Paul Helm

This chapter takes up another aspect relevant to God's relation to time — God's relation to the world, specifically, his relation to human beings. The Scriptures affirm that God is in relationship with human beings. Being in relationship seems to imply the possibility of real give-and-take. Several attributes of God seem to make real give-and-take impossible. Can a timeless God enter into dialogue? Furthermore, can a God who knows what you are going to do and say ahead of time engage you in a genuine dialogue? The chapter examines two proposed solutions to the problem of divine-human dialogue. It ultimately rejects the solution proposed by William Alston and argues that Richard Swinburne's solution is sufficient to preserve genuine dialogue but comes at too high a cost. A solution is proposed that can preserve genuine divine-human dialogue even if it turns out that God determines every event.

The chapter examines Augustine’s discussion of time in Book 11 of the _Confessions_ by emphasizing Augustine’s view of thinking eternally. This is preceded by a discussion of Augustine’s dismissal of Aristotle’s _Categories_ in his search for a way of thinking about the Church’s confession that God is immutable. Augustine comes to rely instead on the conceptuality of neo-Platonism, (as reported in Book 7) though this reliance is definitely and deliberately limited; the “books of the Platonists” are silent on the Incarnation. Invoking the distinction between A-theories and B-theories of time, the essay argues that Augustine opts for a modified B-series in his account of God’s relation to time in Book 11. Augustine’s attitude to temporal indexicality is also discussed.

‘Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them, they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil. The action itself may be blameable; it may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance.'

It has often been claimed that Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) was America's greatest philosopher and theologian. From literary criticism of his sermons to philosophical assessments of his metaphysics, there has been a burgeoning industry in Edwardsian studies, but there has been no one place where an exploration of the theology and philosophy of Edwards has been brought together. 2003 marks the tercentenary date of the birth of Jonathan Edwards. This book draws together specially commissioned contributions from distinguished philosophers and theologians from the USA and UK, to present new analytic philosophical and theological thinking on Edwards in a way that reflects Edwards' own concerns as well as those current in the academy.

It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is itself dependent upon considerations of bodily continuity. Alternatively it has been suggested that Locke's theory could be modified by allowing that for the purposes of personal identity ‘remember’ should be regarded as a transitive relation. So if A remembers the experiences of B but not those of C, and B remembers the experiences of C, then A, B and C can be regarded as belonging to the same unit of consciousness

Eternal God offers an exposition and philosophical defence of the idea that God is timeless. This is the traditional Christian position, though under widespread contemporary attack on both theological and philosophical grounds. The book begins by considering certain issues of method and exploring the very idea of timeless eternity. The defence of the idea of divine timelessness involves arguing against a number of claims, notably that it is incoherent and incompatible with the idea of personhood and freedom. Both these arguments are rebutted. It is argued that if God is in time, then by parity of argument this carries the unacceptable consequence that he is in space. The idea of omniscience, the propriety of speaking of an eternal God's foreknowledge, and of God's knowledge of the future are all discussed. It is argued that while divine foreknowledge is compatible only with some form of determinism, such determinism poses no greater threat to human responsibility than does atheistic determinism. The book concludes with an examination of the conditions under which one might make successful reference to such an eternal God.