-
80Reconstructing Relativism. An Analysis of Radbruch‘s Philosophy of LawArchiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 95 (1): 14-27. 2009.This paper aims at reconstructing Radbruch’s relativistic conception of law within the framework of a model of principles. The idea of relativism remains a disputed issue in current legal and moral philosophy. In spite of the fact that Radbruch’s legal philosophy lacks coherence, it includes elements that resemble modern conceptions of law as a system including principles to be balanced against each other. Therefore, a reconstruction within a model of principles might as well prove the fruitfuln…Read more
-
68Jan-R. Sieckmann. Rechtliches Wissen und Rechtswissenschaft (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 94 (2): 257-263. 2008.
-
19La teoría del derecho de Robert Alexy: análisis y críticaUniversidad Externado de Colombia. 2014.Este libro es el resultado de un conjunto de trabajos que tratan sobre la teoría del derecho de Robert Alexy. Presenté varios de ellos en conferencias o charlas, y en conjunto cubren gran parte de la teoría alexyana. Esto refleja el enorme interés que encuentra esta teoría en particular en Latinoamerica. Dicho interés se justifica, por un lado, por la profundidad y originalidad de su obra desde el punto de vista teórico. Por otro lado, el interés deviene de la observación de la práctica judicial…Read more
-
28Kelsen on Natural Law and Legal ScienceIn John McGarry, Ian Bryan & Peter Langford (eds.), Kelsenian Legal Science and the Nature of Law, Springer Verlag. pp. 257-273. 2017.Kelsen rejects the scientific character of natural-law doctrine. For Kelsen, value judgments are ultimately not rationally justified but a matter of emotions. They can be rationally justified only relative to a certain moral or legal order. Kelsen also rejects the assumption of natural-law doctrines that value is immanent in reality. On the other hand, he suggests that legal science is possible regarding positive law, which is converted into a normative order by presupposing a “basic norm”. I wi…Read more
-
105Proportionality as a Universal Human Rights PrincipleIn David Duarte & Jorge Silva Sampaio (eds.), Proportionality in Law: An Analytical Perspective, Springer Verlag. pp. 3-24. 2018.Proportionality is the standard that guides the balancing of human or fundamental rights in law, requiring that the interference with rights must be justified by reasons that keep a reasonable relation with the intensity of the interference. One may well regard the principle of proportionality as a universal standard of rationality, which any legal system must recognise. Thus, when applied to human rights, proportionality presents a universal human rights principle. However, the thesis of the un…Read more
-
48The Dual‐Nature Thesis: Which Dualism?Ratio Juris 33 (3): 271-282. 2020.According to Robert Alexy’s dual‐nature thesis, “law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical one.” I will suggest, first, that various dualisms need to be distinguished, in particular the empirical and the normative, the real and the ideal, the formal (procedural) and the substantive; second, that the dualism of the empirical and the normative and, within the latter, of the real and the ideal “ought,” is not specific to law but pertains to any normative sy…Read more
-
26Legislation as BalancingIn A. Daniel Oliver-Lalana (ed.), Conceptions and Misconceptions of Legislation, Springer Verlag. pp. 133-152. 2019.I will argue that balancing is the core of rational lawmaking. Balancing has been intensively analysed as a form of judicial reasoning. Legislative balancing, however, has features that are distinct from judicial balancing. In particular, it is open because the legislature may, in general, pursue its political objectives without further legitimation and is not necessarily bound to consider only Legal principles. It is “pure” as the issue of control and its effects on the structure of balancing a…Read more
-
72Jan-R. Sieckmann. Rechtsphilosophen in der Diskussion II (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 93 (3): 430-434. 2007.
-
87Jan-R. Sieckmann. Konzeptionen des Rechts (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 92 (4): 587-593. 2006.
-
66Jan-R. Sieckmann: Recht, Sprache und Erkenntnis (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (4): 580-586. 2005.
-
96Jan-R. Sieckmann (Bamberg): Staatstheorie (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (3): 429-435. 2005.
-
83Jan-R. Sieckmann. Probleme der juristischen Methodenlehre (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 93 (1): 121-127. 2007.
-
86Jan-R. Sieckmann: Richter, Rechtserkenntnis und Demokratie (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 92 (1): 118-124. 2006.
-
76Jan-R. Sieckmann (Bamberg) Literaturbericht: Deontische Logik und juristische Argumentation (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 94 (4): 531-536. 2008.
-
78Jan-R. Sieckmann. Prinzipien, Were und Abwägungen I (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 93 (4): 570-575. 2007.
-
54Jan-R. Sieckmann. Rechtsphilosophen in der Diskussion I (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 93 (2): 264-269. 2007.
-
53Jan-R. Sieckmann: Konflikte in Recht und Moral (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 92 (2): 270-276. 2006.
-
75Jan-R. Sieckmann. Prinzipien, Werte und Abwägungen II (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 94 (1): 137-143. 2008.
-
82Jan-R. Sieckmann (Bamberg): Recht und Objektivität (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (2): 284-290. 2005.
-
1Human rights and the claim to correctness in the theory of Robert AlexyIn George Pavlakos & Robert Alexy (eds.), Law, rights and discourse: the legal philosophy of Robert Alexy, Hart. 2007.
-
70Jan-R. Sieckmann: Argumentation und Abwägung (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 92 (3): 431-437. 2006.
-
Alexy's critique of legal positivismIn Torben Spaak (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism, Cambridge University Press. 2021.
-
78Jan-R. Sieckmann (Bamberg): Sprachphilosophie und juristische Interpretation (Literaturbericht)Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 91 (1): 114-120. 2005.
-
57"Concepción puente" y "concepción insular"Análisis Filosófico 33 (2): 211-222. 2013.Una concepción tradicional de la argumentación jurídica considera que se debe resolver casos jurídicos a través de subsunción y deducción. Hugo Zuleta disputa esta posición, rechazando así la "concepción puente" de las normas, la que fue defendida en particular por Carlos Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin. Según la "concepción puente" la norma condicional incluye una modalidad deóntica solo en su consecuencia, mientras su antecedente consiste en un enunciado descriptivo. En cambio, Zuleta propone la …Read more
Erlangen and Nuremberg, Bavaria, Germany
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy, Misc |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy, Misc |