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73Anti-Descriptivism, Mental Files, And The Communication Of Singular ThoughtsManuscrito 32 (1): 7-32. 2009.In this paper, I argue that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ‘acquaintance’ to the object. Such modes of presentation I analyse as mental files in which the subject can store information gained through the acquaintance relations in question. I show that the mental -file approach provides a solution to a vexing problem regarding the communication of singular thoughts…Read more
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40Situations and the Structure of ContentIn Kumiko Murasugi & Robert Stainton (eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics, Westview Press. pp. 113--165. 1999.An investigation into 'Austinian semantics'. Every utterance is said to express an 'Austinian proposition' consisting of a situation and a fact the situation is presented as supporting. A more recent statement of the theory is to be found in *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: an Essay on Metarepresentation* (MIT Press/Bradford Books, 2000).
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Le langage et la penséeIn Alain Berthoz (ed.), Sciences de la Cognition: Actes du grand colloque de prospective, . pp. 137-141. 1991.
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29Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative UtterancesPhilosophical Review 100 (2): 297. 1991.
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303Perceptual concepts: in defence of the indexical modelSynthese 190 (10): 1841-1855. 2013.Francois Recanati presents the basic features of the *indexical model* of mental files, and defends it against several interrelated objections. According to this model, mental files refer to objects in a way that is analogous to that of indexicals in language: a file refers to an object in virtue of a contextual relation between them. For instance, perception and attention provide the basis for demonstrative files. Several objections, some of them from David Papineau, concern the possibility of …Read more
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19Descriptions and SituationsIn Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and beyond, Oxford University Press. pp. 15-40. 2004.forthcoming.
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10Response to Iglesias' contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop
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30On Kripke on DonnellanIn Herman Parret, Marina Sbisa & Jef Verschueren (eds.), Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics, John Benjamins. pp. 593-660. 1981.
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Contenu sémantique et contenu cognitif des énoncésIn Daniel Laurier & Francois Lepage (eds.), Essais sur le langage et l'intentionnalité, . pp. 201-226. 1992.
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Une solution médiévale du paradoxe du menteur et son intérêt pour la sémantique contemporaineIn Lucie Brind'Amour & Eugene Vance (eds.), Archeologie Du Signe: Colloque : Papers, Pims. pp. 251-264. 1983.
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45Reply to De BrabanterTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 149-156. 2013.Response to two papers by Philippe De Brabanter in the symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).
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247It is raining (somewhere)Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1): 123-146. 2005.The received view about meteorological predicates like ‘rain’ is that they carry an argument slot for a location which can be filled explicitly or implicitly. The view assumes that ‘rain’, in the absence of an explicit location, demands that the context provide a specific location. In an earlier article in this journal, I provided a counter-example, viz. a context in which ‘it is raining’ receives a location-indefinite interpretation. On the basis of that example, I argued that when there is tac…Read more
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Meaning and Force: An IntroductionIn Asa Kasher (ed.), Pragmatics: Critical Concepts, Routledge. pp. 126-143. 1998.
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Contextual DomainsIn Xabier Arrazola (ed.), Discourse, Interaction, and Communication, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25-36. 1997.
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85Precis of *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 49-63. 2013.Precis of "Truth-Conditional Pragmatics" (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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512How narrow is narrow content?Dialectica 48 (3-4): 209-29. 1994.SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and radical ex…Read more
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210Truth-Conditional PragmaticsOxford University Press. 2010.This book argues against the traditional understanding of the semantics/pragmatics divide and puts forward a radical alternative. Through half a dozen case studies, it shows that what an utterance says cannot be neatly separated from what the speaker means. In particular, the speaker's meaning endows words with senses that are tailored to the situation of utterance and depart from the conventional meanings carried by the words in isolation. This phenomenon of ‘pragmatic modulation’ must be taken…Read more
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26Are 'here' and 'now' indexicals?Texte 27 115-127. 2001.It is argued there is nothing special or deviant about the use of 'now' to refer to a time in the past (or about the use of 'here' to refer to a distant place) — no need to appeal to pragmatic mechanisms such as context-shifting to account for such uses. Such uses are puzzling only if one (mistakenly) maintains that 'here' and 'now' are pure indexicals. In the paper it is claimed that they are more similar to demonstratives than to pure indexicals. Updated material on this can be found in *Truth…Read more
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72Reply to Romero and SoriaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 175-178. 2013.Response to Romero's and Soria's paper in the Symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).
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93Predelli and García-Carpintero on "Literal Meaning"Critica 38 (112): 69-79. 2006.A summary of François Recanati's book Literal Meaning, followed by his response to the critical reviews of the same book by Stefano Predelli and Manuel García-Carpintero. /// Este texto da respuesta a los que, en este mismo número, Predelli y García-Carpintero dedican a mi libro Literal Meaning. En la primera seccíon hago un breve resumen de esta obra; en la segunda respondo a los comentarios críticos de Predelli y en la tercera a los de García-Carpintero.
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184Can we believe what we do not understand?Mind and Language 12 (1): 84-100. 1997.In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or 'quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is 'semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semanticall…Read more