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Nathaniel Sharadin

University of Hong Kong
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  •  738
    In Defense of Comic Pluralism
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2): 375-392. 2017.
    Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
    AmoralistsAesthetic NormativityAesthetics and EthicsComicsMoral Judgment, Misc
  •  793
    Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3): 1-8. 2013.
    Mark Schroeder has recently offered a solution to the problem of distinguishing between the so-called " right " and " wrong " kinds of reasons for attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder tries out two different strategies for making his solution work: the alethic strategy and the background-facts strategy. In this paper I argue that neither of Schroeder's two strategies will do the trick. We are still left with the problem of distinguishing the right from the wrong kinds of reasons
    Ethics of BeliefBuck-Passing Accounts of Moral ValueReasons, MiscReasons and Rationality
  •  97
    On Durant Drake’s “May Belief Outstrip Evidence?”
    Ethics 125 (2): 536-539. 2015.
    In his "May Belief Outstrip Evidence?" (1916) Durant Drake argues that beliefs may sometimes permissibly outstrip evidence. Drake's novel idea is that epistemic reasons are not the final arbiter of the justificatory status of beliefs. In this short note I motivate Drake's idea by suggesting an analogy between the epistemic justification of belief and the moral justification of intention.
    Value TheoryEpistemic NormsReasons and RationalityIntentions, MiscEthics of BeliefReasons, Misc
  •  79
    Motivational Internalism (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2015.
    Motivational Internalism is a collection of thirteen new essays on exactly the topic you expect it to be, given the title. It also contains an introductory chapter, in which the editors attach an excellent overview of the current state of play to an intimidating bibliography. The essays in the volume are divided into three sections, each with its own, shorter, introduction by the editors. The first section concerns evidence for and against motivational internalism; the second concerns the releva…Read more
    Moral Reasoning and Motivation, MiscMoral MotivationInternalism and Externalism about Reasons