Alejandro Rosas

Evolutionary explanations of altruism and human cooperation, first set forth by pioneers such as Darwin, Hamilton and Trivers, suggest that biology might be capable of offering a plausible scientific explanation of the core of human morality. According to this project, morality and human cooperation arise when resourcesare scarce; they cannot be exploited by isolated individuals; and individuals cannot maintain a long-term position of domination over others in order to advance their selfish ends. An important philosophical question that arises with respect to this project has to do with the concepts of de morality and moral motivation that itpresupposes. The evolutionary project has not been clear in this respect. The article argues in favor of two theses: 1) evolutionary explanations of cooperation suggest a contractual type of morality, but they are ambiguous regarding the motivations favored by natural selection, thus reflecting, without resolving it, a traditionaldisagreement between Hobbes’s moral contractualism (selfish motivations) and that of Kant (altruistic motivations); 2) in their current form, these explanations cannot resolve that disagreement, but a reflection on the role of the capacity to interpret the motivations and character of others in the evolution of morality could provide arguments in favor of Kantian contractualism.

Se busca rastrear la imagen que Platón tiene de Heráclito y articularla con la estructura argumentativa del Cratilo, para comprender las necesidades textuales a las que responde la doctrina del flujo perpetuo, es decir, la discusión sobre la corrección (ὀρθότης) del nombre. Gracias a la inclusión del testimonio heraclíteo, resulta posible rastrear la presunta consolidación de la tesis sobre los nombres primarios y los secundarios como el eje de la separación entre dos planos de realidad (uno estable y uno móvil) y de la teoría de las Ideas -es decir, como la base de la epistemología platónica presente en los diálogos de madurez-. The article seeks to trace the image Plato has of Heraclitus and connect it with the argumentative structure of the Cratylus in order to understand the textual needs that give rise to the doctrine of perpetual flux, that is, the discussion regarding the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names. The inclusion of Heraclitus's testimony makes it possible to trace the alleged consolidation of the thesis regarding primary and secondary names as the axis of separation between two levels of reality (one stable, the other, changing) and the theory of Ideas -that is, as the basis of Plato's epistemology as set forth in the late dialogues-

Investigadores pertenecientes a la tradición de la psicología del desarrollo cognitivo han llevado a cabo estudios que sugieren que existe un vínculo entre la percepción de daño y el dominio moral. Frente a esta propuesta unificadora del dominio moral han surgido críticas desde la psicología cultural. Haidt publicó en 1993 uno de los estudios más influyentes en esta línea, afirmando haber encontrado evidencia que sugiere la existencia de dominios morales no vinculados a la noción de daño. En este artículo se hará una presentación general del debate en torno al contenido del dominio moral. Luego presentaremos y evaluaremos el estudio de Haidt et al.. Por último, presentamos resultados experimentales que cuestionan las conclusiones de ese estudio y sugieren que el debate sigue abierto. Researchers belonging to the tradition of cognitive-developmental psychology have suggested studies that the perception of harm is central to the Moral Domain. This unifying proposal of the Moral Domain has provoked the criticisms of researchers working in Cultural Psychology. Haidt published in 1993 a very influential study, claiming to have found evidence for the existence of Moral Domains not linked to the notion of harm. In this paper, we briefly present the debate around the content of the moral domain. We then critically examine the study by Haidt et al.. Finally, we present experimental results that question the conclusions of their study and suggest that the debate is still open.

RESUMEN Diversos estudios han concluido que los pacientes con daño en la Corteza Frontal -CF- o Corteza Prefrontal Ventromedial -CPV- muestran una disposición a herir directamente a otra persona con el fin de salvar varias vidas en sus respuestas a los "dilemas morales personales", revelando una posible carencia de empatía. No obstante, cuando evalúan conductas carentes de empatía sin justificación utilitarista, sus respuestas son normales. Defendemos aquí que los pacientes sufren una deficiencia cognitiva relacionada con la hipótesis de marcador somático de Damasio y con juicios de valor. Criticamos la hipótesis del "paciente utilitarista", que se ha atrincherado en la neurociencia cognitiva. ABSTRACT In their answers to questions regarding "personal moral dilemmas", patients with lesions to the Frontal Cortex -FC- or Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex -vmPFC- display a disposition to directly injure another person in order to save lives, thus revealing a possible lack of empathy. However, their answers are normal when they evaluate behaviors lacking in empathy but without a utilitarian justification. We here defend that those patients suffer from a cognitive deficiency associated with Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis and with value judgments. The article critiques the "utilitarian patient" hypothesis that has become deeply rooted in cognitive neuroscience. RESUMO Diversos estudos têm concluído que os pacientes com danos no Córtex Frontal (CF) ou Córtex Pré-frontal Ventromedial (CPV) mostram uma disposição a ferir diretamente a outra pessoa com o objetivo de salvar várias vidas em suas respostas aos "dilemas morais pessoais", o que revela uma possível carência de empatia. Contudo, quando avaliam condutas carentes de empatia sem justificativa utilitarista, suas respostas são normais. Defendemos aqui que os pacientes sofrem uma deficiência cognitiva relacionada com a hipótese de marcador somático de Damásio e com juízos de valor. Criticamos a hipótese do "paciente utilitarista", que vem se refugiando na neurociência cognitiva

Evolutionary ethics debunks moral realism – or value realism in general – but this is not the same as debunking the authority of moral claims, for moral realism is not the only possible explanation of the source of moral authority. However, a few influential evolutionary philosophers do believe that evolution debunks not just moral realism, but morality, period. My main purpose in this paper is to highlight the difference between these two versions of debunking, and to extricate evolutionary theory from being publicly associated with debunking morality, period. Briefly summarized, the latter view is linked to the claim that unless one believes in the objectivity of moral injunctions, the experience of their peculiar authority will not be available. This claim is an unexpected survival of a basic tenet of moral realism, namely, that moral norms derive their authority from objective realities. It is unfortunate to see this claim survive in evolutionary ethicists. They should rather embrace the view that the universal authority of moral norms is vindicated via a set of evolved, socially conditioned, psychological constraints on self-interest, none of which include a belief in the mind-independent objectivity of value.

Una literatura creciente en neuropsicología estudia el juicio moral aplicando dilemas morales a personas con daños neuronales o con rasgos de personalidad antisocial; y parece confirmar una tendencia al juicio utilitarista contra-intuitivo, es decir, estas personas aprueban el sacrificio de un inocente para salvar varias vidas. Argumentamos que las evidencias encontradas no respaldan la hipótesis de dos módulos morales (Greene et al. 2004), sino más bien una disfunción en la capacidad empática o en el procesamiento de emociones, que apoyaría una psicología moral de corte Humeano. Abogamos, además, por ampliar el explanandum: del juicio utilitarista contra-intuitivo al juicio moral contra-intuitivo sin más. Esto permitiría investigar experimentalmente un amplio rango de variables afectadas por disfunciones en la capacidad para la empatía.