Jaap Van Brakel

In this article, we trace and elucidate Heidegger’s radical re-thinking on the relation between science and technology from about 1940 until 1976. A range of passages from the Gesamtausgabe seem to articulate a reversal of the primacy of science and technology in claiming that “Science is applied technology.” After delving into Heidegger’s reflection on the being of science and technology and their “coordination,” we show that such a claim is essentially grounded in Heidegger’s idea that “Science and technology are the Same [das Selbe].” In addition, we argue that, although different ontic epochs can be distinguished in the evolvement of science and/or technology, for Heidegger there is only one unique ontological Epoch of modernity that encompasses various ontic epochs. Therefore, the change from an “epoch of objectivity” to an “epoch of orderability [Bestellbarkeit]” cannot be considered to be an ontological shift. Furthermore, it is not right to ascribe to Heidegger the view that the development of quantum physics signals the beginning of a new ontological Epoch

Models underlying the use of similarity considerations, dimensionless numbers, and dimensional analysis in chemical engineering are discussed. Special attention is given to the many levels at which models and ceteris paribus conditions play a role and to the modeling of initial and boundary conditions. It is shown that both the laws or dimensionless number correlations and the systems to which they apply are models. More generally, no matter which model or description one picks out, what is being modeled is itself a model of something else. Instead of saying that the artifact S models the given B, it is therefore better to say that S and B jointly make up B and S

In this paper my aim is to shed light on the common behavior of human beings by looking at '' first contacts '': the situation where people with unshared histories first meet. The limits of the human life form are given by what is similar in the common behavior of human beings. But what is similar should not be understood as something that is biologically or psychologically or transcendentally shared by all human beings. What is similar is what human beings would recognize as similar in first or other contacts-a similarity that is, in a way, transcendentally grounded, but the content of this grounding remains tied to the local situation of actual encounters. To be a human person, it is both an empirical and a transcendental precondition that one knows the certainties of particular form of life and that one is capable of recognizing and dealing with an indefinite variety of human behaviors. Because I participate in form of life, I can interact with other form of life. By considering first contacts and by interacting with other communities, one can learn to understand better what the common behavior of human beings is/are.