Markku Roinila

The advance of mechanism in science and philosophy in the 17th century created a great interest to machines or automata. Leibniz was no exception - in an early memoir Drôle de pensée he wrote admiringly about a machine that could walk on water, exhibited in Paris. The idea of automatic processing in general had a large role in his thought, as can be seen, for example, in his invention of the binary code and the so-called Calculemus!-model for solving controversies. In metaphysics, the idea of an automata was expressed most clearly in the 1695 article New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and the ensuing correspondence with, among others, Foucher, Bayle, Lamy, Jaquelot and Masham. In the article Leibniz discusses the soul as a spiritual machine in the context of pre-established harmony, arguing that God can "give to a substance at the outset a nature or internal force which could produce in it an orderly way (as in spiritual or formal automaton; but a free one, in the case of a substance which is endowed with a share of reason) everything that is going to happen to it, that is to say, all the appearances or expressions it is going to have, and all without the help of any created thing." The basic idea of Leibniz's spiritual machine is that the soul or entelechy is an autonomous and spontaneous unity, consisting of internal active force and producing its own perceptions (both confused and distinct). It is a self-moving machine, driven by its perceptions and appetites, but it follows (without being conscious of it) a lawful series or programme created by God. The entelechy remains the same despite undergoing an infinite number of changes. To Foucher he explained that each state of the individual substance is a consequence of its preceding one, "as if there were only God and the substance in the world". Despite this, the spiritual machine is related not only to God, but through the pre-established harmony to bodies or natural machines. However, as it is not dependent on them, the spiritual machine is superiot to natural machines. In this paper I concentrate on three moral themes related to the spiritual machine: moral deliberation, moral identity and the goal of moral action. All these themes are more or less implicit in the New System, but are discussed in more detail in the ensuing correspondence after the publication of the article. Finally, the themes are given an extended discussion especially in the second book of New Essays on Human Understanding (1704, published 1765), written partly at the same time as some of the correspondence and unpublished related material. I will first give an overview of Leibniz's position concerning the spiritual machine or automaton in the New System and then go on to explore the three moral themes one by one, as they feature in the subsequent correspondence and in the New Essays. I will show that the three topics are essential to the function of the spiritual machine – to Sophie Charlotte Leibniz wrote: "...let us say that everything in bodies happens mechanically, or in accordance with laws of motion, and that everything in the soul happens morally, or in accordance with perceived good or evil." There are many texts that anticipate the views in the New System (notably the unpublished memoir De Affectibus of 1679) and Leibniz continued to discuss its themes later on (in addition to correpondence, for example, in Theodicy of 1710 and Monadology and Principles of Nature and Grace of 1714). Here I focus on the short-term development of Leibniz's views on the topic (around 1695-1705), but I argue that his basic view of the spiritual machine did not change much after finishing the dialogue with Locke in 1704.

Hahmottelen tässä artikkelissa tekoälyn historiaa varhaismodernin filosofian aikakaudella 1600–1700-luvuilla. Esittelemäni aiheet ovat hieman erillisiä toisistaan, mutta yhteistä niille on ajatus komputaatiosta tai automaatiosta, eräänlaisesta mekaanisesta laskemisesta tai toiminnasta, jota voi pitää tekoälyn varhaisena lähtökohtana. On kuitenkin huomattava, että pelkkä komputaatio eli informaation käsittely sinänsä ei riitä tekoälylle – kaikkia näitä pyrkimyksiä leimaa tietynlainen epistemologinen optimismi: automatisoidun ajattelun avulla uskotaan saatavan enemmän laadukasta tietoa ja kenties myös uudenlaisia ajatuksia, kun ajatteluprosessi tulee sujuvammaksi. Tekoälyn varhaishistoria liittyy siis nimenomaan inhimillisen ajattelun mekanisoimiseen ja uskoon siitä, että sen avulla voidaan lieventää ihmismielen rajoituksia ja ajatella paremmin. Yhteistä sekä tekoälyn että tietokoneen historialle on kuitenkin laskennan kehitys.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnizia (1646–1716) on usein kutsuttu universaalineroksi. Luonnehdinta on varsin osuva ottaen huomioon Leibnizin intressien laajuuden, hänen luovan panoksensa monille eri aloille ja metafyysis-kulttuurisen vision, joka kajasti kaikkien hänen hankkeidensa, niin teoreettisten kuin käytännöllistenkin, taustalla. Leibniz tunnetaan nykyään ennen kaikkea filosofina ja matemaatikkona, mutta ei juurikaan siitä, että hän toimi suuren osan elämästään kahden eri kirjaston hoitajana: Hannoverin herttuallisen kirjaston ja edelleen maineikkaan, Wolfenbüttelissä sijaitsevan Herzog August Bibliothekin. Tämä katsausartikkeli esittelee Leibnizin kirjastouraa ja hänen kirjastonhoitoa koskevia näkemyksiään, jotka eivät omana aikanaan olleet aivan tavanomaisia. Leibnizin universaalikäsityksen mukaan kirjasto ei nimittäin ole kirjoilla täytetty tila vaan heijastus koko inhimillisen tiedon tilasta. Artikkelissa luodaan katsaus aiheesta kirjoitettuun kansainväliseen tutkimuskirjallisuuteen ja Leibnizin kirjastonhoitoa käsitteleviin muistoihin.

Causality and Mind presents seventeen of Nicholas Jolley's essays on early modern philosophy, which focus on two main themes. One theme is the continuing debate over the nature of causality in the period from Descartes to Hume. Jolley shows that, despite his revolutionary stance, Descartes did no serious re-thinking about causality; it was left to his unorthodox disciple Malebranche to argue that there is no place for natural causality in the new mechanistic picture of the physical world. Several essays explore critical reactions to Malebranche's occasionalism in the writings of Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume, and show how in their different ways Leibniz and Hume respond to Malebranche by re-instating the traditional view that science is the search for causes. A second theme of the volume is the set of issues posed by Descartes' innovations in the philosophy of mind. It is argued that Malebranche is once again a pivotal figure. In opposition to Descartes Malebranche insists that ideas, the objects of thought, are not psychological but abstract entities; he thus opposes Descartes' 'dustbin theory of the mind'. Malebranche also challenges Descartes' assumption that intentionality is a mark of the mental and his commitment to the superiority of self-knowledge over knowledge of body. Other essays discuss the debate over innate ideas, Locke's polemics against Descartes' theory of mind, and the issue of Leibniz's phenomenalism. A major aim of the volume is to show that philosophers in the period are systematic critics of their contemporaries and predecessors

Teos sisältää 89 pienoiselämäkertaa, jossa filosofisista kysymyksistä väitelleet suomalaiset kertovat kokemuksistaan matkalla kohti väitöstä. Väittelyiden aikaväli sijoittuu vuosille 1953–2010, ja mukana on monenlaisia tarinoita ja anekdootteja akateemisesta opintiestä ympäri maailmaa, Tasmaniasta Jyväskylään. Kertojina toimivat monet arvostetuimmat suomalaiset filosofit ja toisaalta vasta äskettäin tutkimustaan puolustaneet tulevaisuuden lupaukset. Kirjoittajat kertovat syttymisestään filosofiaan, opiskeluvuosistaan, tutkijanuransa huipuista ja aallonpohjista sekä väitöstapahtumasta ja sen jälkeisistä tuntemuksista. The book includes 98 mini-autobiographies of Finnish philosophers.

Filosofisia tutkielmia sisältää Leibnizin tärkeimmät metafyysiset teokset ja lisäksi varsin laajan valikoiman lyhyitä kirjoituksia monilta hänen filosofiansa aloilta: logiikkaa, tieto-oppia, etiikkaa, oikeusfilosofiaa, fysiikkaa, matematiikkaa ja eri uskontokuntien uskontunnustusten yhteensovittamisesta. Tutkielman lisäksi mukana on osia kirjeenvaihdosta Antoine Arnauld’n kanssa ja koko kuuluisa kirjeenvaihto Samuel Clarken kanssa. Teos sisältää myös johdannon sekä selitysosan, jotka avaavat nykylukijalle tämän monipuolisen filosofian ajattelua. A collection of Leibniz writings translated to Finnish with introduction and notes.

G. W. Leibniz developed a new model for rational decision-making which is suited to complicated decisions, where goods do not rule each other out, but compete with each other. In such cases the deliberator has to consider all of the goods and pick the ones that contribute most to the desired goal which in Leibniz’s system is ultimately the advancement of universal perfection. The inclinations to particular goods can be seen as vectors leading to different directions much like forces in Leibniz’s dynamics. The vectorial model of rational decision-making is related to Leibniz’s work with metaphysical physics and the calculus of variations and is a heuristic tool which helps in finding reasonable combinations – in ideal cases optimums - between competing goods. By applying the model, the decision-maker can map and compare outcomes of combinations of goods in question and practice a kind of pseudo-mechanical arithmetic of reasons. A central feature of the model is the possibility to employ geometrical figures to help the conceptualization. In this paper I present the vectorial model, examine its applications in practical cases from political theory, jurisprudence and ethics Leibniz presented, and compare the model to recent theories of acting under uncertainty, such as bounded rationality and optimizing under constraints.

Our focus in this article concerns Leibniz’s views on evil. Our goal is to examine which are the consequences of his conception of moral agency for the moral psychology of the genuinely evil person. For Leibniz, moral failure is an epistemic error since it involves some false practical judgement. Moral maxims may be represented in blind or symbolic cognitions, but then moral agents can misrepresent the evil consequences of their behaviour. Finally, we discuss Leibniz’s view on habits that may help virtuous persons strive for perfection but also enable evil persons to continue sinning.

Tyynen rauhallisesti, traagisen ennenaikaisesti, koomisen kommelluksen seurauksena, arkipäiväisen banaalisti... Filosofin kuolema sisältää neljäkymmentä tarinaa siitä, miten filosofi kohtaa kuoleman. Mitä Pythagoras ajatteli kuolemanjälkeisestä elämästä? Mikä oli Sokrateen itsemurhan tausta? Entä miten esimerkiksi Platon, Pyrrhon, Aristoteles, Plotinos, Avicenna, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, Benjamin, Kaila ja Foucault suhtautuivat kuolemaan ja miten he kuolivat? Heijastaako filosofin tapa kuolla hänen käsitystään elämästä ja kuolemasta?