• Double bookkeeping in delusions: Explaining the gap between saying and doing
    In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 237--256. 2011.
    In this chapter I defend the doxastic account of delusions and offer some reasons to believe that the double-bookkeeping argument against doxasticism (delusions are not beliefs because they do not drive action) should be resisted.
  •  141
    This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can l…Read more
  •  18
    In this paper I compare different criteria for moral status, and assess Regan's notion of a "subject of a life".
  •  47
    Philip Gerrans the measure of madness: Philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and delusional thought
    with Rachel Gunn
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 919-923. 2016.
    Review of Measure of Madness
  •  255
    Agency, life extension, and the meaning of life
    The Monist 93 (1): 38-56. 2010.
    Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists argue that life extension is bad for the individual. According to the agency objection to life extension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Life extension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the meaningfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to life extension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-ma…Read more
  •  170
    Intentionality without rationality
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3): 385-392. 2005.
    It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description
  •  761
    Rationality, diagnosis and patient autonomy
    Oxford Handbook Psychiatric Ethics. 2014.
    In this chapter, our focus is the role played by notions of rationality in the diagnosis of mental disorders, and in the practice of overriding patient autonomy in psychiatry. We describe and evaluate different hypotheses concerning the relationship between rationality and diagnosis, raising questions about what features underpin psychiatric categories. These questions reinforce widely held concerns about the use of diagnosis as a justification for overriding autonomy, which have motivated a shi…Read more
  •  143
    Irrationality
    Polity Press. 2014.
    We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane. In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Borto…Read more
  •  190
    Does reflection lead to wise choices?
    Philosophical Explorations 14 (3): 297-313. 2011.
    Does conscious reflection lead to good decision-making? Whereas engaging in reflection is traditionally thought to be the best way to make wise choices, recent psychological evidence undermines the role of reflection in lay and expert judgement. The literature suggests that thinking about reasons does not improve the choices people make, and that experts do not engage in reflection, but base their judgements on intuition, often shaped by extensive previous experience. Can we square the tradition…Read more