Edward Halper

The last chapter of Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) is a brief for freedom of religion. In our enthusiasm for Spinoza's conclusion it is easy to overlook the blatant contradiction between this thesis and the central claim of the immediately preceding chapter that "right over matters of religion is vested entirely in the sovereign." There Spinoza emphasizes the necessity that there be but one sovereign in the state and the threat that autonomous religious authorities would pose to the authority of this sovereign. This last claim is, in turn, bolstered by his analysis of the deficiencies of the Hebrew state in the chapter before, chapter 18, according to which it was the usurpation of political authority by priests that ultimately undermined the state. In other words, in chapters 18 and 19, Spinoza makes the case for the strict political control of religion only to conclude his treatise by arguing, in chapter 20, that the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom and that that freedom manifests itself, in part, in freedom of religion. How could this latter not pose exactly the sort of threat to the sovereign and the state that leads Spinoza to insist on the sovereign's absolute control of religion? How can Spinoza insist that religion be both free and controlled by the state? This paper aims to answer this question and, in the process, explains a number of troubling features of the Theological-Political Treatise.

By examining Klein’s discussion of the difference between Plato and Aristotle regarding the ontology of number, this article aims to spells out the significanceof that debate both in itself and for the development of the later mathematical sciences. This is accomplished by explicating and expanding Klein’s account of the differences that exist in the understanding of number presented by these two thinkers. It is ultimately argued that Klein’s analysis can be used to show that the transition from the ancient to the modern number concept has some roots in this disagreement between Plato and Aristotle regarding number. This, in turn, sets up that dispute as an essential part of the background to the more general break between ancient and modern conceptuality, the uncovering of whichis Klein’s main concern.

Why should the work of the ancient and the medievals, so far as it relates to nature, still be of interest and an inspiration to us now? The contributions to this enlightening volume explore and uncover contemporary scholarship's debt to the classical and medieval past. Thinking About the Environment synthesizes religious thought and environmental theory to trace a trajectory from Mesopotamian mythology and classical and Hellenistic Greek, through classical Latin writers, to medieval Christian views of the natural world and our relationship with it. The work also offers medieval Arabic and Jewish views on humanity's inseparability from nature. The volume concludes with a study of the breakdown between science and value in contemporary ecological thought. Thinking About the Environment will be a invaluable source book for those seeking to address environmental ethics from a historical perspective.

In the first lines of Metaphysics 3, Aristotle argues that any progress in this discipline hinges on carefully working through the problems peculiar to it, the metaphysical aporiai; and he devotes all of book 3 to drawing up these problems. Despite this warning, book 3 and its doublet, book 11.1–2, have received relatively little attention. Many of the problems Aristotle sets out here are not addressed explicitly elsewhere in the Metaphysics, their discussion in book 3 is inconclusive, and most seem today of little intrinsic interest on their own. Book 3 has often been read as a merely historical record of that stage in his development when Aristotle personally struggled with Platonism, other philosophies, or his own earlier philosophy. Since there is no detailed and thorough study of book 3 in the recent literature, Madigan’s contribution is sorely needed and a worthy addition to the Clarendon Aristotle series. Like other volumes in the series, this one includes a literal translation followed by a line by line commentary that aims to explore different construals of Aristotle’s arguments and a glossary. Madigan also provides a few pages of textual notes that, unlike the rest of the book, presuppose some knowledge of Greek. A lengthy introduction does a good job of connecting book 3 to the rest of the Metaphysics. Book 11 receives relatively little attention—three pages in the introduction, six in the commentary. Madigan divides the text by aporia, he works through each argument that falls under each aporia, emphasizing in the process Aristotle’s frequent shifts in focus and assumption; Madigan tries to trace the origin of the various assumptions; and he concludes his discussion of each aporia by explaining where and how Aristotle solves it. Additionally, Madigan groups some of book 3’s aporiai and provides, either for the group or each nongrouped aporia, an introduction and an epilogue that lists the premises mentioned explicitly in each aporia along with a statement of whether or not Aristotle continued to accept each or how his view changed. Madigan counts 124 such premises in the whole of book 3. His conclusion is that “working through the aporiai of book 3 would heighten one’s awareness of the difficulties of the issues, but book 3 does not state in so many words what the ‘knots’ in our thinking are, much less how to untie them”.