Edward Zalta

The author engages a question raised about theories of nonexistent objects. The question concerns the way names of fictional characters, when analyzed as names which denote nonexistent objects, acquire their denotations. Since nonexistent objects cannot causally interact with existent objects, it is thought that we cannot appeal to a `dubbing' or a `baptism'. The question is, therefore, what is the starting point of the chain? The answer is that storytellings are to be thought of as extended baptisms, and the details of this response receive attention in the paper. Once the storytelling is complete, and the characters have been baptized, a priori metaphysical principles linking the storytelling with the realm of nonexistent objects provide the referential, non-causal connection between the names used in the storytelling and the objects denoted by such names. [This is the original English version of an article that first appeared in German translation, translated into German by Arnold Günther and published in the Zeitschrift für Semiotik 9/1-2 (1987): 85-95. The version that appears here is, for the most part, unaltered.].

The fundamental principle of the theory of possible worlds is that a proposition p is possible if and only if there is a possible world at which p is true. In this paper we present a valid derivation of this principle from a more general theory in which possible worlds are defined rather than taken as primitive. The general theory uses a primitive modality and axiomatizes abstract objects, properties, and propositions. We then show that this general theory has very small models and hence that its ontological commitments—and, therefore, those of the fundamental principle of world theory—are minimal

In this paper I propose a fundamental modification of standard type theory, produce a new kind of type theoretic language, and couch in this language a comprehensive theory of abstract individuals and abstract properties and relations of every type. I then suggest how to employ the theory to solve the four following philosophical problems: the identification and ontological status of Frege's Senses; the deviant behavior of terms in propositional attitude contexts; the non-identity of necessarily equivalent propositions, and the paradox of analysis. We can roughly describe these solutions as follows: the senses of English names and descriptions which denote individuals will be modelled as abstract individuals; the senses of English relation denoting expressions of a given type will be modelled as abstract relations of that type. Inside de dicto attitude contexts, these English expressions denote their senses. Relations and propositions will not be identified with their extensions, nor with functions or sets of any kind. They will be taken as primitive, and precise being and identity conditions will be proposed consistent with the view that necessarily equivalent relations and propositions may be distinct. With the modelling described in, the expressions being a brother and being a male sibling may both denote the same property, though their senses may differ. Just as Frege predicts, being a brother just is being a male sibling is an informative identity statement because the terms flanking the identity sign have the same denotation, though distinct senses

In this book, Zalta attempts to lay the axiomatic foundations of metaphysics by developing and applying a (formal) theory of abstract objects. The cornerstones include a principle which presents precise conditions under which there are abstract objects and a principle which says when apparently distinct such objects are in fact identical. The principles are constructed out of a basic set of primitive notions, which are identified at the end of the Introduction, just before the theorizing begins. The main reason for producing a theory which defines a logical space of abstract objects is that it may have a great deal of explanatory power. It is hoped that the data explained by means of the theory will be of interest to pure and applied metaphysicians, logicians and linguists, and pure and applied epistemologists.

In (1991), Meinwald initiated a major change of direction in the study of Plato’s Parmenides and the Third Man Argument. On her conception of the Parmenides , Plato’s language systematically distinguishes two types or kinds of predication, namely, predications of the kind ‘x is F pros ta alla’ and ‘x is F pros heauto’. Intuitively speaking, the former is the common, everyday variety of predication, which holds when x is any object (perceptible object or Form) and F is a property which x exemplifies or instantiates in the traditional sense. The latter is a special mode of predication which holds when x is a Form and F is a property which is, in some sense, part of the nature of that Form. Meinwald (1991, p. 75, footnote 18) traces the discovery of this distinction in Plato’s work to Frede (1967), who marks the distinction between pros allo and kath’ hauto predications by placing subscripts on the copula ‘is’.

In this book, Dennett determines just how far we can push the idea that mental states are distinguished by intentionality, that is, by the fact that they have content in virtue of being about, or directed towards, the world at large. Intentionality is characteristic of such states as belief and desire, since all belief is belief of something or that something be the case. In contrast to the physical stance and the design stance, the intentional stance is the predictive attitude or strategy philosophers or cognitive scientists adopt when, in order to explain the behavior of a sufficiently complex system, they treat it as if it had beliefs and desires and acted rationally on its beliefs to satisfy its desires. Dennett insists that this stance is essentially a heuristic that informs the formation of scientific theories which are void of mental state terms. For Dennett, the interesting question, whether we are considering mechanical systems, computer systems, enzymes, microorganisms, vervet monkeys, humans, or martians, is just how far should we go in employing the intentional strategy? At what point must we abandon a strict realism about beliefs, desires, and the other concepts of folk psychology?