•  11
    Delusions and the Background of Rationality
    Mind and Language 20 (2): 189-208. 2005.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson need to be met fo…Read more
  •  17
    Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of neuroscience in th…Read more
  •  22
    Optimism, Agency, and Success
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (3): 1-15. 2018.
    Does optimism lead to success? Friends of optimism argue that positive beliefs about ourselves and our future contribute to fitness and mental health, and are correlated with good functioning, productivity, resilience, and pro-social behaviour. Sceptics, instead, claim that when we are optimistic we fail to react constructively to negative feedback, and put ourselves at risk because we underestimate threats. Thus, it is controversial whether optimistic beliefs are conducive to success, intended …Read more
  •  85
    Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief
    In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief, Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73. 2017.
    In this chapter we argue that some beliefs present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief, according to which it is constitutive of belief that it is aimed at truth. We draw on empirical literature which shows that subjects form beliefs about the real world when they read fictional narratives, even when those narratives are presented as fiction, and subjects are warned that the narratives may contain falsehoods. We consider Nishi Shah’s teleologist’s dilemma and a response to…Read more
  •  23
    The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions
    Mind and Language 33 (3): 263-279. 2018.
    In some neuropsychological disorders memory distortions seemingly fill gaps in people’s knowledge about their past, where people’s self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people’s capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people’s sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological wellbeing. Here we consider both psychological benefits an…Read more
  •  16
    Delusion
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions
  •  2
    What's wrong with 'mental' disorders?
    with Matthew Broome
    Psychological Medicine. 2010.
    Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V".
  •  26
    A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2): 205-224. 2008.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’…Read more
  •  2
    Moral Rights and Human Culture
    Ethical Perspectives 13 (4): 603-620. 2006.
    In this paper I argue that there is no moral justification for the conviction that rights should be reserved to humans. In particular, I reject James Griffin’s view on the moral relevance of the cultural dimension of humanity. Drawing from the original notion of individual right introduced in the Middle Ages and the development of this notion in the eighteenth century, I emphasise that the practice of according rights is justified by the interest in safeguarding the powers of reason and autonomy…Read more
  •  157
    Depressive Delusions
    Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2): 192-201. 2016.
    In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delusions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an i…Read more
  •  32
    Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 879-900. 2016.
    In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are una…Read more
  • The concept of scientific research
    In Carlos Maria Romeo Casabona (ed.), Los nuevos horizontes de la investigacion genetica, Camares. 2011.
    Chapter discussing what it takes for an activity to be an instance of scientific research
  •  21
    Delusions and the background of rationality
    Mind and Language 20 (2): 189-208. 2005.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to b…Read more
  •  13
    What does Fido believe?
    Think 7 (19): 7-15. 2008.
    Lisa Bortolotti introduces the arguments about whether dogs can have beliefs
  •  7
    Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1): 77-87. 2011.
    This feature in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) is intended to provide ongoing commentary on main articles previously published in PPP. The essay by Bortolotti below is a response to John Rhodes and Richard Gipps's paper in PPP (15, no. 4:295-310).Can we understand people who report delusional beliefs? In their thought-provoking paper, "Delusions, Certainty, and the Background", John Rhodes and Richard Gipps (2008) present a novel account of delusions which has two main purposes: (1) …Read more
  •  4
    Philip Gerrans The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and delusional thought (review)
    with Rachel Gunn
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3). 2015.
    Review of Phil Gerrans' book on delusions, The Measure of Madness.
  •  6
    An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science provides a lively and accessible introduction to current key issues and debates in this area. The classic philosophical questions about methodology, progress, rationality and reality are addressed by reference to examples from the full range of natural and social sciences. Lisa Bortolotti uses a historically-informed perspective on the evolution of science and includes a thorough discussion of the ethical implications of scientific research. Special a…Read more
  •  41
    Immortality without boredom
    Ratio 22 (3): 261-277. 2009.
    In this paper we address Bernard Williams' argument for the undesirability of immortality. Williams argues that unavoidable and pervasive boredom would characterise the immortal life of an individual with unchanging categorical desires. We resist this conclusion on the basis of the distinction between habitual and situational boredom and a psychologically realistic account of significant factors in the formation of boredom. We conclude that Williams has offered no persuasive argument for the nec…Read more
  •  144
    What makes a belief delusional?
    with Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Rachel Gunn
    In I. McCarthy, K. Sellevold & O. Smith (eds.), Cognitive Confusions, Legenda. pp. 37-51. 2016.
    In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions. Some of the defining features of delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence). Other defining features of delusions are psychological and they focus on whether delusions are harmful, as in the definition of …Read more
  •  12
    Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals, deserve respectful treatment. It has been argued that, where we cannot agree on whether these individuals have moral status, we might agree that they have symbolic value and ascribe to them moral value in virtue of their symbolic significance. In the paper I resist the suggestion that symbolic value is relevant to ethical disputes in which the respect for individuals with no intrin…Read more
  •  97
    Costs and Benefits of Realism and Optimism
    Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2): 194-198. 2015.
    Purpose of review: What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about style of thinking and mental health. Recent findings: Recent invest…Read more
  •  3
    Delusions in Context (edited book)
    Palgrave. 2018.
    This open access book offers an exploration of delusions--unusual beliefs that can significantly disrupt people's lives. Experts from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, including lived experience, clinical psychiatry, philosophy, clinical psychology, and cognitive neuroscience, discuss how delusions emerge, why it is so difficult to give them up, what their effects are, how they are managed, and what we can do to reduce the stigma associated with them. Taken as a whole, the book proposes that …Read more
  •  54
    Taking the long view: an emerging framework for translational psychiatric science
    with Bill Fulford and Matthew Broome
    World Psychiatry 13 (2): 110-117. 2014.
    Understood in their historical context, current debates about psychiatric classification, prompted by the publication of the DSM-5, open up new opportunities for improved translational research in psychiatry. In this paper, we draw lessons for translational research from three time slices of 20th century psychiatry. From the first time slice, 1913 and the publication of Jaspers’ General Psychopathology, the lesson is that translational research in psychiatry requires a pluralistic approach encom…Read more
  •  1
    Neurophilosophy at work • by Paul Churchland (review)
    Analysis 69 (1): 176-178. 2009.
    This is a collection of Paul Churchland's recent essays which have in common an overarching research programme aimed at identifying the scope and the importance of the contributions that neuroscience has made and will make to philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, epistemology and metaphysics. The general structure of many of the essays included in the collection is as follows: there is a long-standing problem in the philosophical literature which has escaped not only a convincing solution but al…Read more
  •  6
    Can we recreate delusions in the laboratory?
    with Rochelle Cox and Amanda Barnier
    Philosophical Psychology 25 (1). 2012.
    Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic s…Read more
  •  26
    ‘Faultless’ ignorance: Strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation
    with Rochelle E. Cox
    Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4): 952-965. 2009.
    There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However…Read more