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70The dynamics of situationsEuropean Review of Philosophy 2 41-75. 1997.Every statement represents a certain state of affairs as holding in a certain situation, which the statement concerns. The situation which a statement concerns is indicated by the context. It must be distinguished from whichever situation may be explicitly mentioned in the statement. In this framework, two cognitive processes are analysed: projection and reflection. Both involve two representations: one which concerns a situation s, and another one which explicitly mentions that situation. Throu…Read more
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La pensée d'Austin et son originalité par rapport à la philosophie analytique antérieureIn Paul Amselek & Zenon Bankowski (eds.), Théorie des actes de langage, éthique et droit, Presses Universitaires De France - Puf. pp. 19-35. 1986.
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98Replies to the papers in the issue "Recanati on Mental Files"Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4): 408-437. 2015.
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60Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File FrameworkIn Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence, Oxford University Press. pp. 162-185. 2014.Mental files, in Recanati's framework, function as 'singular terms in the language of thought' ; they serve to think about objects in the world (and to store information about them). But they have a derived, metarepresentational function : they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. To account for the metarepresentational use of files, Recanati introduces the notion of an 'indexed file', i.e. a vicarious file that stands, in the subject's mind, for another subjec…Read more
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28Varieties of SimulationIn Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 151-171. 2002.
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8Loana dans le métro : réflexions sur l’indexicalité mentaleIn Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde (ed.), Les formes de l’indexicalité : langage et pensée en contexte, Rue D'ulm. pp. 19-34. 2005.Cet article propose un traitement de l'indexicalité mentale utilisant la notion de fichier.
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114Le soi impliciteRevue de Métaphysique et de Morale 68 (4): 475-494. 2010.Le sujet qui perçoit, ressent, se remémore, ou imagine a conscience de son activité mentale, et notamment du mode — perceptif, mnésique ou autre — de ses états. Le mode des états expérientiels va de pair avec une relation spécifique (variable selon le mode) du sujet à ce que l'état représente. Par exemple, le sujet qui se remémore se trouve (normalement) dans une certaine relation à la scène remémorée : il a perçu celle-ci dans le passé. La thèse principale de l'article est que le sujet conscien…Read more
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105Déstabiliser le sensRevue Internationale de Philosophie 2 (217): 197-208. 2001.Contribution au numéro spécial de la Revue Internationale de Philosophie sur John Searle.
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462What is saidSynthese 128 (1-2): 75--91. 2001.A critique of the purely semantic, minimalist notion of 'what is said'.
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70Knowing that I See. Comments on Alex ByrneIn Francois Recanati (ed.), IJN Working Papers, . 2010.Response to Alex Byrne's paper 'Knowing what I see'.
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5Pragmatics and SemanticsIn Laurence R. Horn & Gregory Ward (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics, Blackwell. pp. 442-462. 2004.
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1Deference and IndexicalityIn Stephen Kosslyn, Albert Galaburda & Yves Christen (eds.), Languages of the Brain, Harvard University Press. pp. 102-109. 2001.
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50Reply to GaukerTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 81-84. 2013.Response to Gauker's paper in the Symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).
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130Opacity and the attitudesIn Alex Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, Kluwer Academic Print On Demand. pp. 367--406. 2000.A discussion of Quine's views.
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49This response was written for the Vth Online Consciousness Conference.
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104Reply to DevittTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 103-107. 2013.Response to Devitt's paper in the symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).
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62Transitive meanings for intransitive verbsIn Laurence Goldstein (ed.), Brevity, Oxford University Press. pp. 122-142. 2013.In their chapter, Bourmayan and Recanati discuss the intransitive use of 'eat' and cognate verbs which take (on such uses) an indefinite implicit argument. Sometimes, Recanati pointed out in early work, the implicit argument of intransitive 'eat' seems definite ; there are also seemingly anaphoric and bound uses. How to account for them ? Recanati's early account invoked free enrichment, but Marti's negation test provides counter-examples to that account. Bourmayan and Recanati offer a new, situ…Read more
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Cher Benoît, cher FrançoisIn Jean-Louis Aroui (ed.), Le sens et la mesure : de la pragmatique à la métrique (hommage à Benoît de Cornulier), Honore Champion. pp. 33-52. 2003.
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71First Person ThoughtIn Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, University of Geneva. pp. 506-511. 2014.First person thoughts are the sort of thought one may express by using the first person ; they are also thoughts that are about the thinker of the thought. Neither characterization is ultimately satisfactory. A thought can be about the thinker of the thought by accident, without being a first person thought. The alternative characterization of first person thought in terms of first person sentences also fails, because it is circular : we need the notion of a first person thought to account for t…Read more
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59‘That’-clauses as existential quantifiersAnalysis 64 (3): 229-235. 2004.Following Panaccio, 'John believes that p' is analysed as 'For some x such that x is true if and only if p, John believes x'. On this view the complement clause 'that p' acts as a restricted existential quantifier and it contributes a higher-order property.
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2La philosophie analytique est-elle dépassée? Note sur la philosophie "post-analytique"Philosophie 35 77-86. 1992.
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106The Alleged Priority of Literal InterpretationCognitive Science 19 (2): 207-232. 1995.In this paper I argue against a widely accepted model of utterance interpretation, namely the LS model, according to which the literal interpretation of an utterance (the proposition literally expressed by that utterance) must be computed before non-literal interpretations can be entertained. Alleged arguments in favor of this model are shown to be fallacious, counterexamples are provided, and alternative models are sketched.
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74De re and De seDialectica 63 (3): 249-269. 2009.For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought ; for Lewis, it is the other way round. To a large extent, the conflict between the two positions is merely apparent: it is due to insufficient appreciation of the crucial distinction between two types of de se thought. In view of this distinction, we can maintain both that de se thought is a special case of de re thought, and that de re thought is a special case of de se thought. Still, I argue, Lewis's position can be cr…Read more