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701Animal rights, animal minds, and human mindreadingJournal of Medical Ethics 32 (2): 84-89. 2006.Do non-human animals have rights? The answer to this question depends on whether animals have morally relevant mental properties. Mindreading is the human activity of ascribing mental states to other organisms. Current knowledge about the evolution and cognitive structure of mindreading indicates that human ascriptions of mental states to non-human animals are very inaccurate. The accuracy of human mindreading can be improved with the help of scientific studies of animal minds. But the scientifi…Read more
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18Can the subject-of-a-life criterion help grant rights to non-persons?In Matti Häyry (ed.), Arguments and analysis in bioethics, Rodopi. 2010.In this paper I compare different criteria for moral status, and assess Regan's notion of a "subject of a life".
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141Mental illness as mental: a defence of psychological realismHumana Mente 3 (11): 25-44. 2009.This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can l…Read more
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353Agency, life extension, and the meaning of lifeThe Monist 93 (1): 38-56. 2010.Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists argue that life extension is bad for the individual. According to the agency objection to life extension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Life extension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the meaningfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to life extension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-ma…Read more
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47Philip Gerrans the measure of madness: Philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and delusional thoughtBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 919-923. 2016.Review of Measure of Madness
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Areas of Specialization
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Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology |
Philosophy of Psychology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Epistemology |
Applied Ethics |