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188A comparison of two intensional logicsLinguistics and Philosophy 11 (1): 59-89. 1988.The author examines the differences between the general intensional logic defined in his recent book and Montague's intensional logic. Whereas Montague assigned extensions and intensions to expressions (and employed set theory to construct these values as certain sets), the author assigns denotations to terms and relies upon an axiomatic theory of intensional entities that covers properties, relations, propositions, worlds, and other abstract objects. It is then shown that the puzzles for Montag…Read more
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43Philosophy and the world wide webAmerican Philosophical Association Newsletter on Computer Use in Philosophy 94 (2): 29-33. 1995.In this note, I plan to describe some of the procedures I followed in creating the World Wide Web site for the Metaphysics Research Lab at CSLI. Its URL (Uniform Resource Locator) is.
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234The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy: A developed dynamic reference workIn James H. Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: the intersection of philosophy and computing, Blackwell. pp. 210-228. 2002.In this entry, the authors outline the goals of a "dynamic reference work", and explain how the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has been designed to achieve those goals.
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101Mally's Determinates and Husserl's NoemataIn Alexander Hieke (ed.), Ernst Mally - Versuch einer Neubewertung, Academia Verlag. 1998.In this paper, the author compares passages from two philosophically important texts and concludes that they have fundamental ideas in common. What makes this comparison and conclusion interesting is that the texts come from two different traditions in philosophy, the analytic and the phenomenological. In 1912, Ernst Mally published *Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik*, an analytic work containing a combination of formal logic and metaphysics. In 1913, Edmund Husserl pu…Read more
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380Worlds and Propositions Set FreeErkenntnis 79 (4). 2014.The authors provide an object-theoretic analysis of two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan. After laying out the paradoxes, the authors provide a brief overview of object theory and point out how syntactic restrictions that prevent object-theoretic versions of the classical paradoxes are justified philosophically. The authors then trace the origins of the Russell paradox to a problematic application of set theory in the definition of worl…Read more
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283Frege's logic, theorem, and foundations for arithmeticStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.In this entry, Frege's logic is introduced and described in some detail. It is shown how the Dedekind-Peano axioms for number theory can be derived from a consistent fragment of Frege's logic, with Hume's Principle replacing Basic Law V.
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450A (leibnizian) theory of conceptsHistory of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 3 (1): 137-183. 2000.In this paper, the author develops a theory of concepts and shows that it captures many of the ideas about concepts that Leibniz expressed in his work. Concepts are first analyzed in terms of a precise background theory of abstract objects, and once concept summation and concept containment are defined, the axioms and theorems of Leibniz's calculus of concepts (in his logical papers) are derived. This analysis of concepts is then seamlessly connected with Leibniz's modal metaphysics of complete …Read more
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306Twenty-five basic theorems in situation and world theoryJournal of Philosophical Logic 22 (4): 385-428. 1993.The foregoing set of theorems forms an effective foundation for the theory of situations and worlds. All twenty-five theorems seem to be basic, reasonable principles that structure the domains of properties, relations, states of affairs, situations, and worlds in true and philosophically interesting ways. They resolve 15 of the 19 choice points defined in Barwise (1989) (see Notes 22, 27, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39, 43, and 45). Moreover, important axioms and principles stipulated by situation theorists…Read more
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2942On the logic of the ontological argumentPhilosophical Perspectives 5 509-529. 1991.In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm's ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm's use of the definite description "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence "there is an x such that..." does not imply "x exists". Then, using an ordin…Read more
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187On mally’S alleged heresy:A replyHistory and Philosophy of Logic 13 (1): 59-68. 1992.In this paper, I respond to D. Jacquette's paper, "Mally's Heresy and the Logic of Meinong's Object Theory" (History and Philosophy of Logic, 10 (1989): 1-14), in which it is claimed that Ernst Mally's distinction between two modes of predication, as it is employed in the theory of abstract objects, is reducible to, and analyzable in terms of, a single mode of predication plus the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. The argument against Jacquette's claims consists of counte…Read more
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227The road between pretense theory and abstract object theoryIn T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence, Csli Publications. 2000.In its approach to fiction and fictional discourse, pretense theory focuses on the behaviors that we engage in once we pretend that something is true. These may include pretending to name, pretending to refer, pretending to admire, and various other kinds of make-believe. Ordinary discourse about fictions is analyzed as a kind of institutionalized manner of speaking. Pretense, make-believe, and manners of speaking are all accepted as complex patterns of behavior that prove to be systematic in va…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Mathematics |
| Formal Philosophy |
| Computational Philosophy |