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32Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance?Synthese 198 (6): 5437-5454. 2019.When subject to the choice-blindness effect, an agent gives reasons for making choice B, moments after making the alternative choice A. Choice blindness has been studied in a variety of contexts, from consumer choice and aesthetic judgement to moral and political attitudes. The pervasiveness and robustness of the effect is regarded as powerful evidence of self-ignorance. Here we compare two interpretations of choice blindness. On the choice error interpretation, when the agent gives reasons she …Read more
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31The relative importance of undesirable truthsMedicine Healthcare and Philosophy (4): 683-690. 2012.The right not to know is often defended on the basis of the principle of respect for personal autonomy. If I choose not to acquire personal information that impacts on my future prospects, such a choice should be respected, because I should be able to decide whether to access information about myself and how to use it. But, according to the incoherence objection to the right not to know in the context of genetic testing, the choice not to acquire genetic information undermines the capacity for a…Read more
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31Review of Evnine, Simon J., Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. viii + 176, £32.50 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 349-352. 2009.
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27Delusions in Context (edited book)Palgrave. 2018.This open access book offers an exploration of delusions--unusual beliefs that can significantly disrupt people's lives. Experts from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, including lived experience, clinical psychiatry, philosophy, clinical psychology, and cognitive neuroscience, discuss how delusions emerge, why it is so difficult to give them up, what their effects are, how they are managed, and what we can do to reduce the stigma associated with them. Taken as a whole, the book proposes that …Read more
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26A new Philosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology 35 (1): 1-5. 2022.Editorial describing changes in the journal Philosophical Psychology
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26The relative importance of undesirable truthsMedicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4): 683-690. 2013.The right not to know is often defended on the basis of the principle of respect for personal autonomy. If I choose not to acquire personal information that impacts on my future prospects, such a choice should be respected, because I should be able to decide whether to access information about myself and how to use it. But, according to the incoherence objection to the right not to know in the context of genetic testing, the choice not to acquire genetic information undermines the capacity for a…Read more
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25Review of Carolyn Price, Functions in mind: A theory of intentional content (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3). 2002.Book Information Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content Carolyn Price Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 vi + 263 Hardback £35 By Carolyn Price. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. vi + 263. Hardback:£35.
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25Introduction: Philosophical Perspectives on ConfabulationTopoi 39 (1): 115-119. 2020.Introduction to a special issue on confabulation
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23Why We Should Be Curious about Each OtherPhilosophies 8 (4): 71. 2023.Is curiosity a virtue or a vice? Curiosity, as a disposition to attain new, worthwhile information, can manifest as an epistemic virtue. When the disposition to attain new information is not manifested virtuously, this is either because the agent lacks the appropriate motivation to attain the information or because the agent has poor judgement, seeking information that is not worthwhile or seeking information by inappropriate means. In the right circumstances, curiosity contributes to the agent’…Read more
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21Review of New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure by Nikolaj Nottelmann (review)Dialectica 68 (1): 141-146. 2014.
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19Why Delusions MatterBloomsbury Publishing. 2023.When we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical delusions in schizophrenia, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are implausible and resistant to counterevidence; these can include anything from beliefs about the benefits of homeopathy to concerns about the threat of alien abduction. Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions …Read more
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18Can the subject-of-a-life criterion help grant rights to non-persons?In Matti Häyry (ed.), Arguments and analysis in bioethics, Rodopi. 2010.In this paper I compare different criteria for moral status, and assess Regan's notion of a "subject of a life".
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17What Makes a Belief Delusional?In I. McCarthy, K. Sellevold & O. Smith (eds.), Cognitive Confusions, Legenda. 2016.In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions, since there is no consensus yet on what causes delusions. Some of the defining features of delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence. Other defining features of delusions are psychological and focus on whe…Read more
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17Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional ContentAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3): 380-381. 2002.Review of the book by Carolyn Price, "Functions in Mind".
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17Sharing responsibility for conspiracy beliefs: The agency-in-context modelResistances. Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (6). 2022.In this paper, I borrow Neil Levy’s account of bad beliefs as a starting point to discuss how the social turn in epistemology affects our understanding of the formation, persistence, and spreading of conspiracy beliefs. Despite the recent convergence of philosophers and psychologists on the importance of studying the social dimensions of cognition, current models of conspiracy beliefs differ substantially as to the role that agents have in adopting and maintaining conspiracy beliefs. As a result…Read more
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16Are delusions bad for you?Forum for European Philosophy Blog. 2016.Lisa Bortolotti argues that there is more to judging delusions than whether they accurately reflect the world.
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15Challenges and achievements for Philosophical PsychologyPhilosophical Psychology 36 (1): 1-3. 2023.Last January I took up the editorship of Philosophical Psychology and assembled a great team of associate editors and book review editors. Our goal was to work toward a more inclusive, diverse, and...
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14Why Delusions MatterBloomsbury Publishing. 2023.Delusions can be many things. They can be symptoms of mental health problems, such as schizophrenia, clinical delusions, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are unsupported by evidence. We call the latter everyday delusions and they can include anything from the benefits of homeopathy to the dangers of alien abduction. Yet, why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why can they be so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions reall…Read more
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13Can there be delusions of pain?Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2): 167-172. 2021.: Jennifer Radden argues that there cannot be delusional pain in depression, putting forward three arguments: the argument from falsehood, the argument from epistemic irrationality, and the argument from incongruousness. Whereas delusions are false, epistemically irrational, and incongruous with the person’s experience, feeling pain from the first-person perspective cannot be false or irrational, and is congruous with the person’s experience in depression. In this commentary on Radden’s paper, w…Read more
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13Are delusions bad for you?Forum for European Philosophy Blog. 2015.Lisa Bortolotti argues that there is more to judging delusions than whether they accurately reflect the world.
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11Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefsIn Geert Keil, Lara Keuck & Rico Hauswald (eds.), Vagueness in Psychiatry, Oxford University Press. pp. 191-210. 2016.
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11The Role of Context in Belief Evaluation: Costs and Benefits of Irrational BeliefsIn Julien Musolino, Joseph Sommer & Pernille Hemmer (eds.), The Cognitive Science of Belief, Cambridge University Press. 2022.Irrational beliefs are often seen as beliefs that are either costly or even pathological and it is assumed that we should eliminate them when possible. In this paper we argue that not only irrational beliefs are a widespread feature of human cognition and agency but also that, depending on context, they can be beneficial to the person holding them, not only psychologically but also epistemically. Given that rationality is highly valued, judgements of rationality have wide-ranging implications fo…Read more
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11Agency Without RationalityIn Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, Palgrave. pp. 265-280. 2018.In the chapter I suggest that epistemic rationality should not be seen as a condition for intentional agency, but rather as an aspiration. Common failures of epistemic rationality in agents, such as conservatism, superstition, and prejudice, do not prevent us from interpreting and predicting those agents’ behaviour on the basis of their intentional states. In some circumstances, including confabulatory explanations and optimistically biased beliefs, instances of epistemic irrationality are instr…Read more
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10Intentionality and the welfare of minded non-humansTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2): 83-96. 2010.
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10Are clinical delusions adaptive?Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews. Cognitive Science 10 (5). 2019.Delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and dementia. By and large, delusions are characterized by their behavioral manifestations and defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. In this overview paper, we ask whether delusions can be adaptive notwithstanding their negative features. Can they be a response to a crisis rather than the source of the crisis? Can they be the beginning of a solution rather than the problem? Some of the psychological, …Read more
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10Affective Instability and ParanoiaIn Anna Bortolan & Alessandro Salice (eds.), Discipline Filosofiche (2018-2): Philosophical Perspectives on Affective Experience and Psychopathology, Quodlibet. pp. 123-136. 2018.
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7Marks of IrrationalityIn S. Clarke & T. D. Lyons (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Springer. pp. 157-173. 2002.
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2Rationality and self-knowledge in delusions and confabulations: Implications for autonomy as self-governanceIn Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder, Oxford University Press. pp. 100-122. 2012.
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2What's wrong with 'mental' disorders?Psychological Medicine. 2010.Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V".
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Double bookkeeping in delusions: Explaining the gap between saying and doingIn Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 237--256. 2010.In this chapter I defend the doxastic account of delusions and offer some reasons to believe that the double-bookkeeping argument against doxasticism (delusions are not beliefs because they do not drive action) should be resisted.
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Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology |
Philosophy of Psychology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Epistemology |
Applied Ethics |