Rico Vitz

In this paper, I elucidate Hume’s account of doxastic virtues and offer three reasons that contemporary epistemologists ought to consider it as an alternative to one of the broadly Aristotelian models currently offered. Specifically, I suggest that Hume’s account of doxastic virtues obviates (1) the much-debated question about whether such virtues are intellectual, “moral,” or some combination thereof, (2) the much-debated question about whether people have voluntary control of their belief formation, and (3) the need to make the kind of thick metaphysical commitments about essentialism and final causation that Aristotelian accounts of such virtues require.

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy is substantially unchanged from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. I show that Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ to refer to three different mental phenomena (a psychological mechanism or principle, a sentiment, and a conversion process) and that he consistently refers to sympathy as a cause of benevolent motivation. I attempt to resolve an apparent difficulty regarding sympathy and humanity by explaining how each is an ‘original principle’ in Hume’s sense. I conclude by suggesting how my interpretation might make a contemporary evaluation of Hume’s account of benevolent motivation possible.

Are Hume's skeptical principles reconcilable with his naturalistic 'science of man'? This is the 'riddle' of Hume's Treatise. Without a solution to this riddle (specifically, one that offers an affirmative answer to the question), Hume's project seems self-defeating, with his skeptical principles undermining his attempt to develop the new 'science' (pp. 3, 270ff; cf. p. vii). Thus, the riddle has understandably been both a major point of contention among Hume scholars as well as a source of intriguing and helpful discussions for philosophers interested in Hume's work. Paul Russell attempts to solve the riddle by fundamentally reorienting the way that people read the Treatise (see, e.g., pp. 61, 69, 270-2)..... All things considered, Paul Russell's The Riddle of Hume's Treatise is an excellent and thought-provoking text that is a pleasure to read. It provides a compelling case regarding the nature and significance of Hume's 'irreligious' motives. In so doing, it lends further support for a naturalistic reading of Hume, according to which Hume's skepticism serves his naturalism and, ultimately, his 'anti-Christian' motives. It deserves to have an important impact not only on Hume research, but on the narrative that drives undergraduate survey courses in the history of early modern philosophy as well.