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Le langage et la penséeIn Alain Berthoz (ed.), Sciences de la Cognition: Actes du grand colloque de prospective, . pp. 137-141. 1991.
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Processing models for non-literal discourseIn Roberto Casati, Barry Smith & Graham Whiteca (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium, . pp. 277-290. 1994.
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10Response to Iglesias' contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop
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29Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative UtterancesPhilosophical Review 100 (2): 297. 1991.
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303Perceptual concepts: in defence of the indexical modelSynthese 190 (10): 1841-1855. 2013.Francois Recanati presents the basic features of the *indexical model* of mental files, and defends it against several interrelated objections. According to this model, mental files refer to objects in a way that is analogous to that of indexicals in language: a file refers to an object in virtue of a contextual relation between them. For instance, perception and attention provide the basis for demonstrative files. Several objections, some of them from David Papineau, concern the possibility of …Read more
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19Descriptions and SituationsIn Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and beyond, Oxford University Press. pp. 15-40. 2004.forthcoming.
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45Reply to De BrabanterTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 149-156. 2013.Response to two papers by Philippe De Brabanter in the symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).
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247It is raining (somewhere)Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1): 123-146. 2005.The received view about meteorological predicates like ‘rain’ is that they carry an argument slot for a location which can be filled explicitly or implicitly. The view assumes that ‘rain’, in the absence of an explicit location, demands that the context provide a specific location. In an earlier article in this journal, I provided a counter-example, viz. a context in which ‘it is raining’ receives a location-indefinite interpretation. On the basis of that example, I argued that when there is tac…Read more
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30On Kripke on DonnellanIn Herman Parret, Marina Sbisa & Jef Verschueren (eds.), Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics, John Benjamins. pp. 593-660. 1981.
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Contenu sémantique et contenu cognitif des énoncésIn Daniel Laurier & Francois Lepage (eds.), Essais sur le langage et l'intentionnalité, . pp. 201-226. 1992.
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85Precis of *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 49-63. 2013.Precis of "Truth-Conditional Pragmatics" (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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510How narrow is narrow content?Dialectica 48 (3-4): 209-29. 1994.SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and radical ex…Read more
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210Truth-Conditional PragmaticsOxford University Press. 2010.This book argues against the traditional understanding of the semantics/pragmatics divide and puts forward a radical alternative. Through half a dozen case studies, it shows that what an utterance says cannot be neatly separated from what the speaker means. In particular, the speaker's meaning endows words with senses that are tailored to the situation of utterance and depart from the conventional meanings carried by the words in isolation. This phenomenon of ‘pragmatic modulation’ must be taken…Read more
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Meaning and Force: An IntroductionIn Asa Kasher (ed.), Pragmatics: Critical Concepts, Routledge. pp. 126-143. 1998.
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Contextual DomainsIn Xabier Arrazola (ed.), Discourse, Interaction, and Communication, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25-36. 1997.
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26Are 'here' and 'now' indexicals?Texte 27 115-127. 2001.It is argued there is nothing special or deviant about the use of 'now' to refer to a time in the past (or about the use of 'here' to refer to a distant place) — no need to appeal to pragmatic mechanisms such as context-shifting to account for such uses. Such uses are puzzling only if one (mistakenly) maintains that 'here' and 'now' are pure indexicals. In the paper it is claimed that they are more similar to demonstratives than to pure indexicals. Updated material on this can be found in *Truth…Read more
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72Reply to Romero and SoriaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 175-178. 2013.Response to Romero's and Soria's paper in the Symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).
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472What is saidSynthese 128 (1-2): 75--91. 2001.A critique of the purely semantic, minimalist notion of 'what is said'.
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6Response to Frapolli's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop
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128Indexical Thought: The Communication ProblemIn Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, Oxford University Press. pp. 141-178. 2016.What characterizes indexical thinking is the fact that the modes of presentation through which one thinks of objects are context-bound and perspectival. Such modes of presentation, I claim, are mental files presupposing that we stand in certain relations to the reference : the role of the file is to store information one can gain in virtue of standing in that relation to the object. This raises the communication problem, first raised by Frege : if indexical thoughts are context-bound and relatio…Read more