Paolo Valore

This paper examines the concept of rape through the lenses of epistemic injustice, social ontology, and conceptual engineering, arguing that entrenched rape myths and historically privileged meaningmaking render the operative concept of rape systematically distorted. The authors propose diagnosing these distortions via conceptual and ontological analysis and outline an ameliorative agenda that (a) revises both manifest (legal) and operative (everyday) concepts and (b) enriches the surrounding conceptual vocabulary to better capture the diversity of experiences of sexual harm. The paper positions this framework as a novel bridge between recent meta-ontological work and feminist philosophy on hermeneutical injustice, aiming to guide future theoretical and practical improvements.

This article examines the divergent yet converging perspectives of W.V.O. Quine and Richard Rorty on the ontology of mathematics. While Quine grounds mathematical entities in the indispensability of abstract objects for scientific theories, Rorty rejects representationalist commitments, constructing mathematics as a contingent linguistic practice. The study reconstructs Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, his holistic epistemology, and his treatment of mathematics as an indispensable component of the web of belief, contrasting them with Rorty’s anti-foundationalist account of mathematics as a pragmatic tool devoid of ontological import. The analysis emphasizes their respective views on the functional role of mathematics, highlighting a shared pragmatist orientation that, beneath their surface disagreement, converges in situating mathematics as a practice for coping with and structuring experience rather than as a reflection of a pre-given reality. The article argues that their apparent opposition between realism and anti-realism masks a deeper convergence: both conceive mathematics as a constructed and adaptable device for generating conceptual possibilities and enabling action.

_La matematica per affrontare il mondo: una lettura pragmatista di Quine e Rorty_ L’articolo esamina le prospettive divergenti e, al contempo, convergenti di W.V.O. Quine e Richard Rorty sull’ontologia della matematica. Mentre Quine fonda gli enti matematici sull’indispensabilità degli oggetti astratti per le teorie scientifiche, Rorty respinge ogni impegno rappresentazionalista, concependo la matematica come una pratica linguistica contingente. Lo studio ricostruisce il criterio di Quine per l’impegno ontologico, la sua epistemologia olistica e la sua trattazione della matematica come componente indispensabile all’interno della rete delle credenze, mettendoli a confronto con l’impostazione anti-fondazionalista di Rorty, che interpreta la matematica come uno strumento pragmatico privo di portata ontologica. L’analisi mette in rilievo le rispettive concezioni del ruolo funzionale della matematica, evidenziando, al di là del disaccordo superficiale, una convergenza su un orientamento pragmatico che riconosce nella matematica una pratica finalizzata ad affrontare e strutturare l’esperienza piuttosto che un riflesso di una realtà già esistente. L’apparente opposizione tra realismo e antirealismo nasconderebbe quindi una convergenza più profonda: entrambi concepiscono la matematica come un dispositivo costruito e adattabile per generare possibilità concettuali e rendere possibile l’azione.

This article introduces a novel theoretical framework for addressing epistemic injustice—a phenomenon where certain groups or individuals are systematically excluded from knowledge creation and dissemination processes—by employing ontological relativity and conceptual analysis. “Ontological relativity” refers to a philosophical perspective that posits our understanding of reality as being shaped by our toolbox of concepts, categories, language, and social practices; “conceptual analysis” is a method of inquiry that involves the rigorous examination and deconstruction of a particular concept or set of concepts in order to uncover their constituent elements, relationships, and underlying assumptions. To exemplify the effectiveness of the ontology‐based approach, two paradigmatic applications are explored: (a) educational practices and (b) clinical practice and access to health care. Through the presentation of these applications and the step‐by‐step illustration of the applied methodology, the aim of the article is to showcase the efficacy of ontology in tackling epistemic injustices, suggesting innovative paths for future research in this domain.

One of the complications of a clear evaluation of different positions called “realism” in metaphysics and ontology is discrepancy in terminology and variance of basic intuitions inherent this notion. I recommend a taxonomy that distinguishes three kinds of variance: variance in the sets of conditions for a philosophical position to be acknowledged as actual realism, variance in strength and variance in conceptual frameworks. Within this last case, I propose to differentiate realism in epistemology, in ontology, and in metaphysics, intersecting these three variants with the local/global realism dichotomy. The taxonomy here provided aims at being meta-philosophical; expressive enough for a fine-grained articulation of different philosophical positions in the recent debate, including the question of metaphysical grounding; and impartial, with no need to be connected to the defense of one form or another of the philosophical positions called “realism.”

One of the innovative approaches in contemporary philosophical ontology consists in the assumption of a plurality of ontologies based on different metaphysical presuppositions. Such presuppositions involve, among others, the identification of relevant properties for the objects of our domain as a guiding principle in uncovering what it is to be considered intrinsic and what could be the mere effect of selection preferences based on objective or subjective criteria. A remarkable example of the application of a background metaphysical theory in astrophysics is the problem of selection biases in detecting cosmological objects, such as supernovae, galaxies and gamma-ray bursts. We will show that it is valuable to be aware of the importance of uncovering this type of background theory to better understand selection effects and to promote a novel approach in scientific research.

According to the quantificational Quinean model in meta-ontology, the question of ontology boils down to the question of whether a sortal property is exemplified. I address some complications that arise when we try to build a philosophical reconstruction of the link between individuals and kinds displayed in the exemplification relation from the point of view of conceptualism about kinds and having in mind this stand in ontology. I distinguish two notions of resemblance, object-to- object and object-to- kind, and show the problems with both of them. Finally, I argue for a better awareness of the implicit "bias" involved in the very notion of "resemblance," without indulging in Quine's veto toward this notion.

Ponto de partida do presente artigo é uma interrogação acerca do significado existencial das proposições. Em primeiro lugar, é considerada a ideia de existência simbólica na lógica de MacColl, ao mesmo tempo que se assinalam os problemas que, na perspectiva de Bertrand Russell, estão associados com a auta-referência e o significado da classe-nula. Por outro lado, o artigo demonstra também até que ponto a própria perspectiva de Russell não está livre de problemas, de ambiguidades e de mudanças de opinião. O autor do artigo partilha a crítica de Russell sobre o significado do quantificador, acabando por usar Russell contra Russell, ou seja, a réplica russelliana de 1957 a G. J. Warnock contra a réplica russelliana de 1905 a MacColl. Assim, a partir de uma análise lógica do debate entre Russell e MacColl, o artigo procede a uma investigação da relação entre Lógica e Ontologia, considerando de um modo especial o caso dos objectos não-existentes. /// Moving from a technical, logical point of view in the RusselUMacColl debate about the existential import of propositions and the significance of the null-class, the paper tries to inquiry the relationship between logic and ontology, considering in special the case ofnon existing objects, Russell's philosophical treatment of the existential quantification gains his full meaning in his realistic perspective. But it is possible to use this treatment versus Russell intentions, to deny that there is a supplementary (in space-time) existence, that "lies wholly outside Symbolic Logic".