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13Putnam is known for having demonstated the existence of a new form of context-dependence, namely that which characterizes natural kind terms. Terms like ‘tiger' and ‘water' are indexical, Putnam says, since their conditions of application varies with the context of use — in a suitably broad sense of ‘context'. In this talk I focus on the relation between Putnam's semantics and a body of views I call ‘contextualism'. Contextualism generalizes context-sensitivity : it claims that sentences carry c…Read more
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505Contextual Dependence and Definite DescriptionsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 57-73. 1987.François Recanati; IV*—Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 1987, Pages 57–74, h.
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"La sémantique des noms propres: remarques sur la notion de "désignateur rigideLangue Française 57 106-118. 1983.
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177Embedded implicaturesPhilosophical Perspectives 17 (1). 2003.Conversational implicatures do not normally fall within the scope of operators because they arise at the speech act level, not at the level of sub-locutionary constituents. Yet in some cases they do, or so it seems. My aim in this paper is to compare different approaches to the problem raised by what I call 'embedded implicatures': seeming implicatures that arise locally, at a sub-locutionary level, without resulting from an inference in the narrow sense.
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108The communication of first person thoughtsIn Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95-102. 1995.A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.
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Le paradoxe de la première personneIn Robert Vion (ed.), Les sujets et leurs discours: énonciation et interaction, Presses De L'université De Provence. pp. 7-17. 1998.
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301Does linguistic communication rest on inference?Mind and Language 17 (1-2). 2002.It is often claimed that, because of semantic underdetermination, one can determine the content of an utterance only by appealing to pragmatic considerations concerning what the speaker means, what his intentions are. This supports ‘inferentialism' : the view that, in contrast to perceptual content, communicational content is accessed indirectly, via an inference. As against this view, I argue that primary pragmatic processes (the pragmatic processes that are involved in the determination of tru…Read more
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12Response to Voltolini's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop