Luiz Carlos Pereira

A common misconception among logicians is to think that intuitionism is necessarily tied-up with single conclusion calculi. Single conclusion calculi can be used to model intuitionism and they are convenient, but by no means are they necessary. This has been shown by such influential textbook authors as Kleene, Takeuti and Dummett, to cite only three. If single conclusions are not necessary, how do we guarantee that only intuitionistic derivations are allowed? Traditionally one insists on restrictions on particular rules: implication right, negation right and universal quantification right are required to be single conclusion rules. In this note we show that instead of a cardinality restriction such as one-conclusion-only, we can use a notion of dependency between formulae to enforce the constructive character of derivations. The system we obtain, called FIL for full intuitionistic logic, satisfies basic properties such as soundness, completeness and cut elimination. We present two motivating applications of FIL and discuss some future work.

The introduction and elimination rules for material implication in natural deduction are not complete with respect to the implicational fragment of classical logic. A natural way to complete the system is through the addition of a new natural deduction rule corresponding to Peirce's formula → A) → A). E. Zimmermann [6] has shown how to extend Prawitz' normalization strategy to Peirce's rule: applications of Peirce's rule can be restricted to atomic conclusions. The aim of the present paper is to extend Seldin's normalization strategy to Peirce's rule by showing that every derivation Π in the implicational fragment can be transformed into a derivation Π' such that no application of Peirce's rule in Π' occurs above applications of →-introduction and →-elimination. As a corollary of Seldin's normalization strategy we obtain a form of Glivenko's theorem for the classical {→}-fragment.