David M. Shaw

It is widely accepted in clinical ethics that removing a patient from a ventilator at the patient’s request is ethically permissible. This constitutes voluntary passive euthanasia. However, voluntary active euthanasia, such as giving a patient a lethal overdose with the intention of ending that patient’s life, is ethically proscribed, as is assisted suicide, such as providing a patient with lethal pills or a lethal infusion. Proponents of voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide have argued that the distinction between killing and letting die is flawed and that there is no real difference between actively ending someone’s life and "merely" allowing them to die. This paper shows that, although this view is correct, there is even less of a distinction than is commonly acknowledged in the literature. It does so by suggesting a new perspective that more accurately reflects the moral features of end-of-life situations: if a patient is mentally competent and wants to die, his body itself constitutes unwarranted life support unfairly prolonging his or her mental life.

In 2006, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) published its ‘Ethical guidelines for Biomedical Research on human participants’. The intention was to translate international ethical standards into locally and culturally appropriate norms and values to help biomedical researchers in India to conduct ethical research and thereby safeguard the interest of human subjects. Unfortunately, it is apparent that the guideline is not fit for purpose. In addition to problems with the structure and clarity of the guidelines, there are several serious omissions and contradictions in the recommendations. In this paper, we take a close look at the two key chapters and highlight some of the striking flaws in this important document. We conclude that ethics committees and national authorities should not lose sight of international ethical standards while incorporating local reality and cultural and social values, as focusing too much on the local context could compromise the safety of human subjects in biomedical research, particularly in India

In 2011 the Swiss government published a report on homeopathy. This report was commissioned following a 2009 referendum in which Swiss people decided that homeopathy and other alternative therapies should be covered by private medical insurance; before implementing this decision, the government wanted to establish whether homeopathy actually works. In February 2012 the report was published in English and was immediately proclaimed by proponents of homeopathy to be conclusive proof that homeopathy is effective. This paper analyses the report and concludes that it is scientifically, logically and ethically flawed. Specifically, it contains no new evidence and misinterprets previously debunked studies; it creates a new standard of evidence in order to make homeopathy appear effective and attempts to discredit randomised controlled trials as the gold standard of evidence; and almost all the authors have conflicts of interest, despite their claim that none exist. If anything, the report proves that homeopaths are willing to distort the evidence in order to support their beliefs, and its authors appear to have violated the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences principles governing scientific integrity.

This special issue of the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry focuses on global health and associated bioethical concerns. As a concept, global health broadens the focus from national public health situations to the international sphere and concerns itself with the health of all humans, but particularly those in developing countries who suffer from severe health inequalities. However, there is one sense in which global health is lacking: Its primary focus is on those currently alive and, in some cases, their offspring. But what about future generations, who may suffer from even more pronounced inequalities? In this editorial, we consider the bioethical implications of failing to adopt an intergenerational concept of global health.One of the major strengths of global health is its emphasis on disenfranchised populations who do not enjoy the advantages of the medical systems of developed countries. By drawing attention to the issues that affect billions of disadvantaged people around the world ..

Current General Medical Council guidelines state that any doctor who does not wish to carry out a non-therapeutic circumcision (NTC) on a boy must invoke conscientious objection. This paper argues that this is illogical, as it is clear that an ethical doctor will object to conducting a clinically unnecessary operation on a child who cannot consent simply because of the parents’ religious beliefs. Comparison of the GMC guidelines with the more sensible British Medical Association guidance reveals that both are biased in favour of NTC and subvert standard consent procedures. It is further argued that any doctor who does participate in non-therapeutic circumcision of a minor may be guilty of negligence and in breach of the Human Rights Act. In fact, the GMC guidance implies that doctors must claim conscientious objection if they do not wish to be negligent. Both sets of guidelines should be changed to ensure an objective consent process and avoid confusion over the ethics of NTC.

Homeopathy has been the subject of intense academic, media and public debate in recent months. Those opposed to the practice, which treats like with like by using ultra-dilute remedies, argue that it is an ineffective non-treatment that is not supported by evidence and should not be funded on the National Health Service. Its proponents claim that it is effective (although they disagree about whether it is more effective than placebo) and argue its use is appropriate for certain conditions. This paper examines homeopathy from the perspective of the four principal principles of medical ethics and two example cases. It transpires that homeopathic practice is in contravention of all four of these principles, and is by its very nature unethical.

It is well known that prisoners’ human rights are often violated. In this chapter we examine whether guidelines can be effective in preventing such violations and in helping physicians resolve the significant conflicts of interest that they often face in trying to protect prisoners’ rights. We begin by explaining the role of clinical and ethical guidelines outside prisons, in the context of healthcare for non-incarcerated prisoners, and then the specific role of such guidelines within prisons, where the main concerns are ensuring respect for the principle of equivalence of care, and for a prisoner patient’s autonomy in health care decisions. After reviewing and analysing various national and international guidelines, we review the literature and assess whether the good practices set out in these guidelines actually translate into changes in professional behaviour and consequent benefits for prisoners. It emerges that physicians both outside and within prisons tend to be insufficiently familiar with the relevant guidelines, and that they too infrequently use the guidance to make decisions, preferring instead to use personal codes of conduct. Guidelines designed specifically for the prison context are important to ensure equivalence of care and should be better known by health care personnel and other professional groups working in prison. Further guidelines should be developed that describe challenging situations and provide concrete guidance as to how to deal with them.

Mandeville and colleagues describe a fascinating case where Facebook was used to warn potential contacts that their acquaintance had a communicable disease (Mandeville et al., 2013). They are correct that this case raises important issues about social media, confidentiality and the prevention of harm. However, they underestimate both the dangers of overcommunication via Wall and Timeline postings (and Twitter) and the potential utility of Facebook in cases like this one. Increased awareness of Facebook functionality will allow more accurate targeting of those at risk of infection, while also protecting the confidentiality of the index case

Several bioethical topics received a great deal of news coverage here in Scotland in 2009. Three important issues with transatlantic connections are the swine flu outbreak, which was handled very differently in Scotland, England and America; the US debate over healthcare reform, which drew the British NHS into the controversy; and the release to Libya of the Lockerbie bomber, which at first glance might not seem particularly bioethical, but which actually hinged on the very public discussion of the prisoner’s medical records. On a national level, there have been attempts in both Scotland and England to change the law on assisted suicide, where success looks more likely than ever. This paper will discuss each of these issues, and hopefully raise awareness of how these issues were dealt with in the UK and its component countries.

In two recent papers, Hugh McLachlan, Jacob Busch and Raffaele Rodogno have criticised my new perspective on euthanasia. Each paper analyses my argument and suggests two flaws. McLachlan identifies what he sees as important points regarding the justification of legal distinctions in the absence of corresponding moral differences and the professional role of the doctor. Busch and Rodogno target my criterion of brain life, arguing that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition and that it is not generalisable. In this paper I indicate flaws in all of these criticisms, and again suggest that my perspective does add something new to the debate.

It is highly probable that you have fallen victim to a spoiler at some point in your life. Perhaps you heard what the twist was in The Sixth Sensei before you saw it, or perhaps you have come across one of the now near-ubiquitous references in the media to Keyzer Soze, and thus had much of your enjoyment of The Usual Suspectsii ruined. Put simply, a spoiler is a piece of information that spoils your enjoyment of a film, usually by revealing a key plot detail. This paper argues that those working in the media and the public at large have an ethical obligation to avoid communicating spoilers if at all possible. Although this might seem like an unimportant moral issue (or not a moral issue at all) it transpires {SPOILER ALERT} that spoilers, particularly of the media variety, can have a significant cumulative antiutilitarian effect. This paper will feature less examples than is typical of a philosophical work, because the author wishes to avoid any spoilers.

IntroductionThis editorial introduces this special issue of the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry on global health by presenting an analysis of the ethical implications of the Glasgow effect, the curious phenomenon whereby inhabitants of Scotland’s largest city have substantially higher mortality rates than their counterparts in similar British cities, despite adjustment for factors such as socioeconomic status, obesity, smoking, drinking, and drug use. The Glasgow effect represents a health inequality that cannot currently be addressed, as its causes are as yet unidentified. As such, it raises several ethical issues. Parents may even have an ethical obligation to move their children away from Glasgow to prevent them being affected by the effect.The Glasgow effect is perhaps the most perplexing health inequality. It represents unfairness with an unknown cause and is composed of several different elements. The most basic fact is that socioeconomically disadvantaged people are worse of ..

This paper analyses the current organ donor card system in Switzerland and identifies five problems that may be partially responsible for the country’s low deceased organ donation rates. There are two minor issues concerning the process of obtaining a donor card: the Swisstransplant website understates the prospective benefits of donation, and the ease with which donor cards can be obtained raises questions regarding whether any consent to donation provided is truly informed. Furthermore, there are two major practical problems that might affect those who carry an organ donor card: the lack of a central donor registry increases the likelihood that donors’ wishes will be “lost”, and there is a high probability that family members will veto organ donation. The fact that these two practical problems are not mentioned to potential donors by Swisstransplant constitutes the fifth problem. Donation rates would probably improve if more accurate information about the benefits of donation was provided to potential donors, a central donor registry was created, and families were not permitted to veto donation from those on the registry.

Why devote an issue of an ethics journal to prison medicine? Why conduct ethics research in prisons in the first place? In this editorial, we explain why prison ethics research is vitally important and illustrate our argument by introducing and briefly discussing the fascinating papers in this special issue of the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry.Ethics is often regarded as a theoretical discipline. This is in large part due to ethics’ origin as a type of moral philosophy, which is frequently associated with armchair theorising about principles and virtues and seems to have little connection with the “real world.” However, medical ethics and bioethics are increasingly becoming empirical disciplines. The “empirical turn” in ethics has led to an explosion in field research in ethics that uses the empirical methods of sociology, anthropology, and the health sciences to investigate a variety of ethical issues. The results of such research are often of much more value than purely theoret.

Nanotechnology, which involves manipulation of matter on a ‘nano’ scale, is considered to be a key enabling technology. Medical applications of nanotechnology are expected to significantly improve disease diagnostic and therapeutic modalities and subsequently reduce health care costs. However, there is no consensus on the definition of nanotechnology or nanomedicine, and this stems from the underlying debate on defining ‘nano’. This paper aims to present the diversity in the definition of nanomedicine and its impact on the translation of basic science research in nanotechnology into clinical applications. We present the insights obtained from exploratory qualitative interviews with 46 stakeholders involved in translational nanomedicine from Europe and North America. The definition of nanomedicine has implications for many aspects of translational research including: fund allocation, patents, drug regulatory review processes and approvals, ethical review processes, clinical trials and public acceptance. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the field and common interest in developing effective clinical applications, it is important to have honest and transparent communication about nanomedicine, its benefits and potential harm. A clear and consistent definition of nanomedicine would significantly facilitate trust among various stakeholders including the general public while minimizing the risk of miscommunication and undue fear of nanotechnology and nanomedicine.

The GDC’s recent third edition (interim) of The First Five Years places renewed emphasis on the place of professionalism in the undergraduate dental curriculum. This paper provides a brief analysis of the concepts of ethics, professionalism and fitness to practice, and an examination of the GDC’s First Five Years and Standards for Dental Professionals guidance, as well as providing an insight into the innovative ethics strand of the BDS course at the University of Glasgow. It emerges that GDC guidance is flawed inasmuch as it advocates a virtue-based approach to ethics and professionalism, and fails to distinguish clearly between these two concepts.

Advance directives (ADs), which are also sometimes referred to as ‘living wills’, are statements made by a person that indicate what treatment she should not be given in the event that she is not competent to consent or refuse at the future moment in question. As such, ADs provide a way for patients to make decisions in advance about what treatments they do not want to receive, without doctors having to find proxy decision-makers or having recourse to the doctrine of necessity. While patients can request particular treatments in an AD, only refusals are binding. This paper will examine whether ADs safeguard the autonomy and best interests of the incompetent patient, and whether legislating for the use of ADs is justified, using the specific context of the legal situation in the United Kingdom to illustrate the debate. The issue of whether the law should permit ADs is itself dependent on the issue of whether ADs are ethically justified; thus we must answer a normative question in order to answer the legislative one. It emerges that ADs suffer from two major problems, one related to autonomy and one to consent. First, ADs’ emphasis on precedent autonomy effectively sentences some people who want to live to death. Second, many ADs might not meet the standard criteria for informed refusal of treatment, because they fail on the crucial criterion of sufficient information. Ultimately, it transpires that ADs are typically only appropriate for patients who temporarily lose physical or mental capacity

In the last year there has been a great deal of public debate about homeopathy. The House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology concluded in November that there is no evidence base for homeopathy, and agreed with some academic commentators that homeopathy should not be funded by the NHS.i ii While homeopathic doctors and hospitals are quite commonplace, some might be surprised to learn that there are also many homeopathic dentists practicing in the UK. This paper examines some of the claims made by homeopathic organisations regarding dentistry, and suggests that they may not be entirely ethical.

In their recent paper in this journal, Heinz and colleagues accuse proponents of cognitive enhancement of making two unjustified assumptions. The first of these is the assumption that neuroenhancing drugs will be safe; the second is that research into cognitive enhancement does not pose particular ethical problems. Heinz and colleagues argue that both these assumptions are false. Here, I argue that these assumptions are in fact correct, and that Heinz and colleagues themselves make several assumptions that undermine their argument. Neuroenhancement does raise several ethical concerns, but safety and research in this area pose no unique difficulties.

The annual UK potential donor audit captures families’ reasons for not consenting to donation of their deceased family members’ organs . Given that many families’ refusals and vetoes are based on false beliefs, cognitive bias and misunderstanding, it is incumbent upon doctors, nurses and transplant coordinators to invest sufficient time to facilitate informed consent or authorization. While such families are distressed, organ donation rates could be substantially improved if they were made aware of any mistaken beliefs, using recently suggested criteria for the ethical use of persuasion . This article examines some of the reasons for refusal of donation and suggests ways to help families make better decisions. It emerges that the use of persuasion is ethically essential in order to prevent families making decisions that they may come to regret.

Currently, any dentist in the UK who is HIV-seropositive must stop treating patients. This is despite the fact that hepatitis B-infected dentists with a low viral load can continue to practise, and the fact that HIV is 100 times less infectious than hepatitis B. Dentists are obliged to treat HIV-positive patients, but are obliged not to treat any patients if they themselves are HIV-positive. Furthermore, prospective dental students are now screened for hepatitis B and C and HIV, and are not allowed to enrol on Bachelor of Dental Surgery degrees if they are infectious carriers of these diseases. This paper will argue that: (i) the current restriction on HIV-positive dentists is unethical, and unfair; (ii) dentists are more likely to contract HIV from patients than vice versa, and this is not reflected by the current system; (iii) the screening of dental students for HIV is also unethical; (iv) the fact that dentists can continue to practise despite hepatitis B infection, but infected prospective students are denied matriculation, is unethical; and (v) that the current Department of Health protocols, as well as being intrinsically unfair, have further unethical effects, such as the waste of valuable resources on ‘lookback’ exercises and the even more damaging loss of present and future dentists. Regulation in this area seems to have been driven by institutional fear of public fear of infection, rather than any scientific evidence or ethical reasoning.

Homeopathic medicine is based on the two principles that “like cures like” and that the potency of substances increases in proportion to their dilution. In November 2009 the UK Parliament’s Science and Technology Committee heard evidence on homeopathy, with several witnesses arguing that homeopathic practice is “unethical, unreliable, and pointless”. Although this increasing scepticism about the merits of homeopathy is to be welcomed, the unethical effects of funding homeopathy on the NHS are even further-reaching than has been acknowledged.

The publish-or-perish paradigm is a prevailing facet of science. We apply game theory to show that, under rather weak assumptions, this publication scenario takes the form of a prisoner’s dilemma, which constitutes a substantial obstacle to beneficial delayed publication of more complete results. One way of avoiding this obstacle while allowing researchers to establish priority of discoveries would be an updated “pli cacheté”, a sealed envelope concept from the 1700s. We describe institutional rules that could additionally favour high-quality work and publications and provide examples of such policies that are already in place. Our analysis should be extended to other publication scenarios and the role of other stakeholders such as scientific journals or sponsors.

Emerging biotechnology may soon allow the creation of genetically human organs inside animals, with non-human primates and pigs being the best candidate species. This prospect raises the question of whether creating organs in primates in order to then transplant them into humans would be more acceptable than using them for research. In this paper, we examine the validity of the purported moral distinction between primates and other animals, and analyze the ethical acceptability of using primates to create organs for human use.