Edward Zalta

In this book, Zalta attempts to lay the axiomatic foundations of metaphysics by developing and applying a (formal) theory of abstract objects. The cornerstones include a principle which presents precise conditions under which there are abstract objects and a principle which says when apparently distinct such objects are in fact identical. The principles are constructed out of a basic set of primitive notions, which are identified at the end of the Introduction, just before the theorizing begins. The main reason for producing a theory which defines a logical space of abstract objects is that it may have a great deal of explanatory power. It is hoped that the data explained by means of the theory will be of interest to pure and applied metaphysicians, logicians and linguists, and pure and applied epistemologists.

In this book, Dennett determines just how far we can push the idea that mental states are distinguished by intentionality, that is, by the fact that they have content in virtue of being about, or directed towards, the world at large. Intentionality is characteristic of such states as belief and desire, since all belief is belief of something or that something be the case. In contrast to the physical stance and the design stance, the intentional stance is the predictive attitude or strategy philosophers or cognitive scientists adopt when, in order to explain the behavior of a sufficiently complex system, they treat it as if it had beliefs and desires and acted rationally on its beliefs to satisfy its desires. Dennett insists that this stance is essentially a heuristic that informs the formation of scientific theories which are void of mental state terms. For Dennett, the interesting question, whether we are considering mechanical systems, computer systems, enzymes, microorganisms, vervet monkeys, humans, or martians, is just how far should we go in employing the intentional strategy? At what point must we abandon a strict realism about beliefs, desires, and the other concepts of folk psychology?

In (1991), Meinwald initiated a major change of direction in the study of Plato’s Parmenides and the Third Man Argument. On her conception of the Parmenides , Plato’s language systematically distinguishes two types or kinds of predication, namely, predications of the kind ‘x is F pros ta alla’ and ‘x is F pros heauto’. Intuitively speaking, the former is the common, everyday variety of predication, which holds when x is any object (perceptible object or Form) and F is a property which x exemplifies or instantiates in the traditional sense. The latter is a special mode of predication which holds when x is a Form and F is a property which is, in some sense, part of the nature of that Form. Meinwald (1991, p. 75, footnote 18) traces the discovery of this distinction in Plato’s work to Frede (1967), who marks the distinction between pros allo and kath’ hauto predications by placing subscripts on the copula ‘is’.

In this paper, the author responds to D. Jacquette's paper, "Mally's Heresy and the Logic of Meinong's Object Theory'' (History and Philosophy of Logic, 10, 1989, 1-14), in which it is claimed that Ernst Mally's distinction between two modes of predication, as it is employed in the theory of abstract objects, is reducible to, and analyzable in terms of, a single mode of predication plus the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. The argument against Jacquette's claims consists of counterexamples to his reductions and analyses. Reasons are offered for thinking that no such reduction/analysis of the kind Jacquette proposes could be successful.

This paper introduces a new method of interpreting complex relation terms in a second-order quantified modal language. We develop a completely general second-order modal language with two kinds of complex terms: one kind for denoting individuals and one kind for denoting n-place relations. Several issues arise in connection with previous, algebraic methods for interpreting the relation terms. The new method of interpreting these terms described here addresses those issues while establishing an interesting connection between λ and ε calculi. The resulting semantics provides a precise understanding of the theory of relations.