ciencia y democracia.We review a few volumes appeared in the last years about the topic of Political Epistemology. The authors came from different traditions such as Science Studies, Sociology of Science, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science or Economics. This convergence is the most meaningful fact, given the well-known controversies in the general field of science. the hard core of the reviewed volumes is the relationship between science and democtratic studies.

Some recent forms of reliabilism, and the epistemic virtues theory, postulate a compromise between reflectivity and informational reliability. In this paper we present a model of epistemic normativity that makes compatible the reflective instance with the physical process of information gathering.The hard core of this proposal is a concept of metarepresentation that allows to represent both the content and the process of belief formation. This new concept is provided by the Recanati´s Principle of Iconicity. We propose this principle as a basis for a more robust knowledge relationship than the considered ones in the clasical forms of reliabilism.

La tradición filosófica ha tenido siempre dificultades para considerar las emociones desde el punto de la racionalidad. Sin embargo hay contextos en los que la evaluación racional debe tomar en cuenta necesariamente un componente de sensibilidad emocional. Estos contextos son los grandes proyectos vitales, que pueden ocupar un fragmento apreciable de la vida, cuando no toda ella. En ellos podemos decir con cierta propiedad que un fracaso afectivo absoluto es un fracaso racional. En este trabajo proponemos un modo de análisis de las emociones como tipos especiales de representaciones (representaciones directivo-descriptivas) que nos permitirá enfocar las relaciones entre emociones y racionalidad de una forma más matizada.

We discuss the conditions that the knowledge of an action must meet to reach the status of agency or complete intentional action. A first problem is to account how the subject appears in the action. We consider the model of a "sense of agency" and we oppose a theory of action control that does not take in charge the epistemological problems associated to the sense of agency model. Our claim is that epistemological requirements are intrinsic components of the agency, and therefore that a theory of action must take in account an epistemological perspective in some nuclear aspects of the production of actions.