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251Uoprigtighed og viden via vidnesbyrdNorsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 48 (2): 121-131. 2013.Denne artikel argumenterer for at når et vidnesbyrds uoprigtighed blokerer tilhørerens videnstilegnelse, kan dette svigt forklares som en form for upålidelighed. Dette motiverer et princip ifølge hvilket det er en nødvendig betingelse for viden via vidnesbyrd at vidnesbyrdet blev givet på en pålidelig basis. Et sådant krav adskiller sig fra andre pålidelighedskrav til viden via vidnesbyrd ved at indføre en snævrere opfattelse af sådan viden.
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282Lying, Deceiving, and MisleadingPhilosophy Compass 8 (4): 348-359. 2013.This article discusses recent work on lying and its relation to deceiving and misleading. Two new developments in this area are considered: first, the acknowledgment of the phenomenon of lying without the intent to deceive , and second, recent work on the distinction between lying and merely misleading. Both are discussed in relation to topics in philosophy of language, the epistemology of testimony, and ethics. Critical surveys of recent theories are offered and challenges and open questions fo…Read more
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44Review of Wright & Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. forthcoming.
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618What is Said?Noûs 50 (4): 759-793. 2015.It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning using the notion of a question under discussion. This account explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined, provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences can come to h…Read more
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66Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica KeiserPhilosophical Studies 174 (4): 853-859. 2017.This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both t…Read more
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118Saying too Little and Saying too Much. Critical notice of ‘Lying, Misleading and What is Said’, by Jennifer Saul (review)Disputatio 5 (35): 81-91. 2013.Saying too little and saying too much : critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said by Jennifer Saul.
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 2010
Uppsala, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Aesthetics |
Meta-Ethics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
PhilPapers Editorships
Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction |