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866What experiment did we just do? Counterfactual error statistics and uncertainties about the reference classPhilosophy of Science 69 (2): 279-299. 2002.Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method by which it may be addressed, with an example from …Read more
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100Strategies for securing evidence through model criticismEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1): 21-43. 2012.Some accounts of evidence regard it as an objective relationship holding between data and hypotheses, perhaps mediated by a testing procedure. Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence is an example of such an approach. Such a view leaves open the question of when an epistemic agent is justified in drawing an inference from such data to a hypothesis. Using Mayo’s account as an illustration, I propose a framework for addressing the justification question via a relativized notion, which I design…Read more
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12Novelty, Severity, and History in the Testing of Hypotheses: The Case of the Top QuarkPhilosophy of Science 63 (5). 1996.It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of "use novelty" introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philosophically, in terms of the need to conduct a seve…Read more
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200Evidential collaborations: Epistemic and pragmatic considerations in "group belief"Social Epistemology 21 (3). 2007.This paper examines the role of evidential considerations in relation to pragmatic concerns in statements of group belief, focusing on scientific collaborations that are constituted in part by the aim of evaluating the evidence for scientific claims (evidential collaborations). Drawing upon a case study in high energy particle physics, I seek to show how pragmatic factors that enter into the decision to issue a group statement contribute positively to the epistemic functioning of such groups, co…Read more
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24An Introduction to the Philosophy of ScienceCambridge University Press. 2014.This book guides readers by gradual steps through the central concepts and debates in the philosophy of science. Using concrete examples from the history of science, Kent W. Staley shows how seemingly abstract philosophical issues are relevant to important aspects of scientific practice. Structured in two parts, the book first tackles the central concepts of the philosophy of science, such as the problem of induction, falsificationism, and underdetermination, and important figures and movements,…Read more
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19The recent discovery of a Higgs boson prompted increased attention of statisticians and philosophers of science to the statistical methodology of High Energy Physics. Amidst long-standing debates within the field, HEP has adopted a mixed statistical methodology drawing upon both frequentist and Bayesian methods, but with standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation playing a primary role. Physicists within HEP typically deny that their methodolo…Read more
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1142Robust evidence and secure evidence claimsPhilosophy of Science 71 (4): 467-488. 2004.Many philosophers have claimed that evidence for a theory is better when multiple independent tests yield the same result, i.e., when experimental results are robust. Little has been said about the grounds on which such a claim rests, however. The present essay presents an analysis of the evidential value of robustness that rests on the fallibility of assumptions about the reliability of testing procedures and a distinction between the strength of evidence and the security of an evidence claim. …Read more
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29Kent Staley Reviewed work: Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics by Peter Galison (review)Philosophy of Science 67 (2): 339-341. 2000.
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80Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background BeliefsEpisteme 7 (3): 232-247. 2010.Some prominent accounts of scientific evidence treat evidence as an unrelativized concept. But whether belief in a hypothesis is justified seems relative to the epistemic situation of the believer. The issue becomes yet more complicated in the context of group epistemic agents, for then one confronts the problem of relativizing to an epistemic situation that may include conflicting beliefs. As a step toward resolution of these difficulties, an ideal of justification is here proposed that incorpo…Read more
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153: Evidence claims depend on fallible assumptions. Three strategies for making true evidence claims in spite of this fallibility are strengthening the support for those assumptions, weakening conclusions, and using multiple independent tests to produce robust evidence. Reliability itself, understood in frequentist terms, does not explain the usefulness of all three strategies; robustness, in particular, sometimes functions in a way that is not well-characterized in terms of reliability. I argue t…Read more
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