Vanessa Rumble

This dissertation deals with Kierkegaard's treatment of self-deception in his early writings, from the Gilleleje journals of 1835 to The Concept of Anxiety . ;It is my thesis that Kierkegaard's philosophical anthropology presents a portrayal of the forms of self-deception by which the individual seeks to confine existence within the bounds of immediacy. Immediacy may be conceived as that which is unqualified by reflection, decision, or dependency upon an Other. For Kierkegaard, the attempt to exist immediately in any of these senses involves the distortion of the nature of selfhood. Rather than presenting a typology of stages in the development of religious consciousness, Kierkegaard's authorship mirrors those configurations of self-deception which stands in the way of such development. ;Hitherto, Kierkegaard scholarship has viewed his understanding of immediacy as restricted to the forms of life portrayed in the aesthetic stage. Immediacy then appears either as the attempt to avoid reflection through sensual abandon, or the attempt to shirk decision and ethical responsibility. When immediacy is understood in these senses, the ethical stage seems essentially opposed to and free from the "vices" of the aesthetic. But the ethicist's attempt to gain moral autonomy and transparent self-knowledge may itself be viewed as an attempt to return to immediacy, to secure an existence unmediated by external agency. On this interpretation, the ethicist shares in the central flaw of the aesthete and is himself engaged in an illegitimate pursuit of immediacy. If this is in fact the case, then Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings can be regarded as challenging an essentially unitary phenomenon. ;Kierkegaard's own understanding of the method of his authorship, particularly the accounts of indirect communication presented in Concluding Unscientific Postscript and The Point of View for My Work as An Author may be criticized for manifesting the same desire for autonomy as the aesthetic and ethical stages. In spite of the shortcomings of his descriptions of his method, Kierkegaard's technique of mirroring self-deception provides the reader with a figure for an understanding of the self which remains uncoerced by the desire for certitude concerning the moral status of the self

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 135-136 [Access article in PDF] Alastair Hannay. Kierkegaard: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xvi + 496. Cloth, $39.95. In the opening pages of this carefully crafted biography, Hannay states that he has no intention of making matters easy for his reader. By this, he means that "final judgments" will not be forthcoming on a number of key issues surrounding Kierkegaard and his works: the nature of his relation to Christianity, the motives leading him to collide with The Corsair, and the meaning and wisdom of his final attack on Bishop Jakob Mynster and the established Danish Church. This is not to say that Hannay presents Kierkegaard either through rose-colored lenses or through narrowly intellectualist ones. Indeed, one of the book's central virtues is that it combines a philosopher's long-standing interest in Kierkegaard's writings with other guiding passions: a fascination with the sources of human creativity, the twists and turns of nineteenth-century European intellectual history, and the drama of one man's sustained grappling with the meaning of (his) life and the degree to which this meaning could be forged and sustained in his own writing.Hannay raises the curtain on Kierkegaard's life at the intellectual debut of the latter. In his first public appearance before the Student Union at the University of Copenhagen, Kierkegaard took issue with a student colleague's espousal of liberal reform. Hannay sees in Kierkegaard's performance signs of things to come: (1) the attempt to gain the notice and approval of the leading cultural lights, such as Danish literary icon Johan Ludvig Heiberg, and (2) a habit of seeking unity and definition through opposition and controversy. In his subsequent discussion of Fear and Trembling, Hannay notes the inescapable fact that Kierkegaard's philosophic positions are often tailor-made justifications for his private [End Page 135] behavior. The classic example is de Silentio's celebration of Abraham's teleological suspension of the ethical, a celebration which would, as often noted, vindicate equally Isaac's sacrifice by Abraham and Regine's "sacrifice" by Kierkegaard. Already on the occasion of his address to the Student Union, Kierkegaard's thought lines up nicely with his self-interest. But Hannay's work is hardly a reductive exposé. His ear for the varied leitmotifs of the authorship, their development and integration, is unrivaled. Regarding Kierkegaard's first skirmish in the academic arena, Hannay alerts his reader to emergent themes: (1) the valorization of personal unity, and the assertion that such unity must emerge from a life rather than be imposed upon it, and (2) a corresponding respect for the power of lived experience and a critique of any life or movement which is either primarily reactive or abstracted from individual existence. While personal unity remains a desideratum throughout his life, the integrity of lived experience is ultimately placed in question by Kierkegaard's construal of Christianity, which he comes increasingly to see as opposed to the humanism which underlies both Enlightened and Romantic thought.Hannay's biography focuses primarily on the development of Kierkegaard's thought as expressed in his journals and published writings. As such, his biography tends to emphasize the continuity of the authorship over its internal tensions. Hannay views, for example, thehumanistic stance of Climacus's Religiousness A as propadeutic to the radical transcendenceof the godhead embraced by Religiousness B. This is a topic open to dispute, since Kierkegaard himself went out of his way to record, and perhaps exhibit, the offensiveness of Christian demands to (fallen) human nature. Hannay acknowledges Kierkegaard's lifelong ambivalencetoward Christianity, but he does not show how this ambivalence echoes in the authorship. Ifhis Kierkegaard is a less divided character than the original, Hannay nevertheless challenges those who would minimize either (1) the depth of Kierkegaard's breach with humanistic thought or (2) the degree to which "the religious life-view [is] persistently in the offing" (Hannay, "Something on Hermeneutics and Communication in Kierkegaard After All," forthcoming in Kierkegaard and the Word, Poul Houe and Gordon D. Marino...

For over a century, the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard has been at the center of a number of important discussions, concerning not only philosophy and theology, but also, more recently, fields such as social thought, psychology, and contemporary aesthetics, especially literary theory. Despite his relatively short life, Kierkegaard was an extraordinarily prolific writer, as attested to by the 26-volume Princeton University Press edition of all of his published writings. But Kierkegaard left behind nearly as much unpublished writing, most of which consists of what are called his "journals and notebooks." Kierkegaard has long been recognized as one of history's great journal keepers, but only rather small portions of his journals and notebooks are what we usually understand by the term “diaries.” By far the greater part of Kierkegaard’s journals and notebooks consists of reflections on a myriad of subjects—philosophical, religious, political, personal. Studying his journals and notebooks takes us into his workshop, where we can see his entire universe of thought. We can witness the genesis of his published works, to be sure—but we can also see whole galaxies of concepts, new insights, and fragments, large and small, of partially completed but unpublished works. Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks enables us to see the thinker in dialogue with his times and with himself. Kierkegaard wrote his journals in a two-column format, one for his initial entries and the second for the extensive marginal comments that he added later. This edition of the journals reproduces this format, includes several photographs of original manuscript pages, and contains extensive scholarly commentary on the various entries and on the history of the manuscripts being reproduced. Volume 9 of this 11-volume series includes five of Kierkegaard’s important “NB” journals, which span from June 1852 to August 1854. This period was marked by Kierkegaard’s increasing preoccupation with what he saw as an unbridgeable gulf in Christianity—between the absolute ideal of the religion of the New Testament and the official, state-sanctioned culture of “Christendom,” which, embodied by the Danish People’s Church, Kierkegaard rejected with increasing vehemence. Crucially, Kierkegaard’s nemesis, Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster, died during this period and, in the months following, Kierkegaard can be seen moving inexorably toward the famous “attack on Christendom” with which he ended his life.

Kierkegaard and his pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, advance a ‘theory’ of indirect communication which designates it as the appropriate vehicle for ethico‐religious discourse. This paper examines the justification for this claim, as it is elaborated in the Postscript, and traces the similarity between Climacus’ account of indirect communication and his broader existential ethics. Both accounts locate the identity of the subject in the repeated renunciation of finitude. Just as the autonomy of the Kantian subject demands indifference to phenomenal incentives, so too the ‘infinite possibility’ of the Climacean subject is assured only through its repeated renunciation of finite determinants. The paper argues that this project of self‐determination underlies both the theory of indirect communication and the Postscript's existential ethics, and both are critiqued by Kierkegaard under the rubric of ‘Religiousness A’. The theory of indirect communication and the existential ethics of which it is a part demand that the individual's freedom be literally ‘thought at every moment’ ‐ a requirement which is as divorced from the circumstances of actual existence as Hegel's much maligned ‘System’. The paper closes by considering the significance of Climacus’ ‘Absolute Paradox’ for the subject's predicament and for Kierkegaard's authorship: does the notion of the Absolute Paradox represent an alternative to the subject's self‐assertion, or is it merely its pre‐eminent expression?

M. Jamie Ferreira’s Love’s Grateful Striving is a noteworthy contribution to Kierkegaard studies. Her informed and insightful explication de texte brings Kierkegaard into dialogue with his better known critics, such as Adorno, MacIntyre, and Løgstrup, as well as with more closely allied thinkers such as Luther, Levinas, and contemporary scholars of Christian ethics. The result is what Merold Westphal calls “a close reading in the best sense of the term”—one which combines “massive but unobtrusive scholarship” with the commentator’s own careful but decidedly original exploration of the text.

Eternity Lies Beneath: Autonomy and Finitude in Kierkegaard's Early Writings VANESSA RUMBLE AMONG the extant descriptions of Kierkegaard by his contemporaries, one particularly vivid portrait captures the reflections of the young theologian on a carriage ride through his beloved Deer Park: The road was so little travelled that it looked in places almost overgrown with grass. There was absolutely no dust .... On either side there were new leaves on the beech trees .... Uncle Peter [Christian Kierkegaard, SCren's eldest brother] had surely said some- thing about how Danish this sort of weather was -- or even that it was Scandinavian: it was so light and so bright and so fine; there was no wilderness or heath; it was almost childlike in its purity. But the younger brother [SCren] had replied that such weather was perfectly suited to conceal the Eternal. It was a temptation -- he had said that many times -- it tempted the mind to dream and to wander. Who could keep hold of a serious thought while enjoying that smooth, billowing grass? Either one had to let one's mind billow and dream like the grass or one had to surrender to one's thoughts, but in that case all this bright, transient lushness became painful. The whole thing was a quaking bog, he had said. Of course it looked as if that green, open plain was solid ground, but the entire thing was a bog, you know. It quaked and quaked, and Eternity lay beneath. He couldn't imagine how his brother could want..