Christoph Horn

This article examines the foundations for the legitimacy of law from the perspective of Hegel’s philosophy. In a first step, Kant’s justification of law is discussed, as Hegel takes the Kantian model as a central point of reference. Then, in the Section 2, I discuss Hegel’s reasons for rejecting the main strategies of justification of the legal order: natural law, contractarianism and legal positivism. This is further followed by a discussion of the meaning and scope of Hegel’s contextualism, according to which there can be no practical normativity without a certain historical embedding. Finally, I describe a more traditional met-aphysical reading that I consider to be the correct solution, contrasting it with Honneth’s theory of recognition and Bran-dom’s pragmatism.

In many contemporary accounts of justice, both in moral and political philosophy, there is a tendency to give too much weight to the concept of justice. ‘Justice’, we often read, is at the center of our normative intuitions. I call this the ‘primacy thesis’, which, for the most part, seems to be inspired by J.S. Mill and by J. Rawls. I challenge the primacy thesis and its four basic convictions: (1) Cases of essential moral importance are always simultaneously questions of justice. (2) Cases of justice are always at the same time questions of essential moral importance. (3) Cases of justice have basically to do with aspects of the legal or political order. (4) Cases of justice are never morally neutral or indifferent.

Happiness is an episodic or periodical concept, which can describe both a subjective sentiment and an objective fulfillment. Against the background of today’s pluralism, this leads to the question as to whether one should follow a subjective understanding of happiness or measure it by objective standards. The rational desire model offers a solution: in order to rate happiness, the component of the fulfillment of desire is filtered by rational criteria. Meanwhile, most of the empirical attempts to systematize the quality of life collapse at the hurdle of describing the decisive point.

Plotinus’ philosophical standpoint as a whole can be characterized as a metaphysics of unity (henology). One or unity is the key term for understanding the Plotinian conception of a hierarchically ordered reality: from the first principle to the lowest entity, matter, Plotinus describes reality as a derivative sequence of decreasing unity. In doing so, he not only uses the term ‚the One‘ (to hen) to designate its absolute or highest principle, but also describes the two other intelligible entities, the intellect (nous) and the soul (psychê), as unities. According to the Plotinian view, Plato gives us the key to a full understanding of reality in the Parmenides by distinguishing a strictly understood first One (to prôton hen, tokuriôteron hen), the second One, which is said to be a ‚one-many‘ (hen polla), and the third One, the ‚one and many‘ (hen kai polla: V 1 [10],8). While Plotinus declares the first One transcendent to Being (‚beyond Being‘, quoting Plato, Republic 6,509b9: epekeina tês ousias), all further unities that emerge from the first show for him inferior forms of unity.

EigentumEigentum und VerteilungsgerechtigkeitGerechtigkeitVerteilungsgerechtigkeit bilden wichtige Grundkonzepte der WirtschaftsethikWirtschaftsethik. Während Verteilungsgerechtigkeit einen normativen Begriff darstellt, der unsere Ideen darüber zusammenfasst, welche Güter in einer Wirtschafts- und GesellschaftsordnungGesellschaftGesellschaftsordnung wem aufgrund welcher PrinzipienPrinzip(ien)Eigentumsprinzip zukommen sollen, ist Eigentum ein eher deskriptiver Begriff: er beschreibt einen bestehenden (meist rechtlich greifbaren) Anspruch einer Person auf die exklusive Nutzung eines Objekts. Rein deskriptiv ist aber auch er nicht; im Grunde beruht unser Eigentumsbegriff auf stark normativ eingefärbten Vorstellungen darüber, was für ein gelingendes menschliches Leben zählt und wie wir uns eine gut funktionierende sozialeOrdnungsoziale Gemeinschaft vorstellen.

Sabe-se que os autores antigos queriam saber a resposta à pergunta segundo a vida Sabe-se que os autores antigos queriam saber a resposta à pergunta segundo a vida boa. Eles queriam saber a razão/motivo de condução da vida humana para o bom resultado ou para o fracasso e, assim, conduzir a práxis individual. De outro modo, mostra-se a filosofia moral moderna que prioriza o interesse nos princípios e nos problemas de fundamentação moral, nos casos de conflitos políticos relevantes e nos campos de aplicação social precários. O acento da filosofia moral antiga está centrado no agente  (agentcentered), enquanto na filosofia moral moderna, no ato (act-centered). Central para os antigos era a qualidade moral da pessoa agente, central para os modernos é a pergunta acerca do valor moral das ações de acordo com sua ligação e fundamentos para isso. boa. Eles queriam saber a razão/motivo de condução da vida humana para o bom resultado ou para o fracasso e, assim, conduzir a práxis individual. De outro modo, mostra-se a filosofia moral moderna que prioriza o interesse nos princípios e nos problemas de fundamentação moral, nos casos de conflitos políticos relevantes e nos campos de aplicação social precários. O acento da filosofia moral antiga está centrado no agente (agentcentered), enquanto na filosofia moral moderna, no ato (act-centered). Central para os antigos era a qualidade moral da pessoa agente, central para os modernos é a pergunta acerca do valor moral das ações de acordo com sua ligação e fundamentos para isso

EigentumEigentum und VerteilungsgerechtigkeitGerechtigkeitVerteilungsgerechtigkeit bilden wichtige Grundkonzepte der WirtschaftsethikWirtschaftsethik. Während Verteilungsgerechtigkeit einen normativen Begriff darstellt, der unsere Ideen darüber zusammenfasst, welche Güter in einer Wirtschafts- und GesellschaftsordnungGesellschaftGesellschaftsordnung wem aufgrund welcher PrinzipienPrinzip(ien)Eigentumsprinzip zukommen sollen, ist Eigentum ein eher deskriptiver Begriff: er beschreibt einen bestehenden (meist rechtlich greifbaren) Anspruch einer Person auf die exklusive Nutzung eines Objekts. Rein deskriptiv ist aber auch er nicht; im Grunde beruht unser Eigentumsbegriff auf stark normativ eingefärbten Vorstellungen darüber, was für ein gelingendes menschliches Leben zählt und wie wir uns eine gut funktionierende sozialeOrdnungsoziale Gemeinschaft vorstellen.

Neste artigo, o autor apresenta a concepção de linguagem de Santo Agostinho, sobretudo nas seguintes obras: De dialectica, De magistro e nos escritos tardios De doctrina christiana e De trinitate. É dada especial atenção à teoria agostiniana da linguagem no De magistro. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Agostinho. Linguagem. De magistro. Sinais. ABSTRACT In this article the author presents St. Augustine’s conception of language philosophy, with special concern for the following works: De dialectica, De Magistro and the later writings De doctrina christiana and De Trinitate. The enphasis of the exposition relies on St. Augustine’s philosophy of language in De magistro. KEY WORDS – Augustine. Philosophy of language. De magistro. Signs