-
49Why a modular approach to reason?Mind and Language 33 (5): 533-541. 2018.In their reviews, Chater and Oaksford, Dutilh Novaes, and Sterelny are critical of our modularist approach to reason. In this response, we clarify our claim that reason is one of many cognitive modules that produce intuitive inferences each in its domain; the reason module producing intuitions about reasons. We argue that in‐principle objections to the idea of massive modularity based on Fodor's peculiar approach are not effective against other interpretations that have led to insightful uses of…Read more
-
2111. Why Is Reasoning Biased?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 205-221. 2017.
-
55The Enigma of Reason (edited book)Harvard University Press. 2017.Reason, we are told, is what makes us human, the source of our knowledge and wisdom. If reason is so useful, why didn't it also evolve in other animals? If reason is that reliable, why do we produce so much thoroughly reasoned nonsense? In their groundbreaking account of the evolution and workings of reason, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber set out to solve this double enigma. Reason, they argue with a compelling mix of real-life and experimental evidence, is not geared to solitary use, to arriving …Read more
-
313. The Dark Side of ReasonIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 237-250. 2017.
-
815. The Bright Side of ReasonIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 262-274. 2017.
-
518. Solitary Geniuses?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 315-327. 2017.
-
810. Reason: What Is It For?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 175-202. 2017.
-
64. ModularityIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 68-75. 2017.
-
6Introduction: A Double EnigmaIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 1-12. 2017.
-
5Illustration CreditsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 385-386. 2017.
-
103. From Unconscious Inferences to IntuitionsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 51-67. 2017.
-
5FrontmatterIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. 2017.
-
128. Could Reason Be a Module?In Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 128-147. 2017.
-
6Conclusion: In Praise of Reason after AllIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 328-336. 2017.
-
75. Cognitive OpportunismIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 76-89. 2017.
-
21ContentsIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. 2017.
-
1014. A Reason for EverythingIn Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.), The Enigma of Reason, Harvard University Press. pp. 251-261. 2017.
-
4Conference on evolution and the human sciencesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (4): 699-700. 1991.
-
223Relevance: Communication and CognitionBlackwell. 1986/1995.This revised edition includes a new Preface outlining developments in Relevance Theory since 1986, discussing the more serious criticisms of the theory, and ...
-
17A Forward Bias in Human Profile‐Oriented PortraitsCognitive Science 44 (6). 2020.The spatial composition of human portraits obeys historically changing cultural norms. We show that it is also affected by cognitive factors that cause greater spontaneous attention to what is in front rather in the back of an agent. Scenes with more space in front of a directed object are both more often produced and judged as more aesthetically pleasant. This leads to the prediction that, in profile‐oriented human portraits, compositions with more space in front of depicted agents (a “forward …Read more
-
27¿Porqué razonan los humanos?Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época 15. 2019.Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability…Read more
-
29Instincts or gadgets? Not the debate we should be havingBehavioral and Brain Sciences 42. 2019.I argue, with examples, that most human cognitive skills are neither instincts nor gadgets but mechanisms shaped both by evolved dispositions and by cultural inputs. This shaping can work either through evolved skills fulfilling their function with the help of cultural skills that they contribute to shape, or through cultural skills recruiting evolved skills and adjusting to them.
-
PragmaticsIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. 2005.
-
52The role of attraction in cultural evolutionJournal of Cognition and Culture 7 (1-2): 89-111. 2007.Henrich and Boyd (2002) were the first to propose a formal model of the role of attraction in cultural evolution. They came to the surprising conclusion that, when both attraction and selection are at work, final outcomes are determined by selection alone. This result is based on a deterministic view of cultural attraction, different from the probabilistic view introduced in Sperber (1996). We defend this probabilistic view, show how to model it, and argue that, when both attraction and selectio…Read more
-
35Truthfulness and Relevance in Telling The TimeMind and Language 17 (5): 457-466. 2002.Someone asked ‘What time is it?’ when her watch reads 3:08 is likely to answer ‘It is 3:10.’ We argue that a fundamental factor that explains such rounding is a psychological disposition to give an answer that, while not necessarily strictly truthful or accurate, is an optimally relevant one (in the sense of relevance theory) i.e. an answer from which hearers can derive the consequences they care about with minimal effort. A rounded answer is easier to process and may carry the same consequences…Read more
-
10IX*—Loose TalkProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1): 153-172. 1986.Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson; IX*—Loose Talk, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 153–172, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.