Christoph Horn

When handling the concept “meaning of life,” it is necessary to differentiate between meaning of life in a strict sense and meaning in life. While the meaning of life refers to human life in general and out of a super subjective perspective, the meaning in life considers the meaning in an individual life out of a subjective perspective. However, in both versions, a problem arises as to whether the question of a meaningful life could be answered objectively or subjectively. A possible though controversial solution is a unity between the happiness from the subjective perspective and the meaningfulness from the objective. Further, the conflict between meaning of life and morality favors an objectivist approach in the attribution of meaning.

Die "Gesetze" ("Nomoi") sind Platons spätester und umfangreichster Dialog. Bei seinem Tod waren die zwölf Bücher stellenweise unvollendet. Aber nicht nur deswegen bildet die Schrift eine interpretatorische Herausforderung. Die "Gesetze" weichen zudem in vielen Hinsichten von den Lehren ab, die uns aus den früheren Dialogen vertraut sind. Primär ist der Dialog der Politischen Philosophie gewidmet: Es geht um die Grundlagen zur Gründung einer idealen Stadt namens Magnesia, um Fragen der Gesetzesordnung, der Ämter, der Erziehung, der Rolle von Männern und Frauen, um Strafrecht, den Umgang mit Geld, die Theologie sowie Komödie und Tragödie. Dass die Forschung zu den "Gesetzen" in den letzten Jahren viele neue Facetten erschlossen hat, spiegelt der vorliegende Band, der Originalbeiträge von 13 anerkannten Platon-Experten versammelt. MIT BEITRÄGEN VON: Chris Bobonich, Hallvard J. Fossheim, Christoph Horn, Manuel Knoll, André Laks, Francisco Lisi, Irmgard Männlein-Robert, Jörn Müller, Matthias Perkams, Klaus Schöpsdau, Anna Schriefl und Eckhart Schütrumpf.

In the epistemology of his middle period, Plato repeatedly describes the alleged ‘intellection of true reality’ in terms of sight, vision, illumination, or touch. Does this show more than Plato’s preference for optic and haptic metaphors? Should we assume that this goes back to a specific reason to be found in his underlying epistemological position? On the traditional reading, Plato actually wants to defend a sort of intuitionism. According to this still wide-spread reading, he claims that there is a very particular way of grasping Forms: Philosophers manage to come into a sort of direct contact with intelligible objects. Intellection is thus conceived as a quasi-visual presence of intelligible Forms. In our contribution, we want to challenge this interpretation by raising several objections against it. Surprisingly, there exists a close parallel in Aristotelian scholarship: Although Aristotle’s epistemology is built on considerably different foundations, there is an interpretative tradition according to which one has to assume a strict discontinuity between the methodical procedure and the intellection of the highest epistemic objects. As for Plato, we want to refuse an interpretation of Aristotle based on a concept of intuition characterized by the following features: Intuition is a specific way of gaining knowledge. It is independent of empirical conditions and leads to apriori knowledge. It consists of some experience of evidence or is accompanied by it. Knowledge gained by this kind of intuition does not need any further argument or justification

Vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Frage nach einer angemessenen Einladungspolitik für akademische Veranstaltungen wird zunächst betont, dass das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung zum absoluten Kern jeder liberalen politischen Ordnung gehört. Seine Wahrnehmung unterliegt jedoch zugleich klaren Bedingungen und weist Legitimitätsgrenzen auf. Im vorliegenden Artikel werden fünf solche Bedingungen genereller Art formuliert, nämlich ein a) Moralitätskriterium, b) ein Reziprozitätskriterium, c) ein Legalitätskriterium, d) ein republikanisches Gemeinwohlkriterium und e) ein Relevanzkriterium. Es folgen weitere sechs Kriterien für die Limitierung des wissenschaftstypischen Gebrauchs von Meinungsfreiheit: f) das Sozialisationskriterium, g) das Expertisekriterium, h) das Einschlägigkeitskriterium, i) das Methodenkriterium, j) das Qualitätskriterium und k) das Objektivitätskriterium. Illiberale Positionen werden sodann als solche definiert, die das Prinzip des Vorrangs der Grundfreiheiten nicht anerkennen. Schließlich stelle ich Überlegungen zum Toleranzbegriff mit dem Ergebnis an, dass gegenüber illiberalen Positionen Toleranz in der Regel nicht angemessen ist.

Kant discusses the value of marriage in the context of his Doctrine of Right from the perspective of a mutual contract. Although this approach has been widely criticized since it was first published, this procedure seems to have some advantages: it seems to leave teleological naturalism behind and to emphasize the juridification of personal relationships. But at a closer look, Kant’s theory of the value of marriage suffers from several serious shortcomings. The fundamental problem is that he derives it from the perspective of our duties towards ourselves.

According to a rather simplified view, Nietzsche hated and rejected Plato in a fundamental and radical way. But at a closer look, we should differentiate between, on the one hand, the basic elements of Nietzsche’s refusal of Plato and, on the other hand, a number of perspectives under which Nietzsche also appreciated and even praised him. Whereas he is highly critical towards the major part of Plato’s ethics, his attitude to Platonic political thought is much more friendly. The important point is to look at the philosophical backgrounds, including the early classicist Nietzsche from the Basel period as we meet him in the lecture notes and in some of the unpublished fragments edited by Colli and Montinari. In volume II/4 of the critical edition (KGW) e.g., we have almost 190 pages of material on Plato Nietzsche used for his university lectures.

Kant formuliert nirgends ein individuelles Recht auf Leben, auf körperliche und psychische Integrität, auf Eigentum, Meinungsfreiheit, Religionsfreiheit, Freizügigkeit usw. Wenn es aber zutrifft, dass Kant keine Konzeption der Menschenrechte in unserem modernen Sinn besitzt, stellt sich die Frage nach den Gründen. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird gezeigt, dass sich auch der Versuch, ein Kantisches Menschenrecht im „angeborenen Recht auf Freiheit“ zu identifizieren, als aussichtslos erweist (I.). Sodann wird eine Erklärung dafür angeboten, weshalb es verfehlt ist, von Kant eine Konzeption der Menschenrechte überhaupt zu erwarten (II.). Diese Erklärung beruht auf zwei Punkten: (a) Kant wählt seinen theoretischen Ausgangspunkt bei den Pflichten, nicht bei den Rechten; und (b) er fasst das Haben von Rechten nicht als die Zusicherung oder Gewährleistung bestimmter moralischer Güter für das Individuum auf. Und schließlich (III.) wird der pflichtentheoretische Rechtsbegriff Kants näher charakterisiert, auf dem sein ‚deontologischer Liberalismus‘ beruht. In der Konsequenz zeigt sich, dass Kant die Menschenrechtsidee auf der Basis seiner eigenen Überzeugungen ablehnen muss (also keineswegs hinter seinen eigenen Ideen oder Vorgaben zurückbleibt).

This paper defends the view that in his Politics, Aristotle embraces ‘normative naturalism’, the view that nature serves as a criterion of goodness, and provides a standard against which success in the practical sphere can be measured. Accordingly, it is argued that the polis’ being ‘by nature’ brings with it teleological implications such as are familiar from Aristotle’s biology. It is also argued that at several points in the Politics, Aristotle actually presupposes this naturalist theory of norms, for instance in his discussion of constitutions that are ‘contrary to nature’.

This article examines the foundations for the legitimacy of law from the perspective of Hegel’s philosophy. In a first step, Kant’s justification of law is discussed, as Hegel takes the Kantian model as a central point of reference. Then, in the Section 2, I discuss Hegel’s reasons for rejecting the main strategies of justification of the legal order: natural law, contractarianism and legal positivism. This is further followed by a discussion of the meaning and scope of Hegel’s contextualism, according to which there can be no practical normativity without a certain historical embedding. Finally, I describe a more traditional met-aphysical reading that I consider to be the correct solution, contrasting it with Honneth’s theory of recognition and Bran-dom’s pragmatism.

In many contemporary accounts of justice, both in moral and political philosophy, there is a tendency to give too much weight to the concept of justice. ‘Justice’, we often read, is at the center of our normative intuitions. I call this the ‘primacy thesis’, which, for the most part, seems to be inspired by J.S. Mill and by J. Rawls. I challenge the primacy thesis and its four basic convictions: (1) Cases of essential moral importance are always simultaneously questions of justice. (2) Cases of justice are always at the same time questions of essential moral importance. (3) Cases of justice have basically to do with aspects of the legal or political order. (4) Cases of justice are never morally neutral or indifferent.

Happiness is an episodic or periodical concept, which can describe both a subjective sentiment and an objective fulfillment. Against the background of today’s pluralism, this leads to the question as to whether one should follow a subjective understanding of happiness or measure it by objective standards. The rational desire model offers a solution: in order to rate happiness, the component of the fulfillment of desire is filtered by rational criteria. Meanwhile, most of the empirical attempts to systematize the quality of life collapse at the hurdle of describing the decisive point.