Peter Kahl

This paper critically examines traditional academic peer review as a colonial epistemic structure that entrenches testimonial and hermeneutical injustices. Drawing on fiduciary ethics, epistemic justice theory, and philosophical analyses from Raz, Heidegger, Giroux, and Connell, it argues that peer review systematically undermines epistemic agency, pluralism, and cognitive diversity. The study extends fiduciary duties into the epistemic domain, situating institutions as trustees of the epistemic commons. It proposes epistemocratic governance—a model integrating fiduciary transparency, multimodal scholarship, distributed epistemic authority, and responsible AI oversight—to replace colonial peer review with accountable, pluralistic knowledge governance. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12547.77607/1

In this essay, I critically examine fiduciary governance failures and conflicts of interest at PhilPapers, focusing particularly on the dual governance and editorial roles held by Professors David Chalmers and David Bourget. Drawing upon fiduciary theory, epistemic justice principles, and my prior scholarship, I argue that the concentration of both governance oversight and editorial decision-making within the same individuals creates structural conflicts that severely compromise transparency, impartiality, and accountability. These governance deficiencies not only undermine the legitimacy and scholarly integrity of PhilPapers but also contribute to epistemic injustice by diminishing scholars’ epistemic autonomy and trust globally. To address these issues, I propose immediate reforms including clear structural separation of fiduciary and editorial roles, establishment of an independent oversight board, rigorous transparency and accountability measures, and meaningful mechanisms for stakeholder responsiveness. The implementation of these reforms is essential, not only for restoring integrity at PhilPapers but also as a globally significant precedent for similar scholarly platforms and epistemic gatekeepers.

Who is Afraid of Free-Range Knowledge? is a multimodal poetic thesis explicitly critiquing academic gatekeeping and epistemic domestication. Through poetry, multilingualism, and visual epistemology, it illustrates how traditional academic structures actively constrain knowledge into sanctioned forms, excluding innovative epistemologies and multidisciplinary approaches. This work explicitly positions epistemic gatekeepers as fiduciaries with ethical, epistemic, and legal obligations to embrace epistemic plurality and facilitate inclusive knowledge practices.

In this paper, I critically examine institutional epistemic gatekeepers—including academic platforms such as PhilPapers, JSTOR, major publishers, and academic repositories—as fiduciaries entrusted with safeguarding epistemic diversity, justice, and integrity. I argue that current institutional policies systematically domesticate and marginalise diverse epistemologies through restrictive registration requirements, monomodal publication frameworks, opaque peer-review processes, and disciplinary siloisation. Drawing on my original scholarship and recent critical insights—particularly concerning epistemic humility, epistemic transposition, and epistemic domestication—I critique these gatekeeping practices as fiduciary breaches that exacerbate socioeconomic, academic, and epistemic stratification. I advocate concrete fiduciary and epistemic reforms, including transparent review processes, representational inclusivity, multimodal and multilingual scholarly frameworks, and institutional oversight committees committed to epistemic plurality and accountability. Ultimately, this paper calls upon scholarly communities and institutions to actively honour their fiduciary responsibilities, thereby fostering genuine epistemic openness, plurality, and justice.

This dissertation develops a framework for understanding epistemic justice as a core institutional responsibility of universities. I argue that higher education institutions act as stewards of an epistemic commons and therefore carry fiduciary-like duties to promote epistemic openness and prevent epistemic injustice. Drawing on the work of Miranda Fricker, Elizabeth Anderson, and traditions in fiduciary ethics, I extend the discussion by incorporating perspectives from educational philosophy (Mill, Freire, Rawls) and Chinese traditions such as Confucian reciprocity, Zhuangzian perspectivism, and Taoist epistemic humility. The analysis combines normative theory with comparative law, examining the UK’s Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023, Germany’s constitutional protections, France’s statutory ambiguity, and the Netherlands’ statutory minimalism. Case studies—including participatory methodologies, microfascist dynamics, and controversies in Groningen and Grenoble—illustrate how epistemic exclusion persists despite formal commitments to openness. I propose institutional mechanisms such as epistemic audits, oversight roles, inclusive pedagogy, and transparent accountability structures to embed epistemic justice in practice and strengthen the legitimacy of universities as custodians of knowledge. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11063.38563