Jörg Noller

Der Beitrag demonstriert, wie YouTube-Kanäle produktiv in die digitale und analoge Lehre integriert werden können. Verschiedene Videoformate werden vorgestellt und die jeweiligen didaktischen und technischen Herausforderungen skizziert. Statistiken werden präsentiert, die Aufschluss über die Chancen, Probleme und Potenziale von YouTube-Kanälen in der Hochschullehre geben. Abschließend werden Erfahrungen geschildert, die ganz allgemein das Kanal-Design und die Werbung neuer Abonnenten betreffen. Dabei werden folgende Fragen und Themen diskutiert: Wie können Studierende durch das Rezipieren von Videos aktiviert werden? Wie sollten Lehrvideos produziert werden? Welche Rolle spielen technische und dramaturgische Faktoren in der philosophischen Lehre?

The aim of the present volume is to advance the debate about free will by combining historical and analytic perspectives. In the discussion throughout the centuries, many problems have emerged that cast doubt on the assumption that we have free will. The aim of this introduction is, first, to present these problems as well as to present several strategies that have been proposed in order to solve these problems; second, to give an overview of the content of the present volume. The contributions to this book aim, for the most part, to advance the debate about these problems by drawing on ideas that can be found in the history of philosophy.

In this chapter, I will address the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür in and after Kant. The aim of my chapter is to defend it against the charge of irrationality and mere chance, and to rehabilitate it from a historical and analytic point of view. I will analyze Kant’s use of the word “Willkür”, and chronologically follow the semantic and systematic changes in his philosophical work. Finally, I address recent attempts to revitalize the concept of Willkür in the analytic debate by referring to the work of Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane. I shall argue that we need to distinguish between two kinds of libera arbitria. Whereas the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae can be interpreted in terms of the pejorative sense of “Willkür”—as mere chance—the liberum arbitrium voluntatis equals a reflective kind of Willkür—literal Will-kür —which involves freedom of the will.

Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s and Friedrich Schiller’s conception of drive can be interpreted as a systematic response to an ambivalence in Kant’s conception of drive and driving force, which he associates with heteronomy and autonomy. Reinhold distinguishes between a selfish and an unselfish drive. In doing so, he revaluates the drive as something that is compatible with our freedom of the will. Both drives are the vital basis of our free decision and therefore united. Schiller distinguishes between three kinds of drive. The object of the form-drive is the Gestalt of the world, its intelligible structure and necessity, whereas the object of the material drive is the human life and its sensual reality. In opposition to Reinhold, Schiller introduces a third drive that he calls the “play drive”. However, it is not an instance additional to the material and form-drive, but rather designates the harmony of both drives.

Der Begriff der Digitalität ist erst in jüngster Zeit ins Zentrum der Kultur- und Geisteswissenschaft gerückt. Er entspricht nicht dem Verständnis von Digitalisierung im Sinne der Entwicklung von Technologien, der Erfassung und Speicherung von Daten und der Automatisierung von Abläufen. Vielmehr reflektiert Digitalität auf kulturelle und gesellschaftliche Realitäten und Lebensformen, die mit der Digitalisierung einhergehen und diese im Wechselspiel wiederum ermöglichen. Ziel des Bandes ist es, das Phänomen der Digitalität näher zu bestimmen und den Blick auf kulturelle, philosophische, didaktische und soziologische Aspekte des Lebens in einer digitalisierten Welt zu richten. Folgende Fragen stehen dabei im Zentrum: In welchem Verhältnis stehen die Phänomene „Digitalisierung“ und „Digitalität“? Wie verändern sich Lehr- und Lernprozesse im Kontext von Digitalisierung und Digitalität? Welche Herausforderungen, Chancen und Probleme ergeben sich aus der Digitalität für die Zukunft der Gesellschaft und der Universitäten? Wie lässt sich die Kultur der Digitalität gezielt gestalten und vermitteln?

This novel contributed volume advances the current debate on free will by bridging the divide between analytic and historically oriented approaches to the problem. With thirteen chapters by leading academics in the field, the volume is divided into three parts: free will and determinism, free will and indeterminism, and free will and moral responsibility. The contributors aim to initiate a philosophical discourse that profits from a combination of the two approaches. On the one hand, the analytic tools familiar from the debate – arguments, concepts, and distinctions – can be used to sharpen our understanding of classical philosophical positions. On the other hand, the rich philosophical tradition can be reconstructed so as to inspire new solutions. In recent years, the problem of free will has received special attention in the analytic arena. This is the first anthology to combine historical and analytic perspectives, significantly furthering the debate, and providing a crucial resource to academics and advanced students alike.

This paper reconstructs Friedrich Schiller’s aesthetics from a compatibilist point of view. I shall argue that it is Schiller’s conception of individual self-determination that motivates his aesthetic critique of Kant’s moral philosophy. Schiller conceives of aesthetic self-determination in terms of a compatibilism between reason and nature. As such, Schiller’s aesthetics can be interpreted as an ontological category. His concepts of love, play and the aesthetic state must therefore be understood in terms of volitional structures that describe human freedom in nature, history and society.

This volume gathers a collection of fourteen original articles discussing the concept of drive in classical German philosophy. Its aim is to offer a comprehensive historical overview of the concept of drive at the turn of the 19th century and to discuss it both historically and systematically. From the 18th century onward, the concept of drive started to play an important role in emerging disciplines such as biology, anthropology, and psychology. In these fields, the concept of drive was used to describe the inner forces of organic nature, or, more particularly, human urges and desires. But it was in the period of classical German philosophy that this concept developed into an important philosophical concept crucial to Kant’s and post-Kantian idealistic systems. Reflecting the complexity of this concept, the volume first discusses historical sources of drive theories in Leibniz, Reimarus, and Blumenbach. Afterwards, the volume presents the philosophical accounts of drives in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and also gives a systematic overview of other important drive theories that were formed around 1800 by Herder, Goethe, Jacobi, Novalis, Reinhold, Schiller, and Schopenhauer.

In this paper, I will reconstruct Kant’s theory of illusion from the perspective of his transcendental philosophy. I argue that it is Kant’s theory of dialectic as the “logic of illusion” that grounds both theoretical and practical error and that traces them back to a common root: the operation of rationalizing by theoretical and practical reason. I analyze different kinds of theoretical and practical errors and show how they are grounded in reason’s general propensity to rationalize. The paper exposes this common root and shows which rules Kant develops in order to avoid rationalizing.

In this paper, I will shed light on Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s and Friedrich Schiller’s conceptions of practical self-determination after Kant. First, I outline Kant’s conception of freedom as autonomy. I then explain the so-called “Reinhold’s dilemma,” which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions, which arises from Kant’s theory of autonomy. I then show how Reinhold and Schiller tried to escape this dilemma by developing an elaborated theory of individual freedom. I will argue that Reinhold’s and Schiller’s symmetrical account of freedom to act according and against the moral law is not to be confused with freedom of indifference but can be reconstructed in terms of practical self-determination on the basis of first-order desires and second-order volitions.

The aim of this paper is to analyze Schelling’s compatibilist account of freedom of the will particularly in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. I shall argue that against Kant’s transcendental compatibilism Schelling proposes a “volitional compatibilism,” according to which the free will emerges out of nature and is not identical to practical reason as Kant claims. Finally, I will relate Schelling’s volitional compatibilism to more recent accounts of free will in order to better understand what he means by his concept of a “higher necessity.”

This volume collects thirteen original essays that address the concept of will in Classical German Philosophy from Kant to Schopenhauer. During this short, but prolific period, the concept of will underwent various transformations. While Kant identifies the will with pure practical reason, Fichte introduces, in the wake of Reinhold, an originally biological concept of drive into his ethical theory, thereby expanding on the Kantian notion of the will. Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer take a step further and conceive the will either as a primal being, as a socio-ontological entity, or as a blindly striving, non-rational force. Thus, the history of the will is marked by a complex set of tensions between rational and non-rational aspects of practical volition. The book outlines these transformations from a historical and systematic point of view. It offers an overview of the most important theories of the will by the major figures of Classical German Philosophy, but also includes interpretations of conceptions developed by lesser-studied philosophers such as Maimon, Jacobi, Reinhold, and Bouterwek.

Kant attempted to answer the question of whether immoral actions result from a mere lack or failing of reason, or whether they consist in a certain form of rationality, i. e. in immoral reasons. The paper addresses this question by concentrating on Kant’s conception of “rationalising” (“Vernünfteln”). This concept is the key for understanding how immoral actions can be based on reasons and are thus imputable. According to Kant, by rationalising, the moral agent constructs a formal coherence of his maxims that pretends to conform with the moral law but actually follows motives such as self-love or self-conceit. This activity of constructing a rational illusion, which derives from a dialectic of reason, can be imputed to the moral agent. Finally, the paper addresses strategies that Kant develops in order to circumvent the rationalising trap.

In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and affectivist interpretations are true. As such, respect can be understood in terms of a process of moral self-consciousness and self-formation, which means that the will must be freed from initial empirical motives, and finally be determined only by rational principles.

Contrary to Karl Leonhard Reinhold's theoretical critique of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique has been almost unknown. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant. I will concentrate on the so‐called Reinhold's dilemma, which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions in Kant. Also, I shall explain how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing a new action theory and by sharply distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's practical significance by relating his conception of individual freedom to recent theories of volitional self‐determination.