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16Evidence and Method: Scientific Strategies of Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell (review)Isis 105 (3): 672-673. 2014.
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6Allan Franklin, No Easy Answers: Science and the Pursuit of Knowledge. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Pp. xii+258. $29.95 (review)British Journal for the History of Science 40 (3): 455. 2007.
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41The Evidence for the Top Quark: Objectivity and Bias in Collaborative ExperimentationCambridge University Press. 2004.The Evidence for the Top Quark offers both a historical and philosophical perspective on an important recent discovery in particle physics: evidence for the elementary particle known as the top quark. Drawing on published reports, oral histories, and internal documents from the large collaboration that performed the experiment, Kent Staley explores in detail the controversies and politics that surrounded this major scientific result. At the same time the book seeks to defend an objective theory …Read more
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91Pragmatic warrant for frequentist statistical practice: the case of high energy physicsSynthese 194 (2). 2017.Amidst long-running debates within the field, high energy physics has adopted a statistical methodology that primarily employs standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation, but incorporates Bayesian methods for limited purposes. The discovery of the Higgs boson has drawn increased attention to the statistical methods employed within HEP. Here I argue that the warrant for the practice in HEP of relying primarily on frequentist methods can best be…Read more
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153Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquirySynthese 182 (3): 475-492. 2011.While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates—the internalist-externalist debate—from the perspective…Read more
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117Dirac's “Fine-Tuning Problem”: A Constructive Use of Anachronism?Perspectives on Science 20 (4): 476-503. 2012.
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866What experiment did we just do? Counterfactual error statistics and uncertainties about the reference classPhilosophy of Science 69 (2): 279-299. 2002.Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method by which it may be addressed, with an example from …Read more
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100Strategies for securing evidence through model criticismEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1): 21-43. 2012.Some accounts of evidence regard it as an objective relationship holding between data and hypotheses, perhaps mediated by a testing procedure. Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence is an example of such an approach. Such a view leaves open the question of when an epistemic agent is justified in drawing an inference from such data to a hypothesis. Using Mayo’s account as an illustration, I propose a framework for addressing the justification question via a relativized notion, which I design…Read more
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12Novelty, Severity, and History in the Testing of Hypotheses: The Case of the Top QuarkPhilosophy of Science 63 (5). 1996.It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of "use novelty" introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philosophically, in terms of the need to conduct a seve…Read more
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200Evidential collaborations: Epistemic and pragmatic considerations in "group belief"Social Epistemology 21 (3). 2007.This paper examines the role of evidential considerations in relation to pragmatic concerns in statements of group belief, focusing on scientific collaborations that are constituted in part by the aim of evaluating the evidence for scientific claims (evidential collaborations). Drawing upon a case study in high energy particle physics, I seek to show how pragmatic factors that enter into the decision to issue a group statement contribute positively to the epistemic functioning of such groups, co…Read more
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24An Introduction to the Philosophy of ScienceCambridge University Press. 2014.This book guides readers by gradual steps through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent W. Staley shows how seemingly abstract philosophical issues are relevant to important aspects of scientific practice. Structured in two parts, the book first tackles the central concepts of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of induction, falsificationism, and underdetermination, and important figures and movements,…Read more
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19The recent discovery of a Higgs boson prompted increased attention of statisticians and philosophers of science to the statistical methodology of High Energy Physics. Amidst long-standing debates within the field, HEP has adopted a mixed statistical methodology drawing upon both frequentist and Bayesian methods, but with standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation playing a primary role. Physicists within HEP typically deny that their methodolo…Read more
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