Christoph Luetge

In 2017, the German ethics commission for automated and connected driving released 20 ethical guidelines for autonomous vehicles. It is now up to the research and industrial sectors to enhance the development of autonomous vehicles based on such guidelines. In the current state of the art, we find studies on how ethical theories can be integrated. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no framework for motion planning has yet been published which allows for the true implementation of any practical ethical policies. This paper makes four contributions: Firstly, we briefly present the state of the art based on recent works concerning unavoidable accidents of autonomous vehicles (AVs) and identify further need for research. While most of the research focuses on decision strategies in moral dilemmas or crash optimization, we aim to develop an ethical trajectory planning for all situations on public roads. Secondly, we discuss several ethical theories and argue for the adoption of the theory “ethics of risk.” Thirdly, we propose a new framework for trajectory planning, with uncertainties and an assessment of risks. In this framework, we transform ethical specifications into mathematical equations and thus create the basis for the programming of an ethical trajectory. We present a risk cost function for trajectory planning that considers minimization of the overall risk, priority for the worst-off and equal treatment of people. Finally, we build a connection between the widely discussed trolley problem and our proposed framework.

Dilemma situations involving the choice of which human life to save in the case of unavoidable accidents are expected to arise only rarely in the context of autonomous vehicles. Nonetheless, the scientific community has devoted significant attention to finding appropriate and acceptable automated decisions in the event that AVs or drivers of AVs were indeed to face such situations. Awad and colleagues, in their now famous paper “The Moral Machine Experiment”, used a “multilingual online ‘serious game’ for collecting large-scale data on how citizens would want AVs to solve moral dilemmas in the context of unavoidable accidents.” Awad and colleagues undoubtedly collected an impressive and philosophically useful data set of armchair intuitions. However, we argue that applying their findings to the development of “global, socially acceptable principles for machine learning” would violate basic tenets of human rights law and fundamental principles of human dignity. To make its arguments, our paper cites principles of tort law, relevant case law, provisions from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and rules from the German Ethics Code for Autonomous and Connected Driving.

The Honorable Merchant as an ideal of business ethics has a long-standing tradition. However, this ideal focusses a lot on the individual person and less on situational conditions, constraints and incentives under which people act. The Order Ethics approach helps conceptualize and justify why business ethics for the globalized market economy might shift this focus and put situational conditions on top of the agenda. This holds within companies as well: Instead of insisting on the ideal of the honorable merchant, companies should change structural incentives and conditions, by way of mechanisms such as Corporate Social Responsibility and others.

This paper draws a connection between recent developments in naturalized philosophy of science and in economics. Social epistemology is one part of the naturalistic enterprise that has become especially important. Some approaches in this field use methods borrowed from economics, a fact that has often been overlooked. But there are also genuinely economic approaches to the problems of science and knowledge. Some of these approaches can be seen as contributions to an "economic epistemology." While these contributions are certainly fruitful, they have also raised criticism from economists. I overview of these points of criticism and outline possibilities to deal with these problems. In particular, the Buchanan research program offers some help.

Teaching experiments are valuable when it comes to sensitizing students for business ethics that addresses the behavior of agents in modern societies. Many students are coined by the often predominantly individualistic ethical reasoning that they are accustomed to from their living environments. In our classes, we confront them with the volatility of their own ethical behavior by the use of experiments that ideally work with real incentives. We believe experiments to be a powerful tool not only to illustrate theoretical concepts, but also to make students experience the compulsion of economic incentives first-hand. This may lead to the insight that one is more prone to the contingencies of the situation than expected. Experiments may make students question their own behavior and re-evaluate the implementability of their moral ideals - as consumers, citizens and managers.

The theme arises from the legal-academic movement "Law and Literature". This newly developed field should aim at two major goals, first, to investigate the meaning of law in a social context by questioning how the characters appearing in literary works understand and behave themselves to the law, and second, to find out a theoretical solution of the methodological question whether and to what extent the legal text can be interpreted objectively in comparison with the question how literary works should be interpreted. The subject of justice and injustice has been covered not only in treatises of law and philosophy, but also in many works of literature: On the one hand, poets and writers have been outraged at the social conditions of their time. On the other hand, some of them have also contributed fundamental reflections on the idea of justice itself.

This edited collection brings together experts from various disciplines to engage critically with diversity theory, diversity politics, and their practical application. Accordingly, the volume provides a provocative discursive space, where the key theoretical as well as practical problems of diversity in business, institutions and culture can speak to each other and can be assessed. The aim is to bridge the gap between two relatively distinct discourses: the discourse on practical applications of diversity concepts and the discourse on theoretical approaches to diversity. This selection of articles delivers the first step towards achieving this goal. Approaching diversity from a business perspective, the chapters discuss its ramifications on democratic institutions and theory, as well as point to its relevance in didactic and educational settings.

Throughout its age-old tradition, philosophy has continuously been presented with new challenges. The latest one in this series comes from the experimental disciplines and their methodology: experimental philosophy has, during the last 10 to 15 years, increasingly gained reputation, and it has certainly been a controversial issue. Within this movement, the field of ethics deserves more attention. This article aims to give not a complete overview of, but at least an introduction to, the newly rising field of ‘Experimental Ethics’, the chances it offers, the problems for discussion, and the criticism to be expected.

This volume explores the concept of the honest merchant, taking a broad perspective and covering a wide range of aspects. It looks at the different types of “honest merchant” conceptions originating from different cultures and literary traditions. The book covers Japanese, Islamic, Scandinavian, Russian, German, Spanish, as well as other aspects, and studies different disciplinary backgrounds of the honest merchant, such as philosophical, economic, neuroethical, sociological and literary ones. The concept of the honest merchant has a long tradition in business ethics. In the Hanseatic League and in medieval Italy, the ideal of the honest businessman was taught since the late Middle Ages. It originated during a time when travelling merchants were often regarded with a sceptical eye. The honest merchants of their time however held clear principles in their business and took responsibility for their community. In later times, the religious notions of the concept lost their pivotal place to reason and morality. This book goes beyond the tradition of discussing business ethics in association with concepts from the Hanseatic League and medieval Italy, and puts the central concept of business ethics in a much greater perspective.

Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.

The ethics of autonomous cars and automated driving have been a subject of discussion in research for a number of years :28–58, 2016). As levels of automation progress, with partially automated driving already becoming standard in new cars from a number of manufacturers, the question of ethical and legal standards becomes virulent. For exam-ple, while automated and autonomous cars, being equipped with appropriate detection sensors, processors, and intelligent mapping material, have a chance of being much safer than human-driven cars in many regards, situations will arise in which accidents cannot be completely avoided. Such situations will have to be dealt with when programming the software of these vehicles. In several instances, internationally, regulations have been passed, based on legal considerations of road safety, mostly. However, to date, there have been few, if any, cases of a broader ethics code for autonomous or automated driving preceding actual regulation and being based on a broadly composed ethics committee of independent experts. In July 2016, the German Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, Alexander Dobrindt, appointed a national ethics committee for automated and connected driving, which began its work in September 2016. In June 2017, this committee presented a code of ethics which was published in German and in English. It consists of 20 ethical guidelines. Having been a member of this committee, I will present the main ethical topics of these guidelines and the discussions that lay behind them.

Zunächst einmal möchten wir klären, was der Begriff ökonomischer Bildung umfasst, um in einem zweiten Schritt klären zu können, welche Teilaspekte von ökonomischer Bildung möglicherweise verbindlich gelehrt werden sollten – und welche Teilaspekte etwa auch nur Teil von Spezialausbildungen sein könnten. Wir werden dabei zu dem Schluss kommen, dass vor allem die Politische Ökonomie – also ein Fach, das einen Schwerpunkt auf ordnungsökonomische und ordnungsethische Problemstellungen legt – ein Kandidat für die allgemein verbindliche Ausbildung an deutschen Schulen ist. Im zweiten Schritt möchten wir diskutieren, inwiefern sich die Einführung eines Faches Politische Ökonomie rechtfertigen ließe. Eine Rechtfertigung im philosophischen Sinne muss dabei zeigen können, dass die Einführung eines Fachs Politische Ökonomie nicht nur bestimmten Interessen – z.B. wirtschaftlichen Lobby-Gruppen dient –, sondern von einem gesellschaftlichen Konsens getragen werden könnte.

In many countries around the world, the mechanisms of civil society have become very commonplace. Large companies are under constant pressure from civil society organizations to change their policies, strategies and approaches. The tobacco industry in particular is under heavy pressure in many parts of the world. Smoking has been prohibited in many public as well as private or semi-private areas in a large number of countries. However, while smoking as an addiction seems to be declining in some countries, in others it is not. This paper presents an example of a country (Indonesia) in which smoking is still on the rise. We discuss how mechanisms of civil society are a chance to at least improve the situation and effectively combat a grave social problem.

During the current financial crisis, the need for an alternative to a laissez-faire ethics of capitalism (the Milton Friedman view) becomes clear. I argue that we need an order ethics which employs economics as a key theoretical resource and which focuses on institutions for implementing moral norms. I will point to some aspects of order ethics which highlight the importance of rules, e.g. global rules for the financial markets. In this regard, order ethics (“Ordnungsethik”) is the complement of the German conception of “Ordnungspolitik” which also stresses the importance of a regulatory framework. This framework is needed not to tame the market, but to make it more profitable in the long run. The conception of order ethics relies heavily on contractarianism, especially on James Buchanan’s work. Unlike many other conceptions of ethics, it does not start with an aim to achieve, but rather with an account of what the social world – in which ethical norms have to be implemented – is like. Our social world is different from the pre-modern one. Pre-modern societies played zero-sum games in which people could only gain significantly at the expense of others. And the types of ethics that we are still used to today have been developed within these pre-modern societies. Modern societies, by contrast, can be characterised – by economists and other social theorists alike – as societies with continuous growth. This growth has only been made possible by the modern competitive market economy which enables everyone to pursue his own interests within a carefully devised institutional system. In this system, positive sum games are played, which makes it in principle possible to improve the position of every individual at the same time. Most kinds of ethics, however, resulting from the conditions of pre-modern societies, ignore the possibility of win-win-situations and instead require us to be moderate, to share, to sacrifice, as this would have been functional in zero-sum games. These conceptions distinguish – in more or less strict ways – between self-interest and altruistic motivation. Self-interest, more often than not, is ultimately seen as something evil. Such an ethics cannot be functional in modern societies. Ethical concepts lag behind. Within zero-sum games, it was necessary to call for temperance, for moderate profits, or for a condemnation of lending money at interest. Within positive-sum games, however, the morally desired result of a social process cannot be brought about by changes in motivation, by switching from ‘egoistic’ to ‘altruistic’ motivation. The second theoretical element introduced by order ethics is the distinction between actions and rules, which was already mentioned. Traditional ethics concerns actions: It calls directly for changes in behaviour. This is a consequence of pre-modern conditions as reconstructed before: People in the pre-modern world were only able to control their actions, not so much however the conditions of their actions. In particular, rules like laws, constitutions, social structures, the market order, and also ethical norms have remained stable for centuries. In modern societies, this situation has changed entirely. The rules governing our actions have increasingly come under our control. In this situation, ethics has to focus on rules. Morality must be incorporated in incentive-compatible rules. Direct calls for changes in behaviour without changes in the rules lead only to an erosion of compliance with moral norms. Individuals that continue to behave ‘morally’ will be singled out, because the incentives have not been changed. Moral norms which are to be justified cannot require people to abstain from pursuing their own advantage. People abstain from taking ‘immoral’ advantages only if adherence to ethical norms yields greater benefits over the planned sequence of actions than defection in the single case. Thus ‘abstaining’ is not abstaining in the long run, it is rather an investment in expectations of long-term benefits. By adhering to ethical norms, I become a reliable partner for interactions. The norms do indeed constrain my actions, but they simultaneously expand my options in interactions. And people consent to rules only if these rules hold greater advantages for them, at least in the long run. In general, ethics cannot require people to abandon their individual calculation of advantages. However, it may suggest improving one’s calculation, by calculating in the long run rather than in the short run, and by taking into account the interests of our fellows, as we depend on their acceptance for reaching an optimal level of well-being, especially in a globalized world full of interdependence. The problem of implementation can now be placed at the beginning of a conception of order ethics, justified with reference to the conditions of modern societies I have sketched. Under the conditions of pre-modern societies, an ethics of temperance had evolved that posed simultaneously the problems of implementation and justification. The implementation of well-justified norms or standards could then be regarded as unproblematic, because the social structures allowed for a direct face-to-face enforcement of norms. Pre-modern societies not only favored an ethics of temperance, they also had the instrument of face-to-face-sanctions within their smaller and non-anonymous communities. This instrument is no longer functional in modern anonymous societies, and so we have to face up to the problem of implementation right at the start of our ethical conception. Simultaneously, an order ethics relies on the implementation of sanctions for enforcing incentive-compatible rules. In modern societies, rules and institutions, to a large extent, must fulfil the tasks that were, in pre-modern times, fulfilled by moral norms, which in turn were sanctioned by face-to-face sanctions. Norm implementation in modern societies thus works by setting adequate incentives in order to prevent the erosion of moral norms, which would happen if ‘moral’ actors were systematically threatened with exploitation by other, less ‘moral’ actors. This conception of order ethics is then elaborated further in the area of business ethics.

The Handbook of Business Ethics: Philosophical Foundations is a standard interdisciplinary reference handbook in the field of business ethics. Articles by notable philosophers and economists examine fundamental concepts, theories and questions of business ethics: Are morality and self-interest compatible? What is meant by a just price? What did the Scholastic philosophers think about business? The handbook will cover the entire philosophical basis of business ethics. Articles range from historical positions such as Aristotelianism, Kantianism and Marxism to systematic issues like justice, religious issues, rights and globalisation or gender. The book is intended as a reference work for academics, students (esp. graduate), and professionals.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is a wide consensus in society and science that a modern society cannot do without a market economy. The current political and academic debate revolves primarily around the question of what kind of social system a modern society needs. This question includes important normative as well as instrumental aspects. In this essay, we want to pursue the question of how modern societies can best achieve progress in both dimensions. The standard response — both politically and academically — is that we can improve our social system best through piecemeal engineering. According to the standard view, the improvements of our social system should be both democratically legitimizced and put into effect nationwide. In this essay, we want to oppose this consensus and raise the question whether a competition between decentralized social systems would not be a more apt means to reach shared goals. The motivating idea behind this essay is not to pesent a fully-fledged theory, but to question some of the standard presumptions for piecemeal engineering that is often directed against institutional compctition in the realm of social systems.

This volume explores various aspects of risk taking. It offers an analysis of financial, entrepreneurial and social risks, as well as a discussion of the ethical implications of empirical findings. The main issues examined in the book are the financial crisis and its implications for business ethics. The book discusses unethical behaviour as a reputational risk (e.g., in the case of Goldman Sachs) and the question is raised as to what extent the financial crisis has changed the banks’ entrepreneurial strategy. The book presents an analysis of the reasons leading to the crisis and identifies them as ethical dilemma structures. In addition, it looks at general questions regarding ethical behaviour and risk taking, such as: To what extent does the social embeddedness or abstraction play a role in guaranteeing ethical behaviour? What conclusions can be drawn from institutional or evolutionary perspectives on risk management? Finally, the book discusses further issues that become factors of risk within and between societies, such as work insecurity, corruption or the problem of facilitation payments as a risk in international transactions.

Contract-based approaches have been a focus of attention in business ethics. As one of the grand traditions in political philosophy, contractarianism is founded on the notion that we will never resolve deep moral disagreement. Classical philosophers like Hobbes and Locke, or recent ones like Rawls and Gaus, seek to solve ethical conflicts on the level of social rules and procedures. Recent authors in business ethics have sought to utilize contract-based approaches for their field and to apply it to concrete business dilemmas. However, the application of contractarianism to management contexts can cause difficulties. Our article discusses this conceptual problem of contractarian business ethics and presents the idea of order ethics as an alternative. Order ethics, as we argue, can make a difference by conceptually bridging the gap between contractarianism and business ethics.

This paper draws a connection between recent developments in naturalized philosophy of science and the Buchanan research program in economics. Economic approaches in naturalized philosophy of science can be combined to form an economic philosophy of science. After giving an overview of some of these approaches, I lay out the fundamentals of the Buchanan research program. I argue that its main elements are a theory of interactions and a normative foundation in consensus which help to answer some important criticisms of economic philosophy of science.

Ziel dieses Papiers ist es die Ordnungsethik – einen bereichsethischen Ansatz, der derzeit vor allem für wirtschaftsethische Fragestellungen benutzt wird – als eine universelle Methode zur Analyse von bereichsethischen Fragestellungen vorzustellen. Um das Vorhaben handhabbar zu machen, muss es in zweierlei Hinsicht eingeschränkt werden. Zum einen kann es sich hier natürlich nicht um eine voll ausgearbeitete Methodologie für die Analyse von bereichsethischen Fragestellungen handeln, sondern nur um eine methodische Skizze. Zum anderen soll es in diesem Papier im Wesentlichen um solche bereichsethischen Fragestellungen gehen, deren Lösung die Implementierung von formellen wie informellen Regeln erfordert.