Denis Fisette

This presentation aims to clarify the historical and theoretical background of the studies included in this issue of Philosophiques, which focus on the work of Husserl during the period of Halle . After a brief description of Husserl’s early years of apprenticeship in philosophy between 1876 and his studies with Brentano in Vienna, I identify several steps that marked the development of his philosophy from his arrival in Halle to the publication of the Logical Investigations : his studies under the direction of C. Stumpf, the publication of the first volume of Philosophy of Arithmetic, the researches belonging to the project of the second volume of this work, the abandonment of this project and the development of the phenomenology of the Logical Investigations. The last part of this paper is an examination of the philosophical issues underlying the disputatio on D. W. Smith’s recent book on Husserl’s philosophy

What is phenomenology's contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind? I am here concerned with this question, and in particular with phenomenology's contribution to what has come to be called the problem of consciousness. The problem of consciousness has constituted the focal point of classical phenomenology as well as the main problem, and indeed perhaps the stumbling block, of the philosophy of mind in the last two decades. Many philosophers of mind, for instance, Thomas Nagel, Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, Colin McGinn and David Chalmers, have acknowledged the properly phenomenological character of this problem; Nagel is even willing to entrust the study of phenomenal consciousness to what he calls an “objective phenomenology.” Yet, the phenomenology to which these philosophers resort has little to do with the conceptual framework that was developed within the phenomenological tradition. They put forward an entity they term “phenomenal consciousness,” but only in the hope that it may be explained by means of the theories that currently prevail in the philosophy of mind or in cognitive sciences.

Les études colligées dans le présent ouvrage ont pour objet les Recherches logiques de Edmund Husserl. La plupart de ces études sont issues du colloque "Les Recherches logiques d'Edmund Husserl, origines et postérité de la phénoménologie (1900/1)" qui a eu lieu à Montréal au mois de mai 2001. Le prétexte à cet événement était de marquer le centenaire de la publication de l'ouvrage séminal de la phénoménologie par une réflexion sur sa signification actuelle, ses origines et sa postérité. L'ouvrage contient douze études qui examinent divers aspects des Recherches logiques de Husserl.

Study of the controversy between Franz Brentano and his student Carl Stumpf on emotions and sense-feelings. The issue is whether the pleasure that provides an object such as a work of art is intentional, as it is the case in Brentano's theory in which it is closely related to the class of emotions (love and hate), or merely phenomenal as Stumpf wants it. The paper is divided into two parts : I first examine several aspects of the relationship between Stumpf and Brentano and I evaluate in the second part whether Stumpf's deviations from several theses of Brentano's descriptive psychology, namely on emotions and sense-feelings, challenge his commitment to Brentano's program in philosophy.

Como conciliar as repetidas críticas ao fenomenismo de Mach, um pouco por toda a obra de Husserl, com o papel proeminente que Husserl parece nele reconhecer em seus últimos trabalhos, quanto à gênese de sua própria fenomenologia? Para responder a essa questão, examinaremos, primeiramente, a relação estreita que Husserl estabelece entre o método fenomenológico e o descritivismo de Mach à luz do debate que opõe nativismo e empirismo sobre a origem da percepção do espaço. Em seguida, examinaremos dois aspectos da crítica que Husserl faz ao positivismo de Mach: o primeiro se refere ao fenomenismo e sua doutrina dos elementos, enquanto o segundo, ao princípio de economia de pensamento, que Husserl associa a uma forma de psicologismo em Prolegômenos. A hipótese que nos guiará nesse estudo é que as opiniões aparentemente contraditórias de Husserl sobre o positivismo de Mach se explicam em parte pelo estatuto duplo que a fenomenologia recebe em seus últimos trabalhos: enquanto programa filosófico, ela se opõe explicitamente ao positivismo; enquanto método, ela se aparenta ao descritivismo de Mach. Concluiremos com a ideia de que esses dois filósofos de origem checa perseguiam o objetivo comum de apreender o sentido originário de positividade.

In ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’, D. Davidson distinguishes three types of knowledge: knowledge of the self, of others’ thoughts, and knowledge of the world. He notes that the Cartesian tradition privileged the first type of knowledge believing that the other two could be derived from it. Against Cartesianism and logical positivism, Davidson maintains that these three modes of knowledge are irreducible, although complementary. I am particularly interested here in one of the arguments brought up by Davidson against the reduction of any one of these modes of thoughts. I will begin my analysis with his views on the characterization and explanation of intentional behavior. according to Davidson, the normative character of rationality and of the concepts used in the characterization and explanation of behavior constitute an inevitable obstacle to their reduction to an explanation using nonnormative concepts, and more particularly, to strict laws. The thesis of the irreducibility of explanations by rationalizations of the explanatory type found in physics but also in biology and neurophysiology, refers, of course, to his theory of identity, and more particularly, to his third principle: the anomalism of the mental. As we all know, this doctrine has been the object of numerous debates in contemporary philosophy. However, it is not my intention to add to this debate. My goal is to examine whether the normative character of rationality, which is also an argument in support of the anomalism of the mental, can support the thesis of the irreducibility of explanations through reasons.

The purpose of this book is to highlight Carl Stumpf's contributions to philosophy and to assess some of the aspects of his work. This book brings together several specialists of Stumpf and the school of Franz Brentano, and includes fourteen original studies (in English and German) on the various aspects of Stumpf's philosophy, and some of his unpublished writings. This book is divided into four sections, and also includes a general introduction on the reception and actuality of Stumpf's philosophy. The first section examines the historical sources of his philosophy, the second examines some of the central themes of his work and the third examines his relationship to other philosophers. The fourth section consists of notes taken by Husserl during Stumpf's lectures on metaphysics in Halle, Stumpf's introduction to the edition of his correspondence with Brentano, which he prepared in 1929, and some important letters pertaining to this correspondence. This book also provides a comprehensive bibliography of Stumpf's works.

Lecture frégéenne de la phénoménologie désigne une interprétation de la théorie husserlienne de l'intentionnalité qui s'inspire des travaux de Gottlob Frege. Largement répandue à l'époque dans la tradition anglo-américaine, cette lecture marque un retour aux problèmes fondamentaux qui sont à l'origine de la philosophie contemporaine. Elle désigne aussi une pratique de la phénoménologie qui s'exerce dans d'autres champs de la philosophie contemporaine. Cette étude cherche à reconstituer quelques-uns des débats qui ont marqué cette lecture non orthodoxe de la phénoménologie, d'en expliciter les enjeux et présupposés, et de questionner la légitimité des parallèles qu'elle s'autorise avec la phénoménologie contemporaine.

The twelve original studies collected in this volume examine different aspects of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. They are authored by scholars and specialists internationally recognized for their expertise in the fields of phenomenology, logic, history of philosophy and philosophy of mind. They approach Husserl's groundwork from different angles and perspectives and shed new light on a number of issues such as meaning, intentionality, ontology, logic, etc. They also explore questions such as the place of the Logical Investigations within the whole of Husserl's work, its sources in 19th century philosophy and in particular in the philosophical work of Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, its reception amongst the so-called members of the Munich Circle and its influence on contemporary philosophy. In short, this volume constitutes a "companion" to Husserl's Logical Investigations.

Ce numéro de Philosophiques rend hommage au philosophe d’origine autrichienne Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) à l’occasion de son 150e anniversaire de naissance. Il est consacré à l’oeuvre du jeune Husserl durant la période de Halle (1886-1901) et réunit plusieurs spécialistes des études husserliennes qui jettent un regard neuf sur cette période méconnue dans la philosophie du père de la phénoménologie. Avec un souci de situer Husserl dans le contexte historique auquel appartiennent ses principaux interlocuteurs durant cette période, ces études portent sur des thèmes tels l’intentionnalité dans son rapport à Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano et Kazimierz Twardowski ; sa théorie du jugement et des assomptions ; sa philosophie des mathématiques et de la logique ; sa contribution au débat sur la Gestalt ; ses échanges avec le néokantisme de Marbourg, et notamment avec Paul Natorp, etc. Ces études sont suivies d’une disputatio autour d’un ouvrage récent portant sur le projet philosophique de Husserl et le sens de sa phénoménologie aujourd’hui.

On nous a habitué, dans les études husserliennes, à traiter de la ques tion du rapport de la phénoménologie des Recherches logiques à Brentano dans la perspective de la critique que Husserl adresse à la théorie immanen tiste de l’intentionnalité dans cet ouvrage*. Mais cette perspective laisse dans l’ombre un enjeu fondamental de la question qui sous-tend les discussions de Husserl dans la § 15 de la cinquième Recherche et dans l’Appendice au deuxième volume de l’ouvrage, à savoir ce que j’appellerai par commodité la thèse du caractère coextensif de la conscience, de l’inten tionnalité et de la pensée. Je voudrais montrer que la critique que Husserl adresse à cette thèse s’appuie sur la distinction introduite dans ses premiers travaux à Halle entre les actes et les contenus sensibles ou contenus pri maires, plus précisément entre deux classes au sein de l’expérience sensible, la première correspondant aux phénomènes psychiques de Brentano, l’autre, qui n’est pas intention nelle, correspond à ce qu’il est maintenant convenu d’appeler la conscience ou l’expérience phénoménale. Pour ce faire, j’exami nerai la critique de la théorie de la perception de Brentano (uniquement celle de sa Psychologie de 1874) dans la première édition des Recherches logiques ainsi que dans un traité sur la perception publié récemment sous le titre de « Abhandlung über Wahrnehmung von 1898 » qui était vraisemblablement destiné à la deuxième série des Re cherches logiques.

This study attempts to situate Carl Stumpf's theory of emotions with regard to that of his teacher, Franz Brentano, and to the sensualist theory of William James. We will argue that Stumpf's theory can be considered an attempt to reconcile James's sensualism, which emphasizes the role of bodily feelings, with what we will call, for the purposes of this study, Brentano's intentionalism, which conceives of emotions as intentional states. Stumpf claims that James's sensory feelings and Brentano's affective intentional states are two sides of the same coin in that they constitute two essential ingredients of a full-fledged theory of emotions. The question is whether Stumpf's ecumenism avoids the objections that he himself raises against James's and Brentano's theories. The paper is divided into four parts: the first part presents Stumpf's classification of psychical functions; the second part presents his criticism of James's theory of emotions; the third part is a summary of Stumpf's complex debate with Brentano on emotions and sensory feelings; the last part examines Stumpf's attempt to incorporate into his theory of affects the phenomenological and intentional aspects of emotions. I conclude with a note on the unity of consciousness.

Examen, dans les cours de Marbourg de Heidegger, des thèmes suivants: a) La « critique » par Heidegger de la phénoménologie husserlienne ; b) Le noème husserlien et les deux dogmes de la théorie traditionnelle de l'intentionnalité ; c) L'aptitude de la théorie husserlienne de l'intentionnalité à rendre compte de la dimension, de l'agir sous-jacente au Dasein; d) finalement, nous examinerons les relations complexes qu'entretiennent les concepts d'intentionnalité et de transcendance.

At first, I introduce two different paths, which lead from Husserl’s phenomenology to classical German philosophy : a. Psychologism: from Kant to the Logical Investigations through Fries, Beneke and Herbart; b. Idealism, from Fichte to Husserl’s late conception of philosophy as transcendental idealism). Then, I argue, in the first section, that Husserl’s transcendental turn after the Logical Investigations could be understood as a kind of idealism, deriving from Fichte. The next part deals mainly with phenomenology’s double meaning : as philosophia perennis and as intentional psychology. First Philosophy asunderstood by Husserl is twofold: as Wissenschaftslehre (a science of all possible sciences) and as justification. I argue that phenomenology’s main contributions to philosophy lie in the concepts of justification and evidence and that intentional psychology plays an important role in that context, methodological as well as conceptual. 4. The final section is a discussion of what Husserl calls in the Krisis the “paradox of human subjectivity”, i.e. the relation between transcendental and empirical ego. The paper concludes with two remarks on foundationalism and intuition.J'introduis, dans un premier temps, deux voies différentes qui mènent de La phénoménologie husserlienne à la philosophie allemande classique: le psychologisme (de Kant aux Recherehes logiques), en passant par Fries, Beneke et Herbart; et l’idéalisme (de Fichte à la conception tardive, chez Husserl, de la philosophie en tant qu’idealisme transcendantal). Je soutiens, en premiere section, que le toumant transcendantal de Husserl apres les Recherehes logiques pourrait etre compris en tant qu’idéalisme, tributaire de Fichte. La seconde partie porte principalement sur la double signification de la phénoménologie: comme philosophia perennis et comme psychologie intentionnelle. Husserl entend la philosophie première de deux façons: en tant que Wissenschaftslehre (une science de toutes les sciences possibles) et en tant que justification. Je soutiens que la contribution principale de la phénoménologie se trouve dans les concepts de justification et d’evidence. La psychologie intentionnelle joue un rôle capital dans ce contexte, tant au niveau méthodologique que conceptuel. La troisième section représente une discussion de ce que Husserl appelle le «paradoxe de la subjectivité humaine»dans la Krisis, c’est-à-dire la relation entre l’ego transcendantal et empirique. Je conclus par deux remarques sur le fondationalisme et l’intuition

What is phenomenology's contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind? I am here concerned with this question, and in particular with phenomenology's contribution to what has come to be called the problem of (intentional) consciousness. The problem of consciousness has constituted the focal point of classical phenomenology as well as the main problem, and indeed perhaps the stumbling block, of the philosophy of mind in the last two decades (Fisette and Poirier 2000). Many philosophers of mind, for instance, Thomas Nagel (1974), Ned Block (1995), Owen Flanagan (1977), Colin McGinn (1991) and David Chalmers (1996), have acknowledged the properly phenomenological character of this problem; Nagel is even willing to entrust the study of phenomenal consciousness to what he calls an “objective phenomenology.” Yet, the phenomenology to which these philosophers resort has little to do with the conceptual framework that was developed within the phenomenologicaltradition.They put forward an entity they term “phenomenal consciousness,” but only in the hope that it may be explained by means of the theories that currently prevail in the philosophy of mind or in cognitive sciences.

La parution récente d'un livre de M. Dummett sur les origines de la philosophie analytique sert ici de prétexte pour examiner à nouveau la question de la relation entre la théorie frégéenne de la signification et la théorie husserlienne de l'intentionnalité. Dummett défend la thèse suivant laquelle les pensées et le sens ont un caractère essentiellement linguistique et qu'ils sont incompatibles avec la conception husserlienne du contenu intentionnel. Nous examinerons les arguments qu'il fait valoir pour l'autonomie du langage et de la signification relativement à la pensée conceptuelle et la légitimité de la distinction entre pensée au sens propre et "pensée primitive" qui est introduite afin de rendre compte du cas de la perception. In a recent book, Urspruenge der analytischen Philosophie, M. Dummett takes a new look at the relationship between Frege's theory of meaning and Husserl's doctrine of intentionality. He argues for the autonomy of linguistic meaning relative to conceptual thought and his arguments are supposed to show that Frege's "Sinne" are incompatible with Husserl's intentional content. I argue that once Dummett's understanding of the intentional content as something psychological is discarded, Husserl's phenomenology can be seen as an extension of, and perhaps a complement to, what Dummett calls Frege's theory of meaning.