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134Millikan’s Theory of Signs (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.Review of Millikan's book Varieties of Meaning (MIT Press/Bradford Books, 2004).
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3D'un contexte a l'autreCahiers Chronos 20 1-14. 2008.On distingue différents types de "contextes" à l'oeuvre dans l'interprétation des expressions indexicales, de façon à rendre compte du style indirect libre et de phénomènes apparentés.
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7Response to Predelli's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop
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11Philosophie du langage (et de l’esprit)Editions Gallimard. 2008.Philosophie du langage et philosophie de l'esprit constituent désormais un tout indissociable. Les expressions linguistiques «signifient». Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? François Recanati distingue trois réponses possibles. Selon la première, signifier c'est (pour une expression linguistique) être associée à des représentations mentales. Selon la deuxième, signifier c'est «faire référence» et renvoyer à quelque chose dans le monde – une réalité extralinguistique. Selon la troisième, enfin, signi…Read more
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69Reply to Romero and SoriaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 175-178. 2013.Response to Romero's and Soria's paper in the Symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).
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110Open quotation revisitedPhilosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 443-471. 2008.This paper — a sequel to my 'Open Quotation' (Mind 2001) — is my reaction to the articles discussing open quotation in the special issue of the Belgian Journal of Linguistics edited by P. De Brabanter in 2005
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The Simulation of BeliefIn Pascal Engel (ed.), Believing and Accepting, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 267-298. 2000.
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17It has often been observed that the meaning of a word may be affected by the other words which occur in the same sentence. How are we to account for this phenomenon of 'semantic flexibility'? It is argued that semantic flexibility reduces to context-sensitivity and does not raise unsurmountable problems for standard compositional accounts. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume too simple a view of context-sensitivity. Two basic forms of context-sensitivity are distinguished in the p…Read more
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8I distinguish, and discuss the relations between, five types of context-shift involving indexicals. For 'intentional' indexicals - indexicals whose value depends upon the speaker's intention - we can shift the context more or less 'at will', by manifesting one's intention to do so. For other indexicals we can shift the context through pretense. Following a number of authors, I distinguish two types of context-shifting pretense, corresponding to two sets of linguistic phenomena. The fourth type o…Read more
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34Truth-conditional pragmatics: an overviewIn Richmond Thomason, Paolo Bouquet & Luciano Serafini (eds.), Perspectives on Context, Csli Stanford. pp. 171-188. 2008.
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242Mental Files: Replies to my CriticsDisputatio 5 (36): 207-242. 2013.My responses to seven critical reviews of my book *Mental Files* published in a special issue of the journal Disputatio, edited by F. Salis. The reviewers are: Keith Hall, David Papineau, Annalisa Coliva and Delia Belleri, Peter Pagin, Thea Goodsell, Krista Lawlor and Manuel Garcia-Carpintero.
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60Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File FrameworkIn Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence, Oxford University Press. pp. 162-185. 2014.Mental files, in Recanati's framework, function as 'singular terms in the language of thought' ; they serve to think about objects in the world (and to store information about them). But they have a derived, metarepresentational function : they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. To account for the metarepresentational use of files, Recanati introduces the notion of an 'indexed file', i.e. a vicarious file that stands, in the subject's mind, for another subjec…Read more
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71The dynamics of situationsEuropean Review of Philosophy 2 41-75. 1997.Every statement represents a certain state of affairs as holding in a certain situation, which the statement concerns. The situation which a statement concerns is indicated by the context. It must be distinguished from whichever situation may be explicitly mentioned in the statement. In this framework, two cognitive processes are analysed: projection and reflection. Both involve two representations: one which concerns a situation s, and another one which explicitly mentions that situation. Throu…Read more
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96Replies to the papers in the issue "Recanati on Mental Files"Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4): 408-437. 2015.
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104Déstabiliser le sensRevue Internationale de Philosophie 2 (217): 197-208. 2001.Contribution au numéro spécial de la Revue Internationale de Philosophie sur John Searle.
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82Varieties of SimulationIn Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 151-171. 2002.
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8Loana dans le métro : réflexions sur l’indexicalité mentaleIn Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde (ed.), Les formes de l’indexicalité : langage et pensée en contexte, . pp. 19-34. 2005.Cet article propose un traitement de l'indexicalité mentale utilisant la notion de fichier.
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113Le soi impliciteRevue de Métaphysique et de Morale 68 (4): 475-494. 2010.Le sujet qui perçoit, ressent, se remémore, ou imagine a conscience de son activité mentale, et notamment du mode — perceptif, mnésique ou autre — de ses états. Le mode des états expérientiels va de pair avec une relation spécifique (variable selon le mode) du sujet à ce que l'état représente. Par exemple, le sujet qui se remémore se trouve (normalement) dans une certaine relation à la scène remémorée : il a perçu celle-ci dans le passé. La thèse principale de l'article est que le sujet conscien…Read more
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50Reply to GaukerTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 81-84. 2013.Response to Gauker's paper in the Symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).
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70Knowing that I See. Comments on Alex ByrneIn Francois Recanati (ed.), IJN Working Papers, . 2010.Response to Alex Byrne's paper 'Knowing what I see'.
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5Pragmatics and SemanticsIn Laurence Horn & Gregory Ward (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics, Blackwell. pp. 442-462. 2004.