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683Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief ReportsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1). 1995.
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Primary Pragmatic ProcessesIn Asa Kasher (ed.), Pragmatics: Critical Concepts, Routledge. pp. 512-531. 1998.
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383De re and De seDialectica 63 (3): 249-269. 2009.For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought. In this paper, I argue that de se thoughts come in two varieties: explicit and implicit. While explicit de se thoughts can be construed as a variety of de re thought, implicit de se thoughts cannot: their content is thetic, while the content of de re thoughts is categoric. The notion of an implicit de se thought is claimed to play a central role in accounting for the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentificati…Read more
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9Philosophie du langage (et de l’esprit)Editions Gallimard. 2008.Philosophie du langage et philosophie de l'esprit constituent désormais un tout indissociable. Les expressions linguistiques «signifient». Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? François Recanati distingue trois réponses possibles. Selon la première, signifier c'est (pour une expression linguistique) être associée à des représentations mentales. Selon la deuxième, signifier c'est «faire référence» et renvoyer à quelque chose dans le monde – une réalité extralinguistique. Selon la troisième, enfin, signi…Read more
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3D'un contexte a l'autreCahiers Chronos 20 1-14. 2008.On distingue différents types de "contextes" à l'oeuvre dans l'interprétation des expressions indexicales, de façon à rendre compte du style indirect libre et de phénomènes apparentés.
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108Reference through Mental Files : Indexicals and Definite DescriptionsIn Carlo Penco & Filippo Domaneschi (eds.), What Is Said and What Is Not, Stanford. pp. 159-173. 2013.Accounts for referential communication (and especially communication by means of definite descriptions and indexicals) in the mental file framework.
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109Open quotation revisitedPhilosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 443-471. 2008.This paper — a sequel to my 'Open Quotation' (Mind 2001) — is my reaction to the articles discussing open quotation in the special issue of the Belgian Journal of Linguistics edited by P. De Brabanter in 2005
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17It has often been observed that the meaning of a word may be affected by the other words which occur in the same sentence. How are we to account for this phenomenon of 'semantic flexibility'? It is argued that semantic flexibility reduces to context-sensitivity and does not raise unsurmountable problems for standard compositional accounts. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume too simple a view of context-sensitivity. Two basic forms of context-sensitivity are distinguished in the p…Read more
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20Response to Dokic's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop
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1Truth-conditional pragmaticsIn Asa Kasher (ed.), Pragmatics: Critical Concepts, . pp. 509-511. 1998.
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233Mental Files: Replies to my CriticsDisputatio 5 (36): 207-242. 2013.My responses to seven critical reviews of my book *Mental Files* published in a special issue of the journal Disputatio, edited by F. Salis. The reviewers are: Keith Hall, David Papineau, Annalisa Coliva and Delia Belleri, Peter Pagin, Thea Goodsell, Krista Lawlor and Manuel Garcia-Carpintero.
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16Relativized PropositionsIn Michael O'Rourke & Corey Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics : Essays on the Work of John Perry, Mit Press. pp. 119-153. 2007.Can we solve the problem of the essential indexical, and account for de se belief, by appealing to 'relativized propositions' (functions from rich indices to truth-values)? According to John Perry, we cannot. This paper offers a detailed examination and a critique of Perry's argument.
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8I distinguish, and discuss the relations between, five types of context-shift involving indexicals. For 'intentional' indexicals - indexicals whose value depends upon the speaker's intention - we can shift the context more or less 'at will', by manifesting one's intention to do so. For other indexicals we can shift the context through pretense. Following a number of authors, I distinguish two types of context-shifting pretense, corresponding to two sets of linguistic phenomena. The fourth type o…Read more
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68The communication of first person thoughtsIn Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95-102. 1995.A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.
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"La sémantique des noms propres: remarques sur la notion de "désignateur rigideLangue Française 57 106-118. 1983.
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398Unarticulated constituentsLinguistics and Philosophy 25 (3): 299-345. 2002.In a recent paper (Linguistics and Philosophy 23, 4, June 2000), Jason Stanley argues that there are no `unarticulated constituents', contrary to what advocates of Truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) have claimed. All truth-conditional effects of context can be traced to logical form, he says. In this paper I maintain that there are unarticulated constituents, and I defend TCP. Stanley's argument exploits the fact that the alleged unarticulated constituents can be `bound', that is, they can be ma…Read more
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60Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File FrameworkIn Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Genoveva Marti (eds.), Empty Representations, Oxford University Press. pp. 162-185. 2013.Mental files, in Recanati's framework, function as 'singular terms in the language of thought' ; they serve to think about objects in the world (and to store information about them). But they have a derived, metarepresentational function : they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. To account for the metarepresentational use of files, Recanati introduces the notion of an 'indexed file', i.e. a vicarious file that stands, in the subject's mind, for another subjec…Read more
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12Response to Voltolini's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop
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8Loana dans le métro : réflexions sur l’indexicalité mentaleIn Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde (ed.), Les formes de l’indexicalité : langage et pensée en contexte, . pp. 19-34. 2005.Cet article propose un traitement de l'indexicalité mentale utilisant la notion de fichier.
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111Le soi impliciteRevue de Métaphysique et de Morale 68 (4): 475-494. 2010.Le sujet qui perçoit, ressent, se remémore, ou imagine a conscience de son activité mentale, et notamment du mode — perceptif, mnésique ou autre — de ses états. Le mode des états expérientiels va de pair avec une relation spécifique (variable selon le mode) du sujet à ce que l'état représente. Par exemple, le sujet qui se remémore se trouve (normalement) dans une certaine relation à la scène remémorée : il a perçu celle-ci dans le passé. La thèse principale de l'article est que le sujet conscien…Read more
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97Déstabiliser le sensRevue Internationale de Philosophie 2 (217): 197-208. 2001.Contribution au numéro spécial de la Revue Internationale de Philosophie sur John Searle.
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70Knowing that I See. Comments on Alex ByrneIn Francois Recanati (ed.), IJN Working Papers, . 2010.Response to Alex Byrne's paper 'Knowing what I see'.