David M. Shaw

Institutional review boards (IRBs) have a reputation for impeding research. This reputation is understandable inasmuch as many studies are poorly designed, exploit participants, or do not ask a relevant question , and it is entirely proper that IRBs should reject such proposals. However, IRBs also frequently reject or tamper with perfectly sound and relevant studies in the name of protecting participants from harm, in accordance with the widely accepted message that “clinical research is justified only when participants are protected from excessive risks”. Here, I argue that IRBs should never reject a study because it poses too high a risk to participants, and that their role should be confined to ensuring that risks and any potential benefits are fully explained to potential participants. Everyone should have the right to participate in research without paternalistic decisions about risk being made on their behalf.

This special issue of the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry focuses on global health and associated bioethical concerns. As a concept, global health broadens the focus from national public health situations to the international sphere and concerns itself with the health of all humans, but particularly those in developing countries who suffer from severe health inequalities. However, there is one sense in which global health is lacking: Its primary focus is on those currently alive and, in some cases, their offspring. But what about future generations, who may suffer from even more pronounced inequalities? In this editorial, we consider the bioethical implications of failing to adopt an intergenerational concept of global health.One of the major strengths of global health is its emphasis on disenfranchised populations who do not enjoy the advantages of the medical systems of developed countries. By drawing attention to the issues that affect billions of disadvantaged people around the world ..

One of the most fascinating issues in the emerging field of neuroethics is pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement (CE). The three main ethical concerns around CE were identified in a Nature commentary in 2008 as safety, coercion and fairness; debate has largely focused on the potential to help those who are cognitively disabled, and on the issue of “cosmetic neurology”, where people enhance not because of a medical need, but because they want to (as many as 25% of American students already use nootropic cognitive enhancers such as ritalin). However, the potential for CE to improve public health has been neglected. This paper examines the prospect of improving health outcomes through cognitive enhancement among sections of the population where health inequalities are particularly pronounced. I term this enhancement of the public's health through CE “neuroenhancing health”. It holds great promise, but raises several ethical issues. This paper provides an outline of these issues and related philosophical problems. These include the potential effectiveness of CE in reducing health inequalities; issues concerning autonomy and free will; whether moral enhancement might be more effective than cognitive enhancement in reducing health inequalities; and the problem of how to provide such CE, including the issue of whether to provide targeted and universal coverage.

Current General Medical Council guidelines state that any doctor who does not wish to carry out a non-therapeutic circumcision (NTC) on a boy must invoke conscientious objection. This paper argues that this is illogical, as it is clear that an ethical doctor will object to conducting a clinically unnecessary operation on a child who cannot consent simply because of the parents’ religious beliefs. Comparison of the GMC guidelines with the more sensible British Medical Association guidance reveals that both are biased in favour of NTC and subvert standard consent procedures. It is further argued that any doctor who does participate in non-therapeutic circumcision of a minor may be guilty of negligence and in breach of the Human Rights Act. In fact, the GMC guidance implies that doctors must claim conscientious objection if they do not wish to be negligent. Both sets of guidelines should be changed to ensure an objective consent process and avoid confusion over the ethics of NTC.

Almost all academics sigh at any mention of the REF. Preparing submissions for the Research Excellence Framework takes up a lot of effort, but is important because the REF determines a department's funding allocation from a finite pot of cash. As such, it is seen as a necessary evil by most staff. However, the REF poses ethical problems in addition to the stress it causes. As it stands, the REF is exacerbating a schism between research and teaching staff, encouraging deceptive attribution of authorship, and failing to give due credit (and cash) to deserving research. As such, the REF needs some serious refereeing.

Oncologists frequently have to break bad news to patients. Although they are not normally the ones who tell patients that they have cancer, they are the ones who have to tell patients that treatment is not working, and they are almost always the ones who have to tell them that they are going to die and that nothing more can be done to cure them. Perhaps the most difficult cases are those where further treatment is almost certainly futile, but there remains an extremely slim chance of yet more aggressive treatment having a near-miraculous effect. In such situations, it can be difficult for the oncologist to decide how to explain things to the patient, and how much to tell them. It can also be very difficult to achieve the correct balance between respecting the patient’s autonomy and not exposing them to harm. This paper examines an example of one such case and makes three suggestions. First, that respecting autonomy cannot be achieved by maximising information-sharing only to deny patients the chance to make decisions based on that information; second, that the simplistic application of the principles of nonmaleficence and respect for autonomy can lead to erroneous conclusions about the most ethical course of action; and third, that there is an extra reason, in addition to respecting patients’ autonomy, for attempting near-futile last-ditch interventions: when treating rare conditions, useful evidence can be generated that will benefit future patients.