Christoph Horn

This article attempts to challenge those contemporary philosophical approaches to justice (and this is the majority of them) which ascribe to the notion of justice a dominant role within ethics and political philosophy. In the first section, this overestimation of justice is traced back to J.S. Mill (and to John Rawls). After having pointed out some of the essential features of the Millian (and Rawlsian) concept, I show how far these attributes are away from what we (in our everyday language) mean by the word ‚justice’. Finally, I try to spell out what might be more plausibly seen as the focus of our shared moral intuition, and to highlight to which extent there is an overlap with our common idea of justice.

En s’appuyant sur le cours de Ricœur sur Le Concept philosophique de volonté – professé en 1967 – l’article examine la position que le philosophe français assume sur la question très controversée concernant l’histoire conceptuelle de la volonté dans la pensée occidentale et notamment dans la philosophie ancienne. En partant d’une clarification terminologique – centrée sur la distinction entre trois concepts de volonté (appétitif, décisionnel et dynamique) – l’article met en cause la thèse défendue ici par Ricœur, selon laquelle le concept de volonté serait absent dans la philosophie ancienne et en particulier dans la pensée d’Aristote. Toutefois, d’accord avec Ricœur, on reconnaît chez Augustin une approche foncièrement novatrice du concept de volonté, dont on précise le sens et la portée dans la partie conclusive.

Diferentes interpretações foram oferecidas ao argumento agostiniano do cogito, tradicionalmente preocupadas com as possíveis semelhanças entre esse e o cogito, sum de Descartes. Centrando-se em De civitate Dei XI 26, o autor oferece uma análise minuciosa do tema em Agostinho, considerando três aspectos: o tema da relação entre o cogito cartesiano e o agostiniano, o lugar do argumento agostiniano no contexto da filosofia da Antiguidade Tardia, o sentido do argumento do cogito no pensamento do próprio Agostinho.

This article attempts to challenge those contemporary philosophical approaches to justice (and this is the majority of them) which ascribe to the notion of justice a dominant role within ethics and political philosophy. In the first section, this overestimation of justice is traced back to J.S. Mill (and to John Rawls). After having pointed out some of the essential features of the Millian (and Rawlsian) concept, I show how far these attributes are away from what we (in our everyday language) mean by the word ‚justice’. Finally, I try to spell out what might be more plausibly seen as the focus of our shared moral intuition, and to highlight to which extent there is an overlap with our common idea of justice.

In several of his treatises, Plotinus discusses truth as a phenomenon that is situated primarily in the Intellect. As the paper aims to make plausible, the Plotinian theory of truth is based on a model of predication that bridges the gap between ontological and propositional aspects. It explains why the contents of the Intellect are grasped infallibly. To a large extent, the Plotinian theory of fallibility and infallibility can be regarded as a transformation of Platonic and Aristotelian considerations on the cognition of what is simple, and analytically implied in a concept. Plotinus, based on his doctrine that the Intellect is the original place of truth, as something internal, adapts the theories of Plato and Aristotle. But there is also an original contribution made by Plotinus to the history of perfect knowledge: the idea of an immediate and spontaneous cognition, i.e., consciousness, which is without deception.

The debate on the ontological foundations of Kant’s philosophy is usually focused on his theoretical and practical philosophy. Does Kant believe that there is an external world which pre-exists our constitution of spatiotemporal beings, as he describes it in the first Critique? Or is he an idealist concerning external reality? And does Kant think that we should assume the independent existence of moral values? Or do we ourselves ultimately create them? Whereas both scholarly discussions are complex and far from having an unambiguous solution, the question of realism and antirealism is rarely raised on the basis of his philosophy of history, although it is a promising approach. In this contribution, I defend the thesis that Kant, while he seems to introduce his theory of history in the sense of a mere projection, quite clearly develops the idea of an “objective progress.” Seen from this perspective, his philosophy of history can also help us better understand his putative antirealism in the theoretical and practical realm.