Christoph Horn

The debate on the ontological foundations of Kant’s philosophy is usually focused on his theoretical and practical philosophy. Does Kant believe that there is an external world which pre-exists our constitution of spatiotemporal beings, as he describes it in the first Critique? Or is he an idealist concerning external reality? And does Kant think that we should assume the independent existence of moral values? Or do we ourselves ultimately create them? Whereas both scholarly discussions are complex and far from having an unambiguous solution, the question of realism and antirealism is rarely raised on the basis of his philosophy of history, although it is a promising approach. In this contribution, I defend the thesis that Kant, while he seems to introduce his theory of history in the sense of a mere projection, quite clearly develops the idea of an “objective progress.” Seen from this perspective, his philosophy of history can also help us better understand his putative antirealism in the theoretical and practical realm.

When handling the concept “meaning of life,” it is necessary to differentiate between meaning of life in a strict sense and meaning in life. While the meaning of life refers to human life in general and out of a super subjective perspective, the meaning in life considers the meaning in an individual life out of a subjective perspective. However, in both versions, a problem arises as to whether the question of a meaningful life could be answered objectively or subjectively. A possible though controversial solution is a unity between the happiness from the subjective perspective and the meaningfulness from the objective. Further, the conflict between meaning of life and morality favors an objectivist approach in the attribution of meaning.

Die "Gesetze" ("Nomoi") sind Platons spätester und umfangreichster Dialog. Bei seinem Tod waren die zwölf Bücher stellenweise unvollendet. Aber nicht nur deswegen bildet die Schrift eine interpretatorische Herausforderung. Die "Gesetze" weichen zudem in vielen Hinsichten von den Lehren ab, die uns aus den früheren Dialogen vertraut sind. Primär ist der Dialog der Politischen Philosophie gewidmet: Es geht um die Grundlagen zur Gründung einer idealen Stadt namens Magnesia, um Fragen der Gesetzesordnung, der Ämter, der Erziehung, der Rolle von Männern und Frauen, um Strafrecht, den Umgang mit Geld, die Theologie sowie Komödie und Tragödie. Dass die Forschung zu den "Gesetzen" in den letzten Jahren viele neue Facetten erschlossen hat, spiegelt der vorliegende Band, der Originalbeiträge von 13 anerkannten Platon-Experten versammelt. MIT BEITRÄGEN VON: Chris Bobonich, Hallvard J. Fossheim, Christoph Horn, Manuel Knoll, André Laks, Francisco Lisi, Irmgard Männlein-Robert, Jörn Müller, Matthias Perkams, Klaus Schöpsdau, Anna Schriefl und Eckhart Schütrumpf.

In the epistemology of his middle period, Plato repeatedly describes the alleged ‘intellection of true reality’ in terms of sight, vision, illumination, or touch. Does this show more than Plato’s preference for optic and haptic metaphors? Should we assume that this goes back to a specific reason to be found in his underlying epistemological position? On the traditional reading, Plato actually wants to defend a sort of intuitionism. According to this still wide-spread reading, he claims that there is a very particular way of grasping Forms: Philosophers manage to come into a sort of direct contact with intelligible objects. Intellection is thus conceived as a quasi-visual presence of intelligible Forms. In our contribution, we want to challenge this interpretation by raising several objections against it. Surprisingly, there exists a close parallel in Aristotelian scholarship: Although Aristotle’s epistemology is built on considerably different foundations, there is an interpretative tradition according to which one has to assume a strict discontinuity between the methodical procedure and the intellection of the highest epistemic objects. As for Plato, we want to refuse an interpretation of Aristotle based on a concept of intuition characterized by the following features: Intuition is a specific way of gaining knowledge. It is independent of empirical conditions and leads to apriori knowledge. It consists of some experience of evidence or is accompanied by it. Knowledge gained by this kind of intuition does not need any further argument or justification

Vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Frage nach einer angemessenen Einladungspolitik für akademische Veranstaltungen wird zunächst betont, dass das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung zum absoluten Kern jeder liberalen politischen Ordnung gehört. Seine Wahrnehmung unterliegt jedoch zugleich klaren Bedingungen und weist Legitimitätsgrenzen auf. Im vorliegenden Artikel werden fünf solche Bedingungen genereller Art formuliert, nämlich ein a) Moralitätskriterium, b) ein Reziprozitätskriterium, c) ein Legalitätskriterium, d) ein republikanisches Gemeinwohlkriterium und e) ein Relevanzkriterium. Es folgen weitere sechs Kriterien für die Limitierung des wissenschaftstypischen Gebrauchs von Meinungsfreiheit: f) das Sozialisationskriterium, g) das Expertisekriterium, h) das Einschlägigkeitskriterium, i) das Methodenkriterium, j) das Qualitätskriterium und k) das Objektivitätskriterium. Illiberale Positionen werden sodann als solche definiert, die das Prinzip des Vorrangs der Grundfreiheiten nicht anerkennen. Schließlich stelle ich Überlegungen zum Toleranzbegriff mit dem Ergebnis an, dass gegenüber illiberalen Positionen Toleranz in der Regel nicht angemessen ist.

Kant discusses the value of marriage in the context of his Doctrine of Right from the perspective of a mutual contract. Although this approach has been widely criticized since it was first published, this procedure seems to have some advantages: it seems to leave teleological naturalism behind and to emphasize the juridification of personal relationships. But at a closer look, Kant’s theory of the value of marriage suffers from several serious shortcomings. The fundamental problem is that he derives it from the perspective of our duties towards ourselves.

According to a rather simplified view, Nietzsche hated and rejected Plato in a fundamental and radical way. But at a closer look, we should differentiate between, on the one hand, the basic elements of Nietzsche’s refusal of Plato and, on the other hand, a number of perspectives under which Nietzsche also appreciated and even praised him. Whereas he is highly critical towards the major part of Plato’s ethics, his attitude to Platonic political thought is much more friendly. The important point is to look at the philosophical backgrounds, including the early classicist Nietzsche from the Basel period as we meet him in the lecture notes and in some of the unpublished fragments edited by Colli and Montinari. In volume II/4 of the critical edition (KGW) e.g., we have almost 190 pages of material on Plato Nietzsche used for his university lectures.

This article examines the foundations for the legitimacy of law from the perspective of Hegel’s philosophy. In a first step, Kant’s justification of law is discussed, as Hegel takes the Kantian model as a central point of reference. Then, in the Section 2, I discuss Hegel’s reasons for rejecting the main strategies of justification of the legal order: natural law, contractarianism and legal positivism. This is further followed by a discussion of the meaning and scope of Hegel’s contextualism, according to which there can be no practical normativity without a certain historical embedding. Finally, I describe a more traditional met-aphysical reading that I consider to be the correct solution, contrasting it with Honneth’s theory of recognition and Bran-dom’s pragmatism.

In many contemporary accounts of justice, both in moral and political philosophy, there is a tendency to give too much weight to the concept of justice. ‘Justice’, we often read, is at the center of our normative intuitions. I call this the ‘primacy thesis’, which, for the most part, seems to be inspired by J.S. Mill and by J. Rawls. I challenge the primacy thesis and its four basic convictions: (1) Cases of essential moral importance are always simultaneously questions of justice. (2) Cases of justice are always at the same time questions of essential moral importance. (3) Cases of justice have basically to do with aspects of the legal or political order. (4) Cases of justice are never morally neutral or indifferent.