-
1091How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You're ExpectingRes Philosophica 92 (2): 1-12. 2015.L.A. Paul has argued that an ordinary, natural way of making a decision -- by reflecting on the phenomenal character of the experiences one will have as a result of that decision -- cannot yield rational decision in certain cases. Paul's argument turns on the (in principle) epistemically inaccessible phenomenal character of certain experiences. In this paper I argue that, even granting Paul a range of assumptions, her argument doesn't work to establish its conclusion. This is because, as I argue…Read more
-
738In Defense of Comic PluralismEthical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2): 375-392. 2017.Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
-
793Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for AttitudesJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3): 1-8. 2013.Mark Schroeder has recently offered a solution to the problem of distinguishing between the so-called " right " and " wrong " kinds of reasons for attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder tries out two different strategies for making his solution work: the alethic strategy and the background-facts strategy. In this paper I argue that neither of Schroeder's two strategies will do the trick. We are still left with the problem of distinguishing the right from the wrong kinds of reasons
-
97On Durant Drake’s “May Belief Outstrip Evidence?”Ethics 125 (2): 536-539. 2015.In his "May Belief Outstrip Evidence?" (1916) Durant Drake argues that beliefs may sometimes permissibly outstrip evidence. Drake's novel idea is that epistemic reasons are not the final arbiter of the justificatory status of beliefs. In this short note I motivate Drake's idea by suggesting an analogy between the epistemic justification of belief and the moral justification of intention.
APA Eastern Division
Central District, Hong Kong
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |