Paul Helm

The two books make a notable contribution in drawing together many of the philosophical problems about time, and the associated literature. The expositions are also valuable for their interdisciplinary strengths, especially in the history and philosophy of science and (to a lesser extent) in theology, and for the clarity and thoroughness of Craig's approach. However, the two books do not present, as might at first appear, a side by side exposition of the respective strengths and weaknesses of the A-series and the B-series views of time. They are, rather, one interconnected defence of the A-series view. Some of the strengths and weaknesses of Craig's exposition and defence of the A-series view are noted.

The paper begins by describing two episodes of personal grief recounted by Augustine in the Confessions, that at the death of an unnamed friend and thatat the death of his mother, Monica. It is argued that Augustine intended to show that the earlier fried, and an early phase of his grief for his mother, were sinful. However, contrary to arecent account of Augustine's grief, it is argued that Augustine does not hold that it is wrong to grieve at the death of a loved one, provided that one grieves for the right reason.

It is argued that Calvin does not veer between two incompatible accounts of grace, freedom and necessity in Institutes II . 2, but presents a consistent position. The consistency is evident once it is seen that Calvin carefully distinguished between necessity and compulsion . For him not all necessitated acts are compelled, but all human acts which are the outcome of efficacious divine grace are necessitated by that grace. Because Calvin is consistent, there is no need to suppose that he has mistaken the causal sufficiency of divine saving grace for its causal importance

It is argued that Calvin does not veer between two incompatible accounts of grace, freedom and necessity in "Institutes II". 2, but presents a consistent position. The consistency is evident once it is seen that Calvin carefully distinguished between necessity and compulsion. For him not all necessitated acts are compelled, but all human acts which are the outcome of efficacious divine grace are necessitated by that grace. Because Calvin is consistent, there is no need to suppose that he has mistaken the causal sufficiency of divine saving grace for its causal importance.

In the first part of his paper, Dr Hudson argues that the distinction between between facts and values is eroded because there are some factual statements from which moral judgments do follow; and secondly he argues that there is a non-contingent connexion between beliefs about man and what it is intelligible to approve of or disapprove of morally. Both these conclusions are argued for tentatively and with reservation. In this comment I want to discuss three of the many issues Dr Hudson raises, and then to touch on a more general point which is at the source of my dissatisfaction with the drift of Dr Hudson's paper

Quentin Smith’s idea is that God being the originating cause of the universe is logically inconsistent with all extant definitions of causation, and thus logically impossible. Thus, for example the God of the Philosophers couldn’t have created the Universe, not even in both its senses, in both literal and analogical senses. The thesis is advanced by accounts of the usual views of “cause”. It is maintained these is successful. Such I shall then offer an account of divine causation of my own, and thus attempt to argue that Smith has not shown that the relation that God has to the universe is not a causal relation. Such as a Humean or that of David Lewis sense and of the “singularist” view of C. J. Ducasse would fail the analogical. And Malebranche’s “occasionalism” is surely an exception. If we turn to the other kind then it seems to be a case of “if the data are analogical-in, then the data will be that too”. Finally, it is argued that it is more productive to consider particular individual theistic powers and perfections, for these are mongrels which literality and of analogy are compounded.

Professor Holt's comments fall into two parts. He begins by raising some objections to the tentative rejection, in my paper, of the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts. He then goes on to offer an argument to show that my defence of the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom fails, or is at least seriously questionable. For brevity I shall concentrate on his remarks on foreknowledge as I do not think that his interesting discussion of the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts vitally affects the question about divine foreknowledge, the main point at issue.So I shall deal with Holt's claim that one can have the power to undo the fact of foreknowledge retroactively and argue that one can no more retroactively bring it about that God did not know than one can retroactively bring it about that he did know.

Unique in all of literature, the Confessions combines frank and profound psychological insight into Augustine's formative years along with sophisticated and beguiling reflections on some of the most important issues in philosophy and theology. The essays contained in this volume, by some of the most distinguished recent and contemporary thinkers in the field, insightfully explore Augustinian themes not only with an eye to historical accuracy but also to gauge the philosophical acumen of Augustine's reflections